blob: 4989f4f37c6b68ef698d08a6c1b193c50a1dfb31 [file] [log] [blame] [raw]
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <malloc.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <syslog.h>
#if HAVE_SELINUX
#include <selinux/avc.h>
#include <selinux/context.h>
#include <selinux/label.h>
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#endif
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "errno-util.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "macro.h"
#include "path-util.h"
#include "selinux-util.h"
#include "stdio-util.h"
#include "time-util.h"
#if HAVE_SELINUX
DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(context_t, context_free);
#define _cleanup_context_free_ _cleanup_(context_freep)
static int mac_selinux_reload(int seqno);
static int cached_use = -1;
static bool initialized = false;
static int (*enforcing_status_func)(void) = security_getenforce;
static int last_policyload = 0;
static struct selabel_handle *label_hnd = NULL;
#define log_enforcing(...) \
log_full(mac_selinux_enforcing() ? LOG_ERR : LOG_WARNING, __VA_ARGS__)
#define log_enforcing_errno(error, ...) \
({ \
bool _enforcing = mac_selinux_enforcing(); \
int _level = _enforcing ? LOG_ERR : LOG_WARNING; \
int _e = (error); \
\
int _r = (log_get_max_level() >= LOG_PRI(_level)) \
? log_internal_realm(_level, _e, PROJECT_FILE, __LINE__, __func__, __VA_ARGS__) \
: -ERRNO_VALUE(_e); \
_enforcing ? _r : 0; \
})
#endif
bool mac_selinux_use(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (_unlikely_(cached_use < 0)) {
cached_use = is_selinux_enabled() > 0;
log_debug("SELinux enabled state cached to: %s", cached_use ? "enabled" : "disabled");
}
return cached_use;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
bool mac_selinux_enforcing(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
return enforcing_status_func() != 0;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
void mac_selinux_retest(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
cached_use = -1;
#endif
}
#if HAVE_SELINUX
# if HAVE_MALLINFO
static struct mallinfo mallinfo_nowarn(void) {
/* glibc has deprecated mallinfo(), but the replacement malloc_info() returns an XML blob ;=[ */
DISABLE_WARNING_DEPRECATED_DECLARATIONS
return mallinfo();
REENABLE_WARNING
}
# else
# warning "mallinfo() is missing, add mallinfo2() supported instead."
# endif
static int open_label_db(void) {
struct selabel_handle *hnd;
usec_t before_timestamp, after_timestamp;
char timespan[FORMAT_TIMESPAN_MAX];
# if HAVE_MALLINFO
struct mallinfo before_mallinfo = mallinfo_nowarn();
# endif
before_timestamp = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
hnd = selabel_open(SELABEL_CTX_FILE, NULL, 0);
if (!hnd)
return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to initialize SELinux labeling handle: %m");
after_timestamp = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
# if HAVE_MALLINFO
struct mallinfo after_mallinfo = mallinfo_nowarn();
int l = after_mallinfo.uordblks > before_mallinfo.uordblks ? after_mallinfo.uordblks - before_mallinfo.uordblks : 0;
log_debug("Successfully loaded SELinux database in %s, size on heap is %iK.",
format_timespan(timespan, sizeof(timespan), after_timestamp - before_timestamp, 0),
DIV_ROUND_UP(l, 1024));
# else
log_debug("Successfully loaded SELinux database in %s.",
format_timespan(timespan, sizeof(timespan), after_timestamp - before_timestamp, 0));
# endif
/* release memory after measurement */
if (label_hnd)
selabel_close(label_hnd);
label_hnd = TAKE_PTR(hnd);
return 0;
}
#endif
int mac_selinux_init(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
int r;
bool have_status_page = false;
if (initialized)
return 0;
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return 0;
r = selinux_status_open(/* netlink fallback */ 1);
if (r < 0) {
if (!ERRNO_IS_PRIVILEGE(errno))
return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to open SELinux status page: %m");
log_warning_errno(errno, "selinux_status_open() with netlink fallback failed, not checking for policy reloads: %m");
} else if (r == 1)
log_warning("selinux_status_open() failed to open the status page, using the netlink fallback.");
else
have_status_page = true;
r = open_label_db();
if (r < 0) {
selinux_status_close();
return r;
}
/* Save the current policyload sequence number, so mac_selinux_maybe_reload() does not trigger on
* first call without any actual change. */
last_policyload = selinux_status_policyload();
if (have_status_page)
/* Now that the SELinux status page has been successfully opened, retrieve the enforcing
* status over it (to avoid system calls in security_getenforce()). */
enforcing_status_func = selinux_status_getenforce;
initialized = true;
#endif
return 0;
}
void mac_selinux_maybe_reload(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
int r;
if (!initialized)
return;
r = selinux_status_updated();
if (r < 0)
log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to update SELinux from status page: %m");
if (r > 0) {
int policyload;
log_debug("SELinux status page update");
/* from libselinux > 3.1 callbacks gets automatically called, see
https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux/commit/05bdc03130d741e53e1fb45a958d0a2c184be503 */
/* only reload on policy changes, not enforcing status changes */
policyload = selinux_status_policyload();
if (policyload != last_policyload) {
mac_selinux_reload(policyload);
last_policyload = policyload;
}
}
#endif
}
void mac_selinux_finish(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (label_hnd) {
selabel_close(label_hnd);
label_hnd = NULL;
}
enforcing_status_func = security_getenforce;
selinux_status_close();
initialized = false;
#endif
}
#if HAVE_SELINUX
static int mac_selinux_reload(int seqno) {
log_debug("SELinux reload %d", seqno);
(void) open_label_db();
return 0;
}
#endif
int mac_selinux_fix_container(const char *path, const char *inside_path, LabelFixFlags flags) {
assert(path);
assert(inside_path);
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_close_ int fd = -1;
/* if mac_selinux_init() wasn't called before we are a NOOP */
if (!label_hnd)
return 0;
/* Open the file as O_PATH, to pin it while we determine and adjust the label */
fd = open(path, O_NOFOLLOW|O_CLOEXEC|O_PATH);
if (fd < 0) {
if ((flags & LABEL_IGNORE_ENOENT) && errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
return -errno;
}
return mac_selinux_fix_container_fd(fd, path, inside_path, flags);
#endif
return 0;
}
int mac_selinux_fix_container_fd(int fd, const char *path, const char *inside_path, LabelFixFlags flags) {
assert(fd >= 0);
assert(inside_path);
#if HAVE_SELINUX
char procfs_path[STRLEN("/proc/self/fd/") + DECIMAL_STR_MAX(int)];
_cleanup_freecon_ char* fcon = NULL;
struct stat st;
int r;
/* if mac_selinux_init() wasn't called before we are a NOOP */
if (!label_hnd)
return 0;
if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0)
return -errno;
/* Check for policy reload so 'label_hnd' is kept up-to-date by callbacks */
mac_selinux_maybe_reload();
if (selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, inside_path, st.st_mode) < 0) {
/* If there's no label to set, then exit without warning */
if (errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
r = -errno;
goto fail;
}
xsprintf(procfs_path, "/proc/self/fd/%i", fd);
if (setfilecon_raw(procfs_path, fcon) < 0) {
_cleanup_freecon_ char *oldcon = NULL;
/* If the FS doesn't support labels, then exit without warning */
if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(errno))
return 0;
/* It the FS is read-only and we were told to ignore failures caused by that, suppress error */
if (errno == EROFS && (flags & LABEL_IGNORE_EROFS))
return 0;
r = -errno;
/* If the old label is identical to the new one, suppress any kind of error */
if (getfilecon_raw(procfs_path, &oldcon) >= 0 && streq(fcon, oldcon))
return 0;
goto fail;
}
return 0;
fail:
return log_enforcing_errno(r, "Unable to fix SELinux security context of %s (%s): %m", strna(path), strna(inside_path));
#endif
return 0;
}
int mac_selinux_apply(const char *path, const char *label) {
assert(path);
#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return 0;
assert(label);
if (setfilecon(path, label) < 0)
return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s on path %s: %m", label, path);
#endif
return 0;
}
int mac_selinux_apply_fd(int fd, const char *path, const char *label) {
assert(fd >= 0);
#if HAVE_SELINUX
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return 0;
assert(label);
if (fsetfilecon(fd, label) < 0)
return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s on path %s: %m", label, strna(path));
#endif
return 0;
}
int mac_selinux_get_create_label_from_exe(const char *exe, char **label) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_freecon_ char *mycon = NULL, *fcon = NULL;
security_class_t sclass;
int r;
assert(exe);
assert(label);
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
r = getcon_raw(&mycon);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
r = getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
sclass = string_to_security_class("process");
if (sclass == 0)
return -ENOSYS;
r = security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, label);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_get_our_label(char **label) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
int r;
assert(label);
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
r = getcon_raw(label);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_get_child_mls_label(int socket_fd, const char *exe, const char *exec_label, char **label) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_freecon_ char *mycon = NULL, *peercon = NULL, *fcon = NULL;
_cleanup_context_free_ context_t pcon = NULL, bcon = NULL;
security_class_t sclass;
const char *range = NULL;
int r;
assert(socket_fd >= 0);
assert(exe);
assert(label);
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
r = getcon_raw(&mycon);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
r = getpeercon_raw(socket_fd, &peercon);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
if (!exec_label) {
/* If there is no context set for next exec let's use context
of target executable */
r = getfilecon_raw(exe, &fcon);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
}
bcon = context_new(mycon);
if (!bcon)
return -ENOMEM;
pcon = context_new(peercon);
if (!pcon)
return -ENOMEM;
range = context_range_get(pcon);
if (!range)
return -errno;
r = context_range_set(bcon, range);
if (r)
return -errno;
freecon(mycon);
mycon = strdup(context_str(bcon));
if (!mycon)
return -ENOMEM;
sclass = string_to_security_class("process");
if (sclass == 0)
return -ENOSYS;
r = security_compute_create_raw(mycon, fcon, sclass, label);
if (r < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
#else
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
#endif
}
char* mac_selinux_free(char *label) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
freecon(label);
#else
assert(!label);
#endif
return NULL;
}
#if HAVE_SELINUX
static int selinux_create_file_prepare_abspath(const char *abspath, mode_t mode) {
_cleanup_freecon_ char *filecon = NULL;
int r;
assert(abspath);
assert(path_is_absolute(abspath));
/* Check for policy reload so 'label_hnd' is kept up-to-date by callbacks */
mac_selinux_maybe_reload();
r = selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &filecon, abspath, mode);
if (r < 0) {
/* No context specified by the policy? Proceed without setting it. */
if (errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to determine SELinux security context for %s: %m", abspath);
}
if (setfscreatecon_raw(filecon) < 0)
return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s for %s: %m", filecon, abspath);
return 0;
}
#endif
int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare_at(int dirfd, const char *path, mode_t mode) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_free_ char *abspath = NULL;
int r;
assert(path);
if (!label_hnd)
return 0;
if (!path_is_absolute(path)) {
_cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL;
if (dirfd == AT_FDCWD)
r = safe_getcwd(&p);
else
r = fd_get_path(dirfd, &p);
if (r < 0)
return r;
path = abspath = path_join(p, path);
if (!path)
return -ENOMEM;
}
return selinux_create_file_prepare_abspath(path, mode);
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(const char *path, mode_t mode) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
int r;
_cleanup_free_ char *abspath = NULL;
assert(path);
if (!label_hnd)
return 0;
r = path_make_absolute_cwd(path, &abspath);
if (r < 0)
return r;
return selinux_create_file_prepare_abspath(abspath, mode);
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
void mac_selinux_create_file_clear(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
PROTECT_ERRNO;
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return;
setfscreatecon_raw(NULL);
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_create_socket_prepare(const char *label) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
assert(label);
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return 0;
if (setsockcreatecon(label) < 0)
return log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s for sockets: %m", label);
#endif
return 0;
}
void mac_selinux_create_socket_clear(void) {
#if HAVE_SELINUX
PROTECT_ERRNO;
if (!mac_selinux_use())
return;
setsockcreatecon_raw(NULL);
#endif
}
int mac_selinux_bind(int fd, const struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) {
/* Binds a socket and label its file system object according to the SELinux policy */
#if HAVE_SELINUX
_cleanup_freecon_ char *fcon = NULL;
const struct sockaddr_un *un;
bool context_changed = false;
char *path;
int r;
assert(fd >= 0);
assert(addr);
assert(addrlen >= sizeof(sa_family_t));
if (!label_hnd)
goto skipped;
/* Filter out non-local sockets */
if (addr->sa_family != AF_UNIX)
goto skipped;
/* Filter out anonymous sockets */
if (addrlen < offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + 1)
goto skipped;
/* Filter out abstract namespace sockets */
un = (const struct sockaddr_un*) addr;
if (un->sun_path[0] == 0)
goto skipped;
path = strndupa(un->sun_path, addrlen - offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path));
/* Check for policy reload so 'label_hnd' is kept up-to-date by callbacks */
mac_selinux_maybe_reload();
if (path_is_absolute(path))
r = selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, path, S_IFSOCK);
else {
_cleanup_free_ char *newpath = NULL;
r = path_make_absolute_cwd(path, &newpath);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = selabel_lookup_raw(label_hnd, &fcon, newpath, S_IFSOCK);
}
if (r < 0) {
/* No context specified by the policy? Proceed without setting it */
if (errno == ENOENT)
goto skipped;
r = log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to determine SELinux security context for %s: %m", path);
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else {
if (setfscreatecon_raw(fcon) < 0) {
r = log_enforcing_errno(errno, "Failed to set SELinux security context %s for %s: %m", fcon, path);
if (r < 0)
return r;
} else
context_changed = true;
}
r = bind(fd, addr, addrlen) < 0 ? -errno : 0;
if (context_changed)
(void) setfscreatecon_raw(NULL);
return r;
skipped:
#endif
if (bind(fd, addr, addrlen) < 0)
return -errno;
return 0;
}