| /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */ |
| |
| #include "dns-domain.h" |
| #include "home-util.h" |
| #include "libcrypt-util.h" |
| #include "memory-util.h" |
| #include "path-util.h" |
| #include "string-util.h" |
| #include "strv.h" |
| #include "user-util.h" |
| |
| bool suitable_user_name(const char *name) { |
| |
| /* Checks whether the specified name is suitable for management via homed. Note that client-side |
| * we usually validate with the simple valid_user_group_name(), while server-side we are a bit more |
| * restrictive, so that we can change the rules server-side without having to update things |
| * client-side too. */ |
| |
| if (!valid_user_group_name(name, 0)) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* We generally rely on NSS to tell us which users not to care for, but let's filter out some |
| * particularly well-known users. */ |
| if (STR_IN_SET(name, |
| "root", |
| "nobody", |
| NOBODY_USER_NAME, NOBODY_GROUP_NAME)) |
| return false; |
| |
| /* Let's also defend our own namespace, as well as Debian's (unwritten?) logic of prefixing system |
| * users with underscores. */ |
| if (STARTSWITH_SET(name, "systemd-", "_")) |
| return false; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| int suitable_realm(const char *realm) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *normalized = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| /* Similar to the above: let's validate the realm a bit stricter server-side than client side */ |
| |
| r = dns_name_normalize(realm, 0, &normalized); /* this also checks general validity */ |
| if (r == -EINVAL) |
| return 0; |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| if (!streq(realm, normalized)) /* is this normalized? */ |
| return false; |
| |
| if (dns_name_is_root(realm)) /* Don't allow top level domain */ |
| return false; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| int suitable_image_path(const char *path) { |
| |
| return !empty_or_root(path) && |
| path_is_valid(path) && |
| path_is_absolute(path); |
| } |
| |
| bool supported_fstype(const char *fstype) { |
| /* Limit the set of supported file systems a bit, as protection against little tested kernel file |
| * systems. Also, we only support the resize ioctls for these file systems. */ |
| return STR_IN_SET(fstype, "ext4", "btrfs", "xfs"); |
| } |
| |
| int split_user_name_realm(const char *t, char **ret_user_name, char **ret_realm) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *user_name = NULL, *realm = NULL; |
| const char *c; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(t); |
| assert(ret_user_name); |
| assert(ret_realm); |
| |
| c = strchr(t, '@'); |
| if (!c) { |
| user_name = strdup(t); |
| if (!user_name) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| } else { |
| user_name = strndup(t, c - t); |
| if (!user_name) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| realm = strdup(c + 1); |
| if (!realm) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| } |
| |
| if (!suitable_user_name(user_name)) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| if (realm) { |
| r = suitable_realm(realm); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| if (r == 0) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| } |
| |
| *ret_user_name = TAKE_PTR(user_name); |
| *ret_realm = TAKE_PTR(realm); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int bus_message_append_secret(sd_bus_message *m, UserRecord *secret) { |
| _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *formatted = NULL; |
| JsonVariant *v; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(m); |
| assert(secret); |
| |
| if (!FLAGS_SET(secret->mask, USER_RECORD_SECRET)) |
| return sd_bus_message_append(m, "s", "{}"); |
| |
| v = json_variant_by_key(secret->json, "secret"); |
| if (!v) |
| return -EINVAL; |
| |
| r = json_variant_format(v, 0, &formatted); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| (void) sd_bus_message_sensitive(m); |
| |
| return sd_bus_message_append(m, "s", formatted); |
| } |