| /* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1+ */ |
| |
| #include <errno.h> |
| #include <linux/loop.h> |
| #include <sched.h> |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include <sys/mount.h> |
| #include <unistd.h> |
| #include <linux/fs.h> |
| |
| #include "alloc-util.h" |
| #include "base-filesystem.h" |
| #include "dev-setup.h" |
| #include "fd-util.h" |
| #include "format-util.h" |
| #include "fs-util.h" |
| #include "label.h" |
| #include "loop-util.h" |
| #include "loopback-setup.h" |
| #include "mkdir.h" |
| #include "mount-util.h" |
| #include "mountpoint-util.h" |
| #include "namespace-util.h" |
| #include "namespace.h" |
| #include "nulstr-util.h" |
| #include "path-util.h" |
| #include "selinux-util.h" |
| #include "socket-util.h" |
| #include "sort-util.h" |
| #include "stat-util.h" |
| #include "string-table.h" |
| #include "string-util.h" |
| #include "strv.h" |
| #include "tmpfile-util.h" |
| #include "umask-util.h" |
| #include "user-util.h" |
| |
| #define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC) |
| |
| typedef enum MountMode { |
| /* This is ordered by priority! */ |
| INACCESSIBLE, |
| BIND_MOUNT, |
| BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE, |
| PRIVATE_TMP, |
| PRIVATE_DEV, |
| BIND_DEV, |
| EMPTY_DIR, |
| SYSFS, |
| PROCFS, |
| READONLY, |
| READWRITE, |
| TMPFS, |
| READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */ |
| _MOUNT_MODE_MAX, |
| } MountMode; |
| |
| typedef struct MountEntry { |
| const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */ |
| MountMode mode:5; |
| bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */ |
| bool has_prefix:1; /* Already is prefixed by the root dir? */ |
| bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */ |
| bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */ |
| bool applied:1; /* Already applied */ |
| char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */ |
| const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts */ |
| char *source_malloc; |
| const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */ |
| char *options_malloc; |
| unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */ |
| unsigned n_followed; |
| } MountEntry; |
| |
| /* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys and /proc into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted |
| * something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */ |
| static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = { |
| { "/proc", PROCFS, false }, |
| { "/dev", BIND_DEV, false }, |
| { "/sys", SYSFS, false }, |
| }; |
| |
| /* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */ |
| static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_table[] = { |
| { "/proc/acpi", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/proc/apm", READONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */ |
| { "/proc/asound", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/proc/bus", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/proc/fs", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/proc/irq", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/proc/kallsyms", INACCESSIBLE, true }, |
| { "/proc/kcore", INACCESSIBLE, true }, |
| { "/proc/latency_stats", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/proc/mtrr", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/proc/scsi", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/proc/sys", READONLY, false }, |
| { "/proc/sysrq-trigger", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/proc/timer_stats", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/sys", READONLY, false }, |
| { "/sys/fs/bpf", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/sys/fs/cgroup", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */ |
| { "/sys/fs/selinux", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, |
| { "/sys/kernel/debug", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/sys/kernel/tracing", READONLY, true }, |
| }; |
| |
| /* ProtectKernelModules= option */ |
| static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = { |
| #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR |
| { "/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true }, |
| #endif |
| { "/usr/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true }, |
| }; |
| |
| /* ProtectKernelLogs= option */ |
| static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_table[] = { |
| { "/proc/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true }, |
| { "/dev/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true }, |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of |
| * system should be protected by ProtectSystem= |
| */ |
| static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = { |
| { "/home", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/run/user", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/root", READONLY, true }, |
| }; |
| |
| /* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */ |
| static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = { |
| { "/home", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME }, |
| { "/run/user", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME }, |
| { "/root", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME }, |
| }; |
| |
| /* ProtectHome=yes table */ |
| static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = { |
| { "/home", INACCESSIBLE, true }, |
| { "/run/user", INACCESSIBLE, true }, |
| { "/root", INACCESSIBLE, true }, |
| }; |
| |
| /* ProtectSystem=yes table */ |
| static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = { |
| { "/usr", READONLY, false }, |
| { "/boot", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/efi", READONLY, true }, |
| #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR |
| { "/lib", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/lib64", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/bin", READONLY, true }, |
| # if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN |
| { "/sbin", READONLY, true }, |
| # endif |
| #endif |
| }; |
| |
| /* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */ |
| static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = { |
| { "/usr", READONLY, false }, |
| { "/boot", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/efi", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/etc", READONLY, false }, |
| #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR |
| { "/lib", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/lib64", READONLY, true }, |
| { "/bin", READONLY, true }, |
| # if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN |
| { "/sbin", READONLY, true }, |
| # endif |
| #endif |
| }; |
| |
| /* |
| * ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything |
| * read-only, except for /proc, /dev, /sys which are the kernel API VFS, |
| * which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables= |
| * protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal. |
| * (And of course /home and friends are also left writable, as ProtectHome= |
| * shall manage those, orthogonally). |
| */ |
| static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = { |
| { "/", READONLY, false }, |
| { "/proc", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */ |
| { "/sys", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */ |
| { "/dev", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */ |
| { "/home", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */ |
| { "/run/user", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */ |
| { "/root", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */ |
| }; |
| |
| static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = { |
| [INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible", |
| [BIND_MOUNT] = "bind", |
| [BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE] = "rbind", |
| [PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp", |
| [PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev", |
| [BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev", |
| [EMPTY_DIR] = "empty", |
| [SYSFS] = "sysfs", |
| [PROCFS] = "procfs", |
| [READONLY] = "read-only", |
| [READWRITE] = "read-write", |
| [TMPFS] = "tmpfs", |
| [READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "rw-implicit", |
| }; |
| |
| DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode); |
| |
| static const char *mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) { |
| assert(p); |
| |
| /* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that, |
| * otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */ |
| |
| return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const; |
| } |
| |
| static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) { |
| assert(p); |
| |
| return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, READONLY, INACCESSIBLE); |
| } |
| |
| static const char *mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) { |
| assert(p); |
| |
| return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const; |
| } |
| |
| static const char *mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) { |
| assert(p); |
| |
| return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const; |
| } |
| |
| static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) { |
| assert(p); |
| |
| p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc); |
| p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc); |
| p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc); |
| } |
| |
| static int append_access_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) { |
| char **i; |
| |
| assert(p); |
| |
| /* Adds a list of user-supplied READWRITE/READWRITE_IMPLICIT/READONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */ |
| |
| STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) { |
| bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false; |
| const char *e = *i; |
| |
| /* Look for any prefixes */ |
| if (startswith(e, "-")) { |
| e++; |
| ignore = true; |
| } |
| if (startswith(e, "+")) { |
| e++; |
| needs_prefix = true; |
| } |
| |
| if (!path_is_absolute(e)) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "Path is not absolute: %s", e); |
| |
| *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { |
| .path_const = e, |
| .mode = mode, |
| .ignore = ignore, |
| .has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix, |
| }; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv) { |
| char **i; |
| |
| assert(p); |
| |
| /* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the |
| * "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */ |
| |
| STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) { |
| |
| *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { |
| .path_const = *i, |
| .mode = EMPTY_DIR, |
| .ignore = false, |
| .read_only = true, |
| .options_const = "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, |
| .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, |
| }; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int append_bind_mounts(MountEntry **p, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) { |
| size_t i; |
| |
| assert(p); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { |
| const BindMount *b = binds + i; |
| |
| *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { |
| .path_const = b->destination, |
| .mode = b->recursive ? BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE : BIND_MOUNT, |
| .read_only = b->read_only, |
| .nosuid = b->nosuid, |
| .source_const = b->source, |
| .ignore = b->ignore_enoent, |
| }; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountEntry **p, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) { |
| size_t i; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(p); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { |
| const TemporaryFileSystem *t = tmpfs + i; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL; |
| unsigned long flags; |
| bool ro = false; |
| |
| if (!path_is_absolute(t->path)) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "Path is not absolute: %s", |
| t->path); |
| |
| str = strjoin("mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_TEMPORARY_FS ",", t->options); |
| if (!str) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str); |
| |
| ro = flags & MS_RDONLY; |
| if (ro) |
| flags ^= MS_RDONLY; |
| |
| *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { |
| .path_const = t->path, |
| .mode = TMPFS, |
| .read_only = ro, |
| .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o), |
| .flags = flags, |
| }; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int append_static_mounts(MountEntry **p, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) { |
| size_t i; |
| |
| assert(p); |
| assert(mounts); |
| |
| /* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */ |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < n; i++) |
| *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { |
| .path_const = mount_entry_path(mounts+i), |
| .mode = mounts[i].mode, |
| .ignore = mounts[i].ignore || ignore_protect, |
| }; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int append_protect_home(MountEntry **p, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) { |
| assert(p); |
| |
| switch (protect_home) { |
| |
| case PROTECT_HOME_NO: |
| return 0; |
| |
| case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY: |
| return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect); |
| |
| case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS: |
| return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect); |
| |
| case PROTECT_HOME_YES: |
| return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect); |
| |
| default: |
| assert_not_reached("Unexpected ProtectHome= value"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int append_protect_system(MountEntry **p, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) { |
| assert(p); |
| |
| switch (protect_system) { |
| |
| case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO: |
| return 0; |
| |
| case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT: |
| return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect); |
| |
| case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES: |
| return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect); |
| |
| case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL: |
| return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect); |
| |
| default: |
| assert_not_reached("Unexpected ProtectSystem= value"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) { |
| int d; |
| |
| /* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */ |
| d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b)); |
| if (d != 0) |
| return d; |
| |
| /* If the paths are equal, check the mode */ |
| return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode); |
| } |
| |
| static int prefix_where_needed(MountEntry *m, size_t n, const char *root_directory) { |
| size_t i; |
| |
| /* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */ |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { |
| char *s; |
| |
| if (m[i].has_prefix) |
| continue; |
| |
| s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(m+i)); |
| if (!s) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| free_and_replace(m[i].path_malloc, s); |
| m[i].has_prefix = true; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static void drop_duplicates(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) { |
| MountEntry *f, *t, *previous; |
| |
| assert(m); |
| assert(n); |
| |
| /* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */ |
| |
| for (f = m, t = m, previous = NULL; f < m + *n; f++) { |
| |
| /* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare() |
| * above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */ |
| if (previous && |
| path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) && |
| !f->applied && !previous->applied) { |
| log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode)); |
| previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f); /* Propagate the read-only flag to the remaining entry */ |
| mount_entry_done(f); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| *t = *f; |
| previous = t; |
| t++; |
| } |
| |
| *n = t - m; |
| } |
| |
| static void drop_inaccessible(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) { |
| MountEntry *f, *t; |
| const char *clear = NULL; |
| |
| assert(m); |
| assert(n); |
| |
| /* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly |
| * ordered already. */ |
| |
| for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) { |
| |
| /* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop |
| * it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */ |
| if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) { |
| log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear); |
| mount_entry_done(f); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| clear = f->mode == INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL; |
| |
| *t = *f; |
| t++; |
| } |
| |
| *n = t - m; |
| } |
| |
| static void drop_nop(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) { |
| MountEntry *f, *t; |
| |
| assert(m); |
| assert(n); |
| |
| /* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the |
| * list is ordered by prefixes. */ |
| |
| for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) { |
| |
| /* Only suppress such subtrees for READONLY, READWRITE and READWRITE_IMPLICIT entries */ |
| if (IN_SET(f->mode, READONLY, READWRITE, READWRITE_IMPLICIT)) { |
| MountEntry *p; |
| bool found = false; |
| |
| /* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */ |
| for (p = t-1; p >= m; p--) { |
| if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) { |
| found = true; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */ |
| if (found && p->mode == f->mode) { |
| log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)", |
| mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode), |
| mount_entry_path(p), mount_mode_to_string(p->mode)); |
| mount_entry_done(f); |
| continue; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| *t = *f; |
| t++; |
| } |
| |
| *n = t - m; |
| } |
| |
| static void drop_outside_root(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, size_t *n) { |
| MountEntry *f, *t; |
| |
| assert(m); |
| assert(n); |
| |
| /* Nothing to do */ |
| if (!root_directory) |
| return; |
| |
| /* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */ |
| |
| for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) { |
| |
| if (!path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) { |
| log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f)); |
| mount_entry_done(f); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| *t = *f; |
| t++; |
| } |
| |
| *n = t - m; |
| } |
| |
| static int clone_device_node( |
| const char *d, |
| const char *temporary_mount, |
| bool *make_devnode) { |
| |
| _cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL; |
| const char *dn, *bn, *t; |
| struct stat st; |
| int r; |
| |
| if (stat(d, &st) < 0) { |
| if (errno == ENOENT) { |
| log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist, ignoring.", d); |
| return -ENXIO; |
| } |
| |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone, ignoring: %m", d); |
| } |
| |
| if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) && |
| !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode)) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), |
| "Device node '%s' to clone is not a device node, ignoring.", |
| d); |
| |
| dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, d); |
| |
| /* First, try to create device node properly */ |
| if (*make_devnode) { |
| mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(d, st.st_mode); |
| r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev); |
| mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| goto add_symlink; |
| if (errno != EPERM) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod failed for %s: %m", d); |
| |
| /* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */ |
| *make_devnode = false; |
| } |
| |
| /* We're about to fallback to bind-mounting the device |
| * node. So create a dummy bind-mount target. |
| * Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */ |
| r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0); |
| if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod() fallback failed for '%s': %m", d); |
| |
| /* Fallback to bind-mounting: |
| * The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard |
| * properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should |
| * either be owned by root:root or root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx) |
| * and should not carry ACLs. */ |
| if (mount(d, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "Bind mounting failed for '%s': %m", d); |
| |
| add_symlink: |
| bn = path_startswith(d, "/dev/"); |
| if (!bn) |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */ |
| if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/%u:%u", temporary_mount, S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block", major(st.st_rdev), minor(st.st_rdev)) < 0) |
| return log_oom(); |
| |
| (void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755); |
| |
| t = strjoina("../", bn); |
| |
| if (symlink(t, sl) < 0) |
| log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int mount_private_dev(MountEntry *m) { |
| static const char devnodes[] = |
| "/dev/null\0" |
| "/dev/zero\0" |
| "/dev/full\0" |
| "/dev/random\0" |
| "/dev/urandom\0" |
| "/dev/tty\0"; |
| |
| char temporary_mount[] = "/tmp/namespace-dev-XXXXXX"; |
| const char *d, *dev = NULL, *devpts = NULL, *devshm = NULL, *devhugepages = NULL, *devmqueue = NULL, *devlog = NULL, *devptmx = NULL; |
| bool can_mknod = true; |
| _cleanup_umask_ mode_t u; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(m); |
| |
| u = umask(0000); |
| |
| if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount)) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount); |
| |
| dev = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev"); |
| (void) mkdir(dev, 0755); |
| if (mount("tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=755" TMPFS_LIMITS_DEV) < 0) { |
| r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount tmpfs on '%s': %m", dev); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| r = label_fix_container(dev, "/dev", 0); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev: %m", dev); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| devpts = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts"); |
| (void) mkdir(devpts, 0755); |
| if (mount("/dev/pts", devpts, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) { |
| r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount /dev/pts on '%s': %m", devpts); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| /* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx. |
| * When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible. |
| * Thus, in that case make a clone. |
| * In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */ |
| r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx"); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m"); |
| goto fail; |
| } else if (r > 0) { |
| devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx"); |
| if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0) { |
| r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| } else { |
| r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| devshm = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm"); |
| (void) mkdir(devshm, 0755); |
| r = mount("/dev/shm", devshm, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount /dev/shm on '%s': %m", devshm); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| devmqueue = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/mqueue"); |
| (void) mkdir(devmqueue, 0755); |
| if (mount("/dev/mqueue", devmqueue, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) |
| log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount /dev/mqueue on '%s', ignoring: %m", devmqueue); |
| |
| devhugepages = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/hugepages"); |
| (void) mkdir(devhugepages, 0755); |
| if (mount("/dev/hugepages", devhugepages, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL) < 0) |
| log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount /dev/hugepages on '%s', ignoring: %m", devhugepages); |
| |
| devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log"); |
| if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0) |
| log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m", devlog); |
| |
| NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) { |
| r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod); |
| /* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */ |
| if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID); |
| if (r < 0) |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount); |
| |
| /* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be |
| * missing when the service is started with RootDirectory. This is |
| * consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing. |
| */ |
| (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); |
| |
| /* Unmount everything in old /dev */ |
| r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0); |
| if (r < 0) |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); |
| |
| if (mount(dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL) < 0) { |
| r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to move mount point '%s' to '%s': %m", dev, mount_entry_path(m)); |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| (void) rmdir(dev); |
| (void) rmdir(temporary_mount); |
| |
| return 0; |
| |
| fail: |
| if (devpts) |
| (void) umount(devpts); |
| |
| if (devshm) |
| (void) umount(devshm); |
| |
| if (devhugepages) |
| (void) umount(devhugepages); |
| |
| if (devmqueue) |
| (void) umount(devmqueue); |
| |
| (void) umount(dev); |
| (void) rmdir(dev); |
| (void) rmdir(temporary_mount); |
| |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) { |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(m); |
| |
| /* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the service's |
| * /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */ |
| |
| (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); |
| |
| r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m"); |
| if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */ |
| return 0; |
| |
| if (mount("/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int mount_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) { |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(m); |
| |
| (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); |
| |
| r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m"); |
| if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */ |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */ |
| if (mount("/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m) { |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(m); |
| |
| (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); |
| |
| r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /proc is already mounted: %m"); |
| if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /proc is already a mount point */ |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in one */ |
| if (mount("proc", mount_entry_path(m), "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL) < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) { |
| assert(m); |
| |
| /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new tmpfs */ |
| |
| (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); |
| (void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0); |
| |
| if (mount("tmpfs", mount_entry_path(m), "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m)) < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to mount %s: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| static int follow_symlink( |
| const char *root_directory, |
| MountEntry *m) { |
| |
| _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| /* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we |
| * might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at |
| * a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the |
| * end and already have a fully normalized name. */ |
| |
| r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m)); |
| if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */ |
| return 1; |
| |
| if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_SYMLINKS_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */ |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP), |
| "Symlink loop on '%s'.", |
| mount_entry_path(m)); |
| |
| log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s → %s.", mount_entry_path(m), target); |
| |
| free_and_replace(m->path_malloc, target); |
| m->has_prefix = true; |
| |
| m->n_followed ++; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int apply_mount( |
| const char *root_directory, |
| MountEntry *m) { |
| |
| _cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL; |
| bool rbind = true, make = false; |
| const char *what; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(m); |
| |
| log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m)); |
| |
| switch (m->mode) { |
| |
| case INACCESSIBLE: { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *tmp = NULL; |
| const char *runtime_dir; |
| struct stat target; |
| |
| /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there |
| * is anything... Then, overmount it with an |
| * inaccessible path. */ |
| (void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0); |
| |
| if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) { |
| if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore) |
| return 0; |
| |
| return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); |
| } |
| |
| if (geteuid() == 0) |
| runtime_dir = "/run"; |
| else { |
| if (asprintf(&tmp, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| runtime_dir = tmp; |
| } |
| |
| r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP), |
| "File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed"); |
| what = inaccessible; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| case READONLY: |
| case READWRITE: |
| case READWRITE_IMPLICIT: |
| r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, 0); |
| if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) |
| return 0; |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); |
| if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY bit for the mount point if needed. */ |
| return 0; |
| /* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */ |
| what = mount_entry_path(m); |
| break; |
| |
| case BIND_MOUNT: |
| rbind = false; |
| |
| _fallthrough_; |
| case BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE: { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL; |
| |
| /* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note that bind |
| * mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as root directory to |
| * chase_symlinks() here. */ |
| |
| r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL); |
| if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) { |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m)); |
| |
| log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s → %s.", mount_entry_source(m), chased); |
| |
| free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased); |
| |
| what = mount_entry_source(m); |
| make = true; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| case EMPTY_DIR: |
| case TMPFS: |
| return mount_tmpfs(m); |
| |
| case PRIVATE_TMP: |
| what = mount_entry_source(m); |
| make = true; |
| break; |
| |
| case PRIVATE_DEV: |
| return mount_private_dev(m); |
| |
| case BIND_DEV: |
| return mount_bind_dev(m); |
| |
| case SYSFS: |
| return mount_sysfs(m); |
| |
| case PROCFS: |
| return mount_procfs(m); |
| |
| default: |
| assert_not_reached("Unknown mode"); |
| } |
| |
| assert(what); |
| |
| if (mount(what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL) < 0) { |
| bool try_again = false; |
| r = -errno; |
| |
| if (r == -ENOENT && make) { |
| struct stat st; |
| |
| /* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create the destination, then try again */ |
| |
| if (stat(what, &st) < 0) |
| log_error_errno(errno, "Mount point source '%s' is not accessible: %m", what); |
| else { |
| int q; |
| |
| (void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); |
| |
| if (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) |
| q = mkdir(mount_entry_path(m), 0755) < 0 ? -errno : 0; |
| else |
| q = touch(mount_entry_path(m)); |
| |
| if (q < 0) |
| log_error_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m)); |
| else |
| try_again = true; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (try_again) { |
| if (mount(what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL) < 0) |
| r = -errno; |
| else |
| r = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m)); |
| } |
| |
| log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m)); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) { |
| unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0; |
| bool submounts = false; |
| int r = 0; |
| |
| assert(m); |
| assert(proc_self_mountinfo); |
| |
| if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == PRIVATE_DEV) { |
| new_flags |= MS_RDONLY; |
| flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY; |
| } |
| |
| if (m->nosuid) { |
| new_flags |= MS_NOSUID; |
| flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID; |
| } |
| |
| if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */ |
| return 0; |
| |
| /* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's |
| * nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the |
| * per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace |
| * and running Linux <= 4.17. */ |
| submounts = |
| mount_entry_read_only(m) && |
| !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS); |
| if (submounts) |
| r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo); |
| else |
| r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo); |
| |
| /* Not that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked |
| * read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we |
| * won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */ |
| |
| if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) |
| return 0; |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m), |
| submounts ? " and its submounts" : ""); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) { |
| assert(ns_info); |
| |
| /* |
| * ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=, |
| * since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the |
| * first place... |
| */ |
| |
| return ns_info->mount_apivfs || |
| ns_info->protect_control_groups || |
| ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables; |
| } |
| |
| static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts( |
| const NamespaceInfo *ns_info, |
| char** read_write_paths, |
| char** read_only_paths, |
| char** inaccessible_paths, |
| char** empty_directories, |
| size_t n_bind_mounts, |
| size_t n_temporary_filesystems, |
| const char* tmp_dir, |
| const char* var_tmp_dir, |
| const char* log_namespace, |
| ProtectHome protect_home, |
| ProtectSystem protect_system) { |
| |
| size_t protect_home_cnt; |
| size_t protect_system_cnt = |
| (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ? |
| ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) : |
| ((protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ? |
| ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) : |
| ((protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ? |
| ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0))); |
| |
| protect_home_cnt = |
| (protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ? |
| ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) : |
| ((protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ? |
| ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) : |
| ((protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ? |
| ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0))); |
| |
| return !!tmp_dir + !!var_tmp_dir + |
| strv_length(read_write_paths) + |
| strv_length(read_only_paths) + |
| strv_length(inaccessible_paths) + |
| strv_length(empty_directories) + |
| n_bind_mounts + |
| n_temporary_filesystems + |
| ns_info->private_dev + |
| (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table) : 0) + |
| (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) + |
| (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_table) : 0) + |
| (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) + |
| protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt + |
| (ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) + |
| (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) + |
| !!log_namespace; |
| } |
| |
| static void normalize_mounts(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts) { |
| assert(root_directory); |
| assert(n_mounts); |
| assert(mounts || *n_mounts == 0); |
| |
| typesafe_qsort(mounts, *n_mounts, mount_path_compare); |
| |
| drop_duplicates(mounts, n_mounts); |
| drop_outside_root(root_directory, mounts, n_mounts); |
| drop_inaccessible(mounts, n_mounts); |
| drop_nop(mounts, n_mounts); |
| } |
| |
| static bool root_read_only( |
| char **read_only_paths, |
| ProtectSystem protect_system) { |
| |
| /* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */ |
| |
| if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT) |
| return true; |
| |
| if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/")) |
| return true; |
| |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| static bool home_read_only( |
| char** read_only_paths, |
| char** inaccessible_paths, |
| char** empty_directories, |
| const BindMount *bind_mounts, |
| size_t n_bind_mounts, |
| const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems, |
| size_t n_temporary_filesystems, |
| ProtectHome protect_home) { |
| |
| size_t i; |
| |
| /* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes, |
| * this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple |
| * settings. */ |
| |
| if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO) |
| return true; |
| |
| if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") || |
| prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") || |
| prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home")) |
| return true; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < n_temporary_filesystems; i++) |
| if (path_equal(temporary_filesystems[i].path, "/home")) |
| return true; |
| |
| /* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */ |
| for (i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++) |
| if (path_equal(bind_mounts[i].destination, "/home")) |
| return true; |
| |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| int setup_namespace( |
| const char* root_directory, |
| const char* root_image, |
| const NamespaceInfo *ns_info, |
| char** read_write_paths, |
| char** read_only_paths, |
| char** inaccessible_paths, |
| char** empty_directories, |
| const BindMount *bind_mounts, |
| size_t n_bind_mounts, |
| const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems, |
| size_t n_temporary_filesystems, |
| const char* tmp_dir, |
| const char* var_tmp_dir, |
| const char *log_namespace, |
| ProtectHome protect_home, |
| ProtectSystem protect_system, |
| unsigned long mount_flags, |
| const void *root_hash, |
| size_t root_hash_size, |
| const char *root_hash_path, |
| const void *root_hash_sig, |
| size_t root_hash_sig_size, |
| const char *root_hash_sig_path, |
| const char *root_verity, |
| DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags, |
| char **error_path) { |
| |
| _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(decrypted_image_unrefp) DecryptedImage *decrypted_image = NULL; |
| _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ void *root_hash_decoded = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ char *verity_data = NULL, *hash_sig_path = NULL; |
| MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL; |
| size_t n_mounts; |
| bool require_prefix = false; |
| const char *root; |
| int r = 0; |
| |
| assert(ns_info); |
| |
| if (mount_flags == 0) |
| mount_flags = MS_SHARED; |
| |
| if (root_image) { |
| dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT; |
| |
| /* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */ |
| if (root_read_only(read_only_paths, |
| protect_system) && |
| home_read_only(read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, empty_directories, |
| bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems, |
| protect_home) && |
| strv_isempty(read_write_paths)) |
| dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY; |
| |
| r = loop_device_make_by_path(root_image, |
| FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */, |
| LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN, |
| &loop_device); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m"); |
| |
| r = verity_metadata_load(root_image, root_hash_path, root_hash ? NULL : &root_hash_decoded, root_hash ? NULL : &root_hash_size, root_verity ? NULL : &verity_data, root_hash_sig || root_hash_sig_path ? NULL : &hash_sig_path); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m"); |
| dissect_image_flags |= root_verity || verity_data ? DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE : 0; |
| |
| r = dissect_image(loop_device->fd, root_hash ?: root_hash_decoded, root_hash_size, root_verity ?: verity_data, dissect_image_flags, &dissected_image); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m"); |
| |
| r = dissected_image_decrypt(dissected_image, NULL, root_hash ?: root_hash_decoded, root_hash_size, root_verity ?: verity_data, root_hash_sig_path ?: hash_sig_path, root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size, dissect_image_flags, &decrypted_image); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m"); |
| } |
| |
| if (root_directory) |
| root = root_directory; |
| else { |
| /* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating |
| * directly in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being |
| * potentially obscured my other mounts we already applied. |
| * We use the same mount point for all images, which is safe, since they all live |
| * in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each other. */ |
| |
| root = "/run/systemd/unit-root"; |
| (void) mkdir_label(root, 0700); |
| require_prefix = true; |
| } |
| |
| n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts( |
| ns_info, |
| read_write_paths, |
| read_only_paths, |
| inaccessible_paths, |
| empty_directories, |
| n_bind_mounts, |
| n_temporary_filesystems, |
| tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, |
| log_namespace, |
| protect_home, protect_system); |
| |
| if (n_mounts > 0) { |
| m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts); |
| if (!mounts) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| |
| r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| |
| r = append_access_mounts(&m, inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| |
| r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, empty_directories); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| |
| r = append_bind_mounts(&m, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| |
| r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| |
| if (tmp_dir) { |
| *(m++) = (MountEntry) { |
| .path_const = "/tmp", |
| .mode = PRIVATE_TMP, |
| .source_const = tmp_dir, |
| }; |
| } |
| |
| if (var_tmp_dir) { |
| *(m++) = (MountEntry) { |
| .path_const = "/var/tmp", |
| .mode = PRIVATE_TMP, |
| .source_const = var_tmp_dir, |
| }; |
| } |
| |
| if (ns_info->private_dev) { |
| *(m++) = (MountEntry) { |
| .path_const = "/dev", |
| .mode = PRIVATE_DEV, |
| .flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, |
| }; |
| } |
| |
| if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) { |
| r = append_static_mounts(&m, protect_kernel_tunables_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_table), ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| |
| if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) { |
| r = append_static_mounts(&m, protect_kernel_modules_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table), ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| |
| if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) { |
| r = append_static_mounts(&m, protect_kernel_logs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_table), ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| |
| if (ns_info->protect_control_groups) { |
| *(m++) = (MountEntry) { |
| .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup", |
| .mode = READONLY, |
| }; |
| } |
| |
| r = append_protect_home(&m, protect_home, ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| |
| r = append_protect_system(&m, protect_system, false); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| |
| if (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info)) { |
| r = append_static_mounts(&m, apivfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table), ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| |
| if (ns_info->protect_hostname) { |
| *(m++) = (MountEntry) { |
| .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname", |
| .mode = READONLY, |
| }; |
| *(m++) = (MountEntry) { |
| .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname", |
| .mode = READONLY, |
| }; |
| } |
| |
| if (log_namespace) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *q; |
| |
| q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace); |
| if (!q) { |
| r = -ENOMEM; |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| |
| *(m++) = (MountEntry) { |
| .path_const = "/run/systemd/journal", |
| .mode = BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE, |
| .read_only = true, |
| .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q), |
| }; |
| } |
| |
| assert(mounts + n_mounts == m); |
| |
| /* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */ |
| r = prefix_where_needed(mounts, n_mounts, root); |
| if (r < 0) |
| goto finish; |
| |
| normalize_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts); |
| } |
| |
| /* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */ |
| |
| if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) { |
| r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m"); |
| if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -EPERM, -EOPNOTSUPP, -ENOSYS)) |
| /* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter in place |
| * that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then propagate a recognizable |
| * error back, which the caller can use to detect this case (and only this) and optionally |
| * continue without namespacing applied. */ |
| r = -ENOANO; |
| |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| |
| /* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace |
| * shows up in the parent */ |
| if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) { |
| r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m"); |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| |
| if (root_image) { |
| /* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */ |
| r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, root, UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m"); |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| |
| if (decrypted_image) { |
| r = decrypted_image_relinquish(decrypted_image); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish decrypted image: %m"); |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| loop_device_relinquish(loop_device); |
| |
| } else if (root_directory) { |
| |
| /* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */ |
| r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root); |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| if (r == 0) { |
| if (mount(root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) { |
| r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount '%s': %m", root); |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| } else { |
| |
| /* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */ |
| if (mount("/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) { |
| r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to bind mount '/' on '%s': %m", root); |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */ |
| if (root_image || root_directory) |
| (void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID); |
| |
| if (n_mounts > 0) { |
| _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL; |
| _cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL; |
| size_t j; |
| |
| /* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of /proc. |
| * For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc' */ |
| proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re"); |
| if (!proc_self_mountinfo) { |
| r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open /proc/self/mountinfo: %m"); |
| if (error_path) |
| *error_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo"); |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| |
| /* First round, establish all mounts we need */ |
| for (;;) { |
| bool again = false; |
| |
| for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; ++m) { |
| |
| if (m->applied) |
| continue; |
| |
| r = follow_symlink(root, m); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m)) |
| *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m)); |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| if (r == 0) { |
| /* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might point to a |
| * very different place now. Let's normalize the changed list, and start from |
| * the beginning. After all to mount the entry at the new location we might |
| * need some other mounts first */ |
| again = true; |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| r = apply_mount(root, m); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m)) |
| *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m)); |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| |
| m->applied = true; |
| } |
| |
| if (!again) |
| break; |
| |
| normalize_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts); |
| } |
| |
| /* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */ |
| deny_list = new(char*, n_mounts+1); |
| if (!deny_list) { |
| r = -ENOMEM; |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| for (j = 0; j < n_mounts; j++) |
| deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j); |
| deny_list[j] = NULL; |
| |
| /* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */ |
| for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; ++m) { |
| r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m)) |
| *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m)); |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */ |
| r = mount_move_root(root); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m"); |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| |
| /* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not |
| * reestablish propagation from our side to the host, since |
| * what's disconnected is disconnected. */ |
| if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_flags | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) { |
| r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m"); |
| goto finish; |
| } |
| |
| r = 0; |
| |
| finish: |
| if (n_mounts > 0) |
| for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; m++) |
| mount_entry_done(m); |
| |
| free(mounts); |
| |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) { |
| size_t i; |
| |
| assert(b || n == 0); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { |
| free(b[i].source); |
| free(b[i].destination); |
| } |
| |
| free(b); |
| } |
| |
| int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; |
| BindMount *c; |
| |
| assert(b); |
| assert(n); |
| assert(item); |
| |
| s = strdup(item->source); |
| if (!s) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| d = strdup(item->destination); |
| if (!d) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| c = reallocarray(*b, *n + 1, sizeof(BindMount)); |
| if (!c) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| *b = c; |
| |
| c[(*n) ++] = (BindMount) { |
| .source = TAKE_PTR(s), |
| .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), |
| .read_only = item->read_only, |
| .nosuid = item->nosuid, |
| .recursive = item->recursive, |
| .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent, |
| }; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) { |
| size_t i; |
| |
| assert(t || n == 0); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { |
| free(t[i].path); |
| free(t[i].options); |
| } |
| |
| free(t); |
| } |
| |
| int temporary_filesystem_add( |
| TemporaryFileSystem **t, |
| size_t *n, |
| const char *path, |
| const char *options) { |
| |
| _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL; |
| TemporaryFileSystem *c; |
| |
| assert(t); |
| assert(n); |
| assert(path); |
| |
| p = strdup(path); |
| if (!p) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| if (!isempty(options)) { |
| o = strdup(options); |
| if (!o) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| } |
| |
| c = reallocarray(*t, *n + 1, sizeof(TemporaryFileSystem)); |
| if (!c) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| *t = c; |
| |
| c[(*n) ++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) { |
| .path = TAKE_PTR(p), |
| .options = TAKE_PTR(o), |
| }; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL; |
| int r; |
| |
| /* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */ |
| r = access(prefix, F_OK); |
| if (r >= 0) |
| return 0; |
| if (errno != ENOENT) |
| return -errno; |
| |
| r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| if (mkdir(t, 0777) < 0) |
| return -errno; |
| |
| if (chmod(t, 01777) < 0) { |
| r = -errno; |
| (void) rmdir(t); |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| if (rename(t, prefix) < 0) { |
| r = -errno; |
| (void) rmdir(t); |
| return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */ |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| |
| } |
| |
| static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path) { |
| _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL; |
| char bid[SD_ID128_STRING_MAX]; |
| sd_id128_t boot_id; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(id); |
| assert(prefix); |
| assert(path); |
| |
| /* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a |
| * reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */ |
| |
| r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", sd_id128_to_string(boot_id, bid), "-", id, "-XXXXXX"); |
| if (!x) |
| return -ENOMEM; |
| |
| r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| RUN_WITH_UMASK(0077) |
| if (!mkdtemp(x)) |
| return -errno; |
| |
| RUN_WITH_UMASK(0000) { |
| char *y; |
| |
| y = strjoina(x, "/tmp"); |
| |
| if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0) |
| return -errno; |
| } |
| |
| *path = TAKE_PTR(x); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) { |
| char *a, *b; |
| int r; |
| |
| assert(id); |
| assert(tmp_dir); |
| assert(var_tmp_dir); |
| |
| r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a); |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| |
| r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b); |
| if (r < 0) { |
| char *t; |
| |
| t = strjoina(a, "/tmp"); |
| (void) rmdir(t); |
| (void) rmdir(a); |
| |
| free(a); |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| *tmp_dir = a; |
| *var_tmp_dir = b; |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int setup_netns(const int netns_storage_socket[static 2]) { |
| _cleanup_close_ int netns = -1; |
| int r, q; |
| |
| assert(netns_storage_socket); |
| assert(netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0); |
| assert(netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0); |
| |
| /* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our |
| * namespace reference fd. Whatever process runs this first |
| * shall create a new namespace, all others should just join |
| * it. To serialize that we use a file lock on the socket |
| * pair. |
| * |
| * It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */ |
| |
| if (lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0) |
| return -errno; |
| |
| netns = receive_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT); |
| if (netns == -EAGAIN) { |
| /* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */ |
| |
| if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) { |
| r = -errno; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| (void) loopback_setup(); |
| |
| netns = open("/proc/self/ns/net", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY); |
| if (netns < 0) { |
| r = -errno; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| r = 1; |
| |
| } else if (netns < 0) { |
| r = netns; |
| goto fail; |
| |
| } else { |
| /* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */ |
| if (setns(netns, CLONE_NEWNET) < 0) { |
| r = -errno; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| r = 0; |
| } |
| |
| q = send_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[1], netns, MSG_DONTWAIT); |
| if (q < 0) { |
| r = q; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| fail: |
| (void) lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0); |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| int open_netns_path(const int netns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path) { |
| _cleanup_close_ int netns = -1; |
| int q, r; |
| |
| assert(netns_storage_socket); |
| assert(netns_storage_socket[0] >= 0); |
| assert(netns_storage_socket[1] >= 0); |
| assert(path); |
| |
| /* If the storage socket doesn't contain a netns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in |
| * it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_netns() which will allocate a |
| * new anonymous netns if needed. */ |
| |
| if (lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0) |
| return -errno; |
| |
| netns = receive_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT); |
| if (netns == -EAGAIN) { |
| /* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */ |
| |
| netns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC); |
| if (netns < 0) { |
| r = -errno; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| r = fd_is_network_ns(netns); |
| if (r == 0) { /* Not a netns? Refuse early. */ |
| r = -EINVAL; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| if (r < 0 && r != -EUCLEAN) /* EUCLEAN: we don't know */ |
| goto fail; |
| |
| r = 1; |
| |
| } else if (netns < 0) { |
| r = netns; |
| goto fail; |
| } else |
| r = 0; /* Already allocated */ |
| |
| q = send_one_fd(netns_storage_socket[1], netns, MSG_DONTWAIT); |
| if (q < 0) { |
| r = q; |
| goto fail; |
| } |
| |
| fail: |
| (void) lockf(netns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0); |
| return r; |
| } |
| |
| bool ns_type_supported(NamespaceType type) { |
| const char *t, *ns_proc; |
| |
| t = namespace_type_to_string(type); |
| if (!t) /* Don't know how to translate this? Then it's not supported */ |
| return false; |
| |
| ns_proc = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", t); |
| return access(ns_proc, F_OK) == 0; |
| } |
| |
| static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = { |
| [PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no", |
| [PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes", |
| [PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only", |
| [PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs", |
| }; |
| |
| DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES); |
| |
| static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = { |
| [PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no", |
| [PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes", |
| [PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full", |
| [PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict", |
| }; |
| |
| DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES); |
| |
| static const char* const namespace_type_table[] = { |
| [NAMESPACE_MOUNT] = "mnt", |
| [NAMESPACE_CGROUP] = "cgroup", |
| [NAMESPACE_UTS] = "uts", |
| [NAMESPACE_IPC] = "ipc", |
| [NAMESPACE_USER] = "user", |
| [NAMESPACE_PID] = "pid", |
| [NAMESPACE_NET] = "net", |
| }; |
| |
| DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(namespace_type, NamespaceType); |