blob: 28fe2065072df4f77c629b71041daac0d8765338 [file] [log] [blame] [raw]
/***
This file is part of systemd.
Copyright 2016 Lennart Poettering
systemd is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License as published by
the Free Software Foundation; either version 2.1 of the License, or
(at your option) any later version.
systemd is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
Lesser General Public License for more details.
You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public License
along with systemd; If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
***/
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/eventfd.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/poll.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "alloc-util.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "macro.h"
#include "missing.h"
#include "nsflags.h"
#include "process-util.h"
#include "raw-clone.h"
#include "seccomp-util.h"
#include "set.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "virt.h"
#if SCMP_SYS(socket) < 0 || defined(__i386__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__s390__)
/* On these archs, socket() is implemented via the socketcall() syscall multiplexer,
* and we can't restrict it hence via seccomp. */
# define SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN 1
#else
# define SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN 0
#endif
static void test_seccomp_arch_to_string(void) {
uint32_t a, b;
const char *name;
a = seccomp_arch_native();
assert_se(a > 0);
name = seccomp_arch_to_string(a);
assert_se(name);
assert_se(seccomp_arch_from_string(name, &b) >= 0);
assert_se(a == b);
}
static void test_architecture_table(void) {
const char *n, *n2;
NULSTR_FOREACH(n,
"native\0"
"x86\0"
"x86-64\0"
"x32\0"
"arm\0"
"arm64\0"
"mips\0"
"mips64\0"
"mips64-n32\0"
"mips-le\0"
"mips64-le\0"
"mips64-le-n32\0"
"ppc\0"
"ppc64\0"
"ppc64-le\0"
"s390\0"
"s390x\0") {
uint32_t c;
assert_se(seccomp_arch_from_string(n, &c) >= 0);
n2 = seccomp_arch_to_string(c);
log_info("seccomp-arch: %s → 0x%"PRIx32" → %s", n, c, n2);
assert_se(streq_ptr(n, n2));
}
}
static void test_syscall_filter_set_find(void) {
assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find(NULL));
assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find(""));
assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find("quux"));
assert_se(!syscall_filter_set_find("@quux"));
assert_se(syscall_filter_set_find("@clock") == syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_CLOCK);
assert_se(syscall_filter_set_find("@default") == syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT);
assert_se(syscall_filter_set_find("@raw-io") == syscall_filter_sets + SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_RAW_IO);
}
static void test_filter_sets(void) {
unsigned i;
int r;
if (!is_seccomp_available())
return;
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
for (i = 0; i < _SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_MAX; i++) {
pid_t pid;
log_info("Testing %s", syscall_filter_sets[i].name);
pid = fork();
assert_se(pid >= 0);
if (pid == 0) { /* Child? */
int fd;
if (i == SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT) /* if we look at the default set, whitelist instead of blacklist */
r = seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN), syscall_filter_sets + i, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW);
else
r = seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, syscall_filter_sets + i, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN));
if (r < 0)
_exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
/* Test the sycall filter with one random system call */
fd = eventfd(0, EFD_NONBLOCK|EFD_CLOEXEC);
if (IN_SET(i, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_IO_EVENT, SYSCALL_FILTER_SET_DEFAULT))
assert_se(fd < 0 && errno == EUCLEAN);
else {
assert_se(fd >= 0);
safe_close(fd);
}
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_warn(syscall_filter_sets[i].name, pid, true) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
}
static void test_restrict_namespace(void) {
_cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL;
unsigned long ul;
pid_t pid;
assert_se(namespace_flag_to_string(0) == NULL);
assert_se(streq(namespace_flag_to_string(CLONE_NEWNS), "mnt"));
assert_se(namespace_flag_to_string(CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWIPC) == NULL);
assert_se(streq(namespace_flag_to_string(CLONE_NEWCGROUP), "cgroup"));
assert_se(namespace_flag_from_string("mnt") == CLONE_NEWNS);
assert_se(namespace_flag_from_string(NULL) == 0);
assert_se(namespace_flag_from_string("") == 0);
assert_se(namespace_flag_from_string("uts") == CLONE_NEWUTS);
assert_se(namespace_flag_from_string(namespace_flag_to_string(CLONE_NEWUTS)) == CLONE_NEWUTS);
assert_se(streq(namespace_flag_to_string(namespace_flag_from_string("ipc")), "ipc"));
assert_se(namespace_flag_from_string_many(NULL, &ul) == 0 && ul == 0);
assert_se(namespace_flag_from_string_many("", &ul) == 0 && ul == 0);
assert_se(namespace_flag_from_string_many("mnt uts ipc", &ul) == 0 && ul == (CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWUTS|CLONE_NEWIPC));
assert_se(namespace_flag_to_string_many(NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL, &s) == 0);
assert_se(streq(s, "cgroup ipc net mnt pid user uts"));
assert_se(namespace_flag_from_string_many(s, &ul) == 0 && ul == NAMESPACE_FLAGS_ALL);
if (!is_seccomp_available())
return;
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
pid = fork();
assert_se(pid >= 0);
if (pid == 0) {
assert_se(seccomp_restrict_namespaces(CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWNET) >= 0);
assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) == 0);
assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWNET) == 0);
assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWUTS) == -1);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWIPC) == -1);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
assert_se(unshare(CLONE_NEWNET|CLONE_NEWUTS) == -1);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
/* We use fd 0 (stdin) here, which of course will fail with EINVAL on setns(). Except of course our
* seccomp filter worked, and hits first and makes it return EPERM */
assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWNS) == -1);
assert_se(errno == EINVAL);
assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWNET) == -1);
assert_se(errno == EINVAL);
assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWUTS) == -1);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWIPC) == -1);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
assert_se(setns(0, CLONE_NEWNET|CLONE_NEWUTS) == -1);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
assert_se(setns(0, 0) == -1);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWNS);
assert_se(pid >= 0);
if (pid == 0)
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWNET);
assert_se(pid >= 0);
if (pid == 0)
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWUTS);
assert_se(pid < 0);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWIPC);
assert_se(pid < 0);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
pid = raw_clone(CLONE_NEWNET|CLONE_NEWUTS);
assert_se(pid < 0);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_warn("nsseccomp", pid, true) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
static void test_protect_sysctl(void) {
pid_t pid;
if (!is_seccomp_available())
return;
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
if (detect_container() > 0) /* in containers _sysctl() is likely missing anyway */
return;
pid = fork();
assert_se(pid >= 0);
if (pid == 0) {
#if __NR__sysctl > 0
assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, NULL) < 0);
assert_se(errno == EFAULT);
#endif
assert_se(seccomp_protect_sysctl() >= 0);
#if __NR__sysctl > 0
assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, 0, 0, 0) < 0);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
#endif
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_warn("sysctlseccomp", pid, true) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
static void test_restrict_address_families(void) {
pid_t pid;
if (!is_seccomp_available())
return;
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
pid = fork();
assert_se(pid >= 0);
if (pid == 0) {
int fd;
Set *s;
fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
assert_se(fd >= 0);
safe_close(fd);
fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
assert_se(fd >= 0);
safe_close(fd);
fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
assert_se(fd >= 0);
safe_close(fd);
assert_se(s = set_new(NULL));
assert_se(set_put(s, INT_TO_PTR(AF_UNIX)) >= 0);
assert_se(seccomp_restrict_address_families(s, false) >= 0);
fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
assert_se(fd >= 0);
safe_close(fd);
fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
#if SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN
assert_se(fd >= 0);
safe_close(fd);
#else
assert_se(fd < 0);
assert_se(errno == EAFNOSUPPORT);
#endif
fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
assert_se(fd >= 0);
safe_close(fd);
set_clear(s);
assert_se(set_put(s, INT_TO_PTR(AF_INET)) >= 0);
assert_se(seccomp_restrict_address_families(s, true) >= 0);
fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
assert_se(fd >= 0);
safe_close(fd);
fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
#if SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN
assert_se(fd >= 0);
safe_close(fd);
#else
assert_se(fd < 0);
assert_se(errno == EAFNOSUPPORT);
#endif
fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
#if SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN
assert_se(fd >= 0);
safe_close(fd);
#else
assert_se(fd < 0);
assert_se(errno == EAFNOSUPPORT);
#endif
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_warn("socketseccomp", pid, true) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
static void test_restrict_realtime(void) {
pid_t pid;
if (!is_seccomp_available())
return;
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
if (detect_container() > 0) /* in containers RT privs are likely missing anyway */
return;
pid = fork();
assert_se(pid >= 0);
if (pid == 0) {
assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 1 }) >= 0);
assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_RR, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 1 }) >= 0);
assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_IDLE, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 0 }) >= 0);
assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_BATCH, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 0 }) >= 0);
assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_OTHER, &(struct sched_param) {}) >= 0);
assert_se(seccomp_restrict_realtime() >= 0);
assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_IDLE, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 0 }) >= 0);
assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_BATCH, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 0 }) >= 0);
assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_OTHER, &(struct sched_param) {}) >= 0);
assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_FIFO, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 1 }) < 0);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
assert_se(sched_setscheduler(0, SCHED_RR, &(struct sched_param) { .sched_priority = 1 }) < 0);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_warn("realtimeseccomp", pid, true) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
static void test_memory_deny_write_execute_mmap(void) {
pid_t pid;
if (!is_seccomp_available())
return;
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
pid = fork();
assert_se(pid >= 0);
if (pid == 0) {
void *p;
p = mmap(NULL, page_size(), PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,0);
assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
assert_se(munmap(p, page_size()) >= 0);
p = mmap(NULL, page_size(), PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,0);
assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
assert_se(munmap(p, page_size()) >= 0);
assert_se(seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute() >= 0);
p = mmap(NULL, page_size(), PROT_WRITE|PROT_EXEC, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,0);
#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__powerpc64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
assert_se(p == MAP_FAILED);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
#else /* unknown architectures */
assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
assert_se(munmap(p, page_size()) >= 0);
#endif
p = mmap(NULL, page_size(), PROT_WRITE|PROT_READ, MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1,0);
assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
assert_se(munmap(p, page_size()) >= 0);
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_warn("memoryseccomp-mmap", pid, true) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
static void test_memory_deny_write_execute_shmat(void) {
int shmid;
pid_t pid;
if (!is_seccomp_available())
return;
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
shmid = shmget(IPC_PRIVATE, page_size(), 0);
assert_se(shmid >= 0);
pid = fork();
assert_se(pid >= 0);
if (pid == 0) {
void *p;
p = shmat(shmid, NULL, 0);
assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
assert_se(shmdt(p) == 0);
p = shmat(shmid, NULL, SHM_EXEC);
assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
assert_se(shmdt(p) == 0);
assert_se(seccomp_memory_deny_write_execute() >= 0);
p = shmat(shmid, NULL, SHM_EXEC);
#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__)
assert_se(p == MAP_FAILED);
assert_se(errno == EPERM);
#else /* __i386__, __powerpc64__, and "unknown" architectures */
assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
assert_se(shmdt(p) == 0);
#endif
p = shmat(shmid, NULL, 0);
assert_se(p != MAP_FAILED);
assert_se(shmdt(p) == 0);
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_warn("memoryseccomp-shmat", pid, true) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
static void test_restrict_archs(void) {
pid_t pid;
if (!is_seccomp_available())
return;
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
pid = fork();
assert_se(pid >= 0);
if (pid == 0) {
_cleanup_set_free_ Set *s = NULL;
assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0);
assert_se(s = set_new(NULL));
#ifdef __x86_64__
assert_se(set_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(SCMP_ARCH_X86+1)) >= 0);
#endif
assert_se(seccomp_restrict_archs(s) >= 0);
assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0);
assert_se(seccomp_restrict_archs(NULL) >= 0);
assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0);
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_warn("archseccomp", pid, true) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) {
pid_t pid;
if (!is_seccomp_available())
return;
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
pid = fork();
assert_se(pid >= 0);
if (pid == 0) {
_cleanup_set_free_ Set *s = NULL;
assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0);
assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0);
assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, NULL, SCMP_ACT_KILL) >= 0);
assert_se(access("/", F_OK) >= 0);
assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0);
assert_se(s = set_new(NULL));
#if SCMP_SYS(access) >= 0
assert_se(set_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1)) >= 0);
#else
assert_se(set_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1)) >= 0);
#endif
assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, s, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUCLEAN)) >= 0);
assert_se(access("/", F_OK) < 0);
assert_se(errno == EUCLEAN);
assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0);
s = set_free(s);
assert_se(s = set_new(NULL));
#if SCMP_SYS(poll) >= 0
assert_se(set_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1)) >= 0);
#else
assert_se(set_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1)) >= 0);
#endif
assert_se(seccomp_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, s, SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EUNATCH)) >= 0);
assert_se(access("/", F_OK) < 0);
assert_se(errno == EUCLEAN);
assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) < 0);
assert_se(errno == EUNATCH);
_exit(EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
assert_se(wait_for_terminate_and_warn("syscallrawseccomp", pid, true) == EXIT_SUCCESS);
}
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
log_set_max_level(LOG_DEBUG);
test_seccomp_arch_to_string();
test_architecture_table();
test_syscall_filter_set_find();
test_filter_sets();
test_restrict_namespace();
test_protect_sysctl();
test_restrict_address_families();
test_restrict_realtime();
test_memory_deny_write_execute_mmap();
test_memory_deny_write_execute_shmat();
test_restrict_archs();
test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw();
return 0;
}