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/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
/*
* Port to systemd-boot
* Copyright © 2017 Max Resch <resch.max@gmail.com>
*
* Security Policy Handling
* Copyright © 2012 <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
* https://github.com/mjg59/efitools
*/
#include <efi.h>
#include <efilib.h>
#include "missing_efi.h"
#include "util.h"
#include "shim.h"
#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__i386__)
#define __sysv_abi__ __attribute__((sysv_abi))
#else
#define __sysv_abi__
#endif
struct ShimLock {
EFI_STATUS __sysv_abi__ (*shim_verify) (void *buffer, UINT32 size);
/* context is actually a struct for the PE header, but it isn't needed so void is sufficient just do define the interface
* see shim.c/shim.h and PeHeader.h in the github shim repo */
EFI_STATUS __sysv_abi__ (*generate_hash) (void *data, UINT32 datasize, void *context, UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash);
EFI_STATUS __sysv_abi__ (*read_header) (void *data, UINT32 datasize, void *context);
};
#define SHIM_LOCK_GUID \
&(const EFI_GUID) { 0x605dab50, 0xe046, 0x4300, { 0xab, 0xb6, 0x3d, 0xd8, 0x10, 0xdd, 0x8b, 0x23 } }
BOOLEAN shim_loaded(void) {
struct ShimLock *shim_lock;
return !EFI_ERROR(BS->LocateProtocol((EFI_GUID*) SHIM_LOCK_GUID, NULL, (void**) &shim_lock));
}
static BOOLEAN shim_validate(void *data, UINT32 size) {
struct ShimLock *shim_lock;
if (!data)
return FALSE;
if (EFI_ERROR(BS->LocateProtocol((EFI_GUID*) SHIM_LOCK_GUID, NULL, (void**) &shim_lock)))
return FALSE;
if (!shim_lock)
return FALSE;
return !EFI_ERROR(shim_lock->shim_verify(data, size));
}
/* Handle to the original authenticator for security1 protocol */
static EFI_SECURITY_FILE_AUTHENTICATION_STATE esfas = NULL;
/* Handle to the original authenticator for security2 protocol */
static EFI_SECURITY2_FILE_AUTHENTICATION es2fa = NULL;
/*
* Perform shim/MOK and Secure Boot authentication on a binary that's already been
* loaded into memory. This function does the platform SB authentication first
* but preserves its return value in case of its failure, so that it can be
* returned in case of a shim/MOK authentication failure. This is done because
* the SB failure code seems to vary from one implementation to another, and I
* don't want to interfere with that at this time.
*/
static EFIAPI EFI_STATUS security2_policy_authentication (const EFI_SECURITY2_PROTOCOL *this,
const EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *device_path,
void *file_buffer, UINTN file_size, BOOLEAN boot_policy) {
EFI_STATUS status;
assert(this);
/* device_path and file_buffer may be NULL */
/* Chain original security policy */
status = es2fa(this, device_path, file_buffer, file_size, boot_policy);
/* if OK, don't bother with MOK check */
if (!EFI_ERROR(status))
return status;
if (shim_validate(file_buffer, file_size))
return EFI_SUCCESS;
return status;
}
/*
* Perform both shim/MOK and platform Secure Boot authentication. This function loads
* the file and performs shim/MOK authentication first simply to avoid double loads
* of Linux kernels, which are much more likely to be shim/MOK-signed than platform-signed,
* since kernels are big and can take several seconds to load on some computers and
* filesystems. This also has the effect of returning whatever the platform code is for
* authentication failure, be it EFI_ACCESS_DENIED, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, or something
* else. (This seems to vary between implementations.)
*/
static EFIAPI EFI_STATUS security_policy_authentication (const EFI_SECURITY_PROTOCOL *this, UINT32 authentication_status,
const EFI_DEVICE_PATH_PROTOCOL *device_path_const) {
EFI_STATUS status;
_cleanup_freepool_ EFI_DEVICE_PATH *dev_path = NULL;
_cleanup_freepool_ CHAR16 *dev_path_str = NULL;
EFI_HANDLE h;
_cleanup_freepool_ CHAR8 *file_buffer = NULL;
UINTN file_size;
assert(this);
if (!device_path_const)
return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
dev_path = DuplicateDevicePath((EFI_DEVICE_PATH*) device_path_const);
if (!dev_path)
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
EFI_DEVICE_PATH *dp = dev_path;
status = BS->LocateDevicePath(&FileSystemProtocol, &dp, &h);
if (EFI_ERROR(status))
return status;
_cleanup_(file_closep) EFI_FILE *root = LibOpenRoot(h);
if (!root)
return EFI_NOT_FOUND;
dev_path_str = DevicePathToStr(dp);
if (!dev_path_str)
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
status = file_read(root, dev_path_str, 0, 0, &file_buffer, &file_size);
if (EFI_ERROR(status))
return status;
if (shim_validate(file_buffer, file_size))
return EFI_SUCCESS;
/* Try using the platform's native policy.... */
return esfas(this, authentication_status, device_path_const);
}
EFI_STATUS security_policy_install(void) {
EFI_SECURITY_PROTOCOL *security_protocol;
EFI_SECURITY2_PROTOCOL *security2_protocol = NULL;
EFI_STATUS status;
/* Already Installed */
if (esfas)
return EFI_ALREADY_STARTED;
/*
* Don't bother with status here. The call is allowed
* to fail, since SECURITY2 was introduced in PI 1.2.1.
* Use security2_protocol == NULL as indicator.
*/
BS->LocateProtocol((EFI_GUID*) SECURITY_PROTOCOL2_GUID, NULL, (void**) &security2_protocol);
status = BS->LocateProtocol((EFI_GUID*) SECURITY_PROTOCOL_GUID, NULL, (void**) &security_protocol);
/* This one is mandatory, so there's a serious problem */
if (EFI_ERROR(status))
return status;
esfas = security_protocol->FileAuthenticationState;
security_protocol->FileAuthenticationState = security_policy_authentication;
if (security2_protocol) {
es2fa = security2_protocol->FileAuthentication;
security2_protocol->FileAuthentication = security2_policy_authentication;
}
return EFI_SUCCESS;
}