auth2-jpake.c - security/openssh-library - Rivoreo Source Code Repositories

 /* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.3 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
  *
  * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
  * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
  * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
  *
  * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
  * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
  * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
  * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
  * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
  * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
  * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
  */

 /*
  * Server side of zero-knowledge password auth using J-PAKE protocol
  * as described in:
  *
  * F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
  * 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
  *
  * http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
  */

 #ifdef JPAKE

 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/param.h>

 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <login_cap.h>

 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>

 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "key.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "dispatch.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 #include "ssh-gss.h"
 #endif
 #include "monitor_wrap.h"

 #include "schnorr.h"
 #include "jpake.h"

 /*
  * XXX options->permit_empty_passwd (at the moment, they will be refused
  * anyway because they will mismatch on fake salt.
  */

 /* Dispatch handlers */
 static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int, u_int32_t, void *);
 static void input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);

 static int auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *);

 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
 extern u_char *session_id2;
 extern u_int session_id2_len;

 /*
  * Attempt J-PAKE authentication.
  */
 static int
 userauth_jpake(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	int authenticated = 0;

 	packet_check_eom();

 	debug("jpake-01@openssh.com requested");

 	if (authctxt->user != NULL) {
 		if (authctxt->jpake_ctx == NULL)
 			authctxt->jpake_ctx = jpake_new();
 		if (options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
 			authenticated = auth2_jpake_start(authctxt);
 	}

 	return authenticated;
 }

 Authmethod method_jpake = {
 	"jpake-01@openssh.com",
 	userauth_jpake,
 	&options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication
 };

 /* Clear context and callbacks */
 void
 auth2_jpake_stop(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	/* unregister callbacks */
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);
 	if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
 		jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
 		authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
 	}
 }

 /* Returns 1 if 'c' is a valid crypt(3) salt character, 0 otherwise */
 static int
 valid_crypt_salt(int c)
 {
 	if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
 		return 1;
 	if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
 		return 1;
 	if (c >= '.' && c <= '9')
 		return 1;
 	return 0;
 }

 /*
  * Derive fake salt as H(username || first_private_host_key)
  * This provides relatively stable fake salts for non-existent
  * users and avoids the jpake method becoming an account validity
  * oracle.
  */
 static void
 derive_rawsalt(const char *username, u_char *rawsalt, u_int len)
 {
 	u_char *digest;
 	u_int digest_len;
 	Buffer b;
 	Key *k;

 	buffer_init(&b);
 	buffer_put_cstring(&b, username);
 	if ((k = get_hostkey_by_index(0)) == NULL ||
 	    (k->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
 		fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
 	switch (k->type) {
 	case KEY_RSA1:
 	case KEY_RSA:
 		if (k->rsa->p == NULL || k->rsa->q == NULL)
 			fatal("%s: RSA key missing p and/or q", __func__);
 		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->p);
 		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->q);
 		break;
 	case KEY_DSA:
 		if (k->dsa->priv_key == NULL)
 			fatal("%s: DSA key missing priv_key", __func__);
 		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->dsa->priv_key);
 		break;
 	default:
 		fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, k->type);
 	}
 	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
 	    &digest, &digest_len) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
 	buffer_free(&b);
 	if (len > digest_len)
 		fatal("%s: not enough bytes for rawsalt (want %u have %u)",
 		    __func__, len, digest_len);
 	memcpy(rawsalt, digest, len);
 	bzero(digest, digest_len);
 	xfree(digest);
 }

 /* ASCII an integer [0, 64) for inclusion in a password/salt */
 static char
 pw_encode64(u_int i64)
 {
 	const u_char e64[] =
 	    "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
 	return e64[i64 % 64];
 }

 /* Generate ASCII salt bytes for user */
 static char *
 makesalt(u_int want, const char *user)
 {
 	u_char rawsalt[32];
 	static char ret[33];
 	u_int i;

 	if (want > sizeof(ret) - 1)
 		fatal("%s: want %u", __func__, want);

 	derive_rawsalt(user, rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));
 	bzero(ret, sizeof(ret));
 	for (i = 0; i < want; i++)
 		ret[i] = pw_encode64(rawsalt[i]);
 	bzero(rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));

 	return ret;
 }

 /*
  * Select the system's default password hashing scheme and generate
  * a stable fake salt under it for use by a non-existent account.
  * Prevents jpake method being used to infer the validity of accounts.
  */
 static void
 fake_salt_and_scheme(Authctxt *authctxt, char **salt, char **scheme)
 {
 	char *rounds_s, *style;
 	long long rounds;
 	login_cap_t *lc;


 	if ((lc = login_getclass(authctxt->pw->pw_class)) == NULL &&
 	    (lc = login_getclass(NULL)) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: login_getclass failed", __func__);
 	style = login_getcapstr(lc, "localcipher", NULL, NULL);
 	if (style == NULL)
 		style = xstrdup("blowfish,6");
 	login_close(lc);

 	if ((rounds_s = strchr(style, ',')) != NULL)
 		*rounds_s++ = '\0';
 	rounds = strtonum(rounds_s, 1, 1<<31, NULL);

 	if (strcmp(style, "md5") == 0) {
 		xasprintf(salt, "$1$%s$", makesalt(8, authctxt->user));
 		*scheme = xstrdup("md5");
 	} else if (strcmp(style, "old") == 0) {
 		*salt = xstrdup(makesalt(2, authctxt->user));
 		*scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
 	} else if (strcmp(style, "newsalt") == 0) {
 		rounds = MAX(rounds, 7250);
 		rounds = MIN(rounds, (1<<24) - 1);
 		xasprintf(salt, "_%c%c%c%c%s",
 		    pw_encode64(rounds), pw_encode64(rounds >> 6),
 		    pw_encode64(rounds >> 12), pw_encode64(rounds >> 18),
 		    makesalt(4, authctxt->user));
 		*scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
 	} else {
 		/* Default to blowfish */
 		rounds = MAX(rounds, 3);
 		rounds = MIN(rounds, 31);
 		xasprintf(salt, "$2a$%02lld$%s", rounds,
 		    makesalt(22, authctxt->user));
 		*scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
 	}
 	xfree(style);
 	debug3("%s: fake %s salt for user %s: %s",
 	    __func__, *scheme, authctxt->user, *salt);
 }

 /*
  * Fetch password hashing scheme, password salt and derive shared secret
  * for user. If user does not exist, a fake but stable and user-unique
  * salt will be returned.
  */
 void
 auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM **s,
     char **hash_scheme, char **salt)
 {
 	char *cp;
 	u_char *secret;
 	u_int secret_len, salt_len;

 #ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
 	debug3("%s: valid %d pw %.5s...", __func__,
 	    authctxt->valid, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd);
 #endif

 	*salt = NULL;
 	*hash_scheme = NULL;
 	if (authctxt->valid) {
 		if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2$", 3) == 0 &&
 		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 28) {
 			/*
 			 * old-variant bcrypt:
 			 *     "$2$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
 			 */
 			salt_len = 3 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
 			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
 			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
 			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
 		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2a$", 4) == 0 &&
 		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 29) {
 			/*
 			 * current-variant bcrypt:
 			 *     "$2a$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
 			 */
 			salt_len = 4 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
 			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
 			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
 			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
 		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$1$", 3) == 0 &&
 		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 5) {
 			/*
 			 * md5crypt:
 			 *     "$1$", salt until "$"
 			 */
 			cp = strchr(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd + 3, '$');
 			if (cp != NULL) {
 				salt_len = (cp - authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) + 1;
 				*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
 				strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
 				    salt_len);
 				*hash_scheme = xstrdup("md5crypt");
 			}
 		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "_", 1) == 0 &&
 		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 9) {
 			/*
 			 * BSDI extended crypt:
 			 *     "_", 4 digits count, 4 chars salt
 			 */
 			salt_len = 1 + 4 + 4 + 1;
 			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
 			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
 			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
 		} else if (strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) == 13  &&
 		    valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[0]) &&
 		    valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[1])) {
 			/*
 			 * traditional crypt:
 			 *     2 chars salt
 			 */
 			salt_len = 2 + 1;
 			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
 			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
 			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
 		}
 		if (*salt == NULL) {
 			debug("%s: unrecognised crypt scheme for user %s",
 			    __func__, authctxt->pw->pw_name);
 		}
 	}
 	if (*salt == NULL)
 		fake_salt_and_scheme(authctxt, salt, hash_scheme);

 	if (hash_buffer(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
 	    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd), EVP_sha256(),
 	    &secret, &secret_len) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
 	if ((*s = BN_bin2bn(secret, secret_len, NULL)) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn (secret)", __func__);
 #ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
 	debug3("%s: salt = %s (len %u)", __func__,
 	    *salt, (u_int)strlen(*salt));
 	debug3("%s: scheme = %s", __func__, *hash_scheme);
 	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((*s, "%s: s = ", __func__));
 #endif
 	bzero(secret, secret_len);
 	xfree(secret);
 }

 /*
  * Begin authentication attempt.
  * Note, sets authctxt->postponed while in subprotocol
  */
 static int
 auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
 	u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
 	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
 	char *salt, *hash_scheme;

 	debug("%s: start", __func__);

 	PRIVSEP(jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
 	    &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
 	    &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
 	    &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
 	    &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len));

 	PRIVSEP(auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s,
 	    &hash_scheme, &salt));

 	if (!use_privsep)
 		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 sending in %s", __func__));

 	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1);
 	packet_put_cstring(hash_scheme);
 	packet_put_cstring(salt);
 	packet_put_string(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
 	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x3);
 	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x4);
 	packet_put_string(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
 	packet_put_string(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();

 	bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
 	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
 	xfree(hash_scheme);
 	xfree(salt);
 	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
 	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
 	xfree(x3_proof);
 	xfree(x4_proof);

 	/* Expect step 1 packet from peer */
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1,
 	    input_userauth_jpake_client_step1);

 	authctxt->postponed = 1;
 	return 0;
 }

 /* ARGSUSED */
 static void
 input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
 	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
 	u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
 	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;

 	/* Disable this message */
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);

 	/* Fetch step 1 values */
 	if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
 	    (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
 	pctx->client_id = packet_get_string(&pctx->client_id_len);
 	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x1);
 	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x2);
 	x1_proof = packet_get_string(&x1_proof_len);
 	x2_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_proof_len);
 	packet_check_eom();

 	if (!use_privsep)
 		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 received in %s", __func__));

 	PRIVSEP(jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
 	    pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
 	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
 	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
 	    x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
 	    x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
 	    &pctx->b,
 	    &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len));

 	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
 	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
 	xfree(x1_proof);
 	xfree(x2_proof);

 	if (!use_privsep)
 		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 sending in %s", __func__));

 	/* Send values for step 2 */
 	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2);
 	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->b);
 	packet_put_string(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();

 	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
 	xfree(x4_s_proof);

 	/* Expect step 2 packet from peer */
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2,
 	    input_userauth_jpake_client_step2);
 }

 /* ARGSUSED */
 static void
 input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
 	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
 	u_char *x2_s_proof;
 	u_int x2_s_proof_len;

 	/* Disable this message */
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);

 	if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);

 	/* Fetch step 2 values */
 	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->a);
 	x2_s_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_s_proof_len);
 	packet_check_eom();

 	if (!use_privsep)
 		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 received in %s", __func__));

 	/* Derive shared key and calculate confirmation hash */
 	PRIVSEP(jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
 	    pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
 	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
 	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
 	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
 	    x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
 	    &pctx->k,
 	    &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len));

 	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
 	xfree(x2_s_proof);

 	if (!use_privsep)
 		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm sending in %s", __func__));

 	/* Send key confirmation proof */
 	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM);
 	packet_put_string(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();

 	/* Expect confirmation from peer */
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM,
 	    input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm);
 }

 /* ARGSUSED */
 static void
 input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
 {
 	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
 	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
 	int authenticated = 0;

 	/* Disable this message */
 	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);

 	pctx->h_k_cid_sessid = packet_get_string(&pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
 	packet_check_eom();

 	if (!use_privsep)
 		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm received in %s", __func__));

 	/* Verify expected confirmation hash */
 	if (PRIVSEP(jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
 	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
 	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
 	    pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len)) == 1)
 		authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
 	else
 		debug("%s: confirmation mismatch", __func__);

 	/* done */
 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
 	jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
 	authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
 	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name);
 }

 #endif /* JPAKE */
	/* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.3 2009/03/05 07:18:19 djm Exp $ */
	/*
	* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
	*
	* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
	* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
	* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
	*
	* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
	* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
	* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
	* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
	* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
	* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
	* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
	*/

	/*
	* Server side of zero-knowledge password auth using J-PAKE protocol
	* as described in:
	*
	* F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
	* 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
	*
	* http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
	*/

	#ifdef JPAKE

	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <sys/param.h>

	#include <pwd.h>
	#include <stdio.h>
	#include <string.h>
	#include <login_cap.h>

	#include <openssl/bn.h>
	#include <openssl/evp.h>

	#include "xmalloc.h"
	#include "ssh2.h"
	#include "key.h"
	#include "hostfile.h"
	#include "auth.h"
	#include "buffer.h"
	#include "packet.h"
	#include "dispatch.h"
	#include "log.h"
	#include "servconf.h"
	#include "auth-options.h"
	#include "canohost.h"
	#ifdef GSSAPI
	#include "ssh-gss.h"
	#endif
	#include "monitor_wrap.h"

	#include "schnorr.h"
	#include "jpake.h"

	/*
	* XXX options->permit_empty_passwd (at the moment, they will be refused
	* anyway because they will mismatch on fake salt.
	*/

	/* Dispatch handlers */
	static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int, u_int32_t, void *);
	static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int, u_int32_t, void *);
	static void input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);

	static int auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *);

	/* import */
	extern ServerOptions options;
	extern u_char *session_id2;
	extern u_int session_id2_len;

	/*
	* Attempt J-PAKE authentication.
	*/
	static int
	userauth_jpake(Authctxt *authctxt)
	{
	int authenticated = 0;

	packet_check_eom();

	debug("jpake-01@openssh.com requested");

	if (authctxt->user != NULL) {
	if (authctxt->jpake_ctx == NULL)
	authctxt->jpake_ctx = jpake_new();
	if (options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
	authenticated = auth2_jpake_start(authctxt);
	}

	return authenticated;
	}

	Authmethod method_jpake = {
	"jpake-01@openssh.com",
	userauth_jpake,
	&options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication
	};

	/* Clear context and callbacks */
	void
	auth2_jpake_stop(Authctxt *authctxt)
	{
	/* unregister callbacks */
	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);
	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);
	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);
	if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
	jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
	authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
	}
	}

	/* Returns 1 if 'c' is a valid crypt(3) salt character, 0 otherwise */
	static int
	valid_crypt_salt(int c)
	{
	if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
	return 1;
	if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
	return 1;
	if (c >= '.' && c <= '9')
	return 1;
	return 0;
	}

	/*
	* Derive fake salt as H(username \|\| first_private_host_key)
	* This provides relatively stable fake salts for non-existent
	* users and avoids the jpake method becoming an account validity
	* oracle.
	*/
	static void
	derive_rawsalt(const char username, u_char rawsalt, u_int len)
	{
	u_char *digest;
	u_int digest_len;
	Buffer b;
	Key *k;

	buffer_init(&b);
	buffer_put_cstring(&b, username);
	if ((k = get_hostkey_by_index(0)) == NULL \|\|
	(k->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
	fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
	switch (k->type) {
	case KEY_RSA1:
	case KEY_RSA:
	if (k->rsa->p == NULL \|\| k->rsa->q == NULL)
	fatal("%s: RSA key missing p and/or q", __func__);
	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->p);
	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->q);
	break;
	case KEY_DSA:
	if (k->dsa->priv_key == NULL)
	fatal("%s: DSA key missing priv_key", __func__);
	buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->dsa->priv_key);
	break;
	default:
	fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, k->type);
	}
	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
	&digest, &digest_len) != 0)
	fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
	buffer_free(&b);
	if (len > digest_len)
	fatal("%s: not enough bytes for rawsalt (want %u have %u)",
	__func__, len, digest_len);
	memcpy(rawsalt, digest, len);
	bzero(digest, digest_len);
	xfree(digest);
	}

	/* ASCII an integer [0, 64) for inclusion in a password/salt */
	static char
	pw_encode64(u_int i64)
	{
	const u_char e64[] =
	"./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
	return e64[i64 % 64];
	}

	/* Generate ASCII salt bytes for user */
	static char *
	makesalt(u_int want, const char *user)
	{
	u_char rawsalt[32];
	static char ret[33];
	u_int i;

	if (want > sizeof(ret) - 1)
	fatal("%s: want %u", __func__, want);

	derive_rawsalt(user, rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));
	bzero(ret, sizeof(ret));
	for (i = 0; i < want; i++)
	ret[i] = pw_encode64(rawsalt[i]);
	bzero(rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));

	return ret;
	}

	/*
	* Select the system's default password hashing scheme and generate
	* a stable fake salt under it for use by a non-existent account.
	* Prevents jpake method being used to infer the validity of accounts.
	*/
	static void
	fake_salt_and_scheme(Authctxt authctxt, char salt, char *scheme)
	{
	char rounds_s, style;
	long long rounds;
	login_cap_t *lc;


	if ((lc = login_getclass(authctxt->pw->pw_class)) == NULL &&
	(lc = login_getclass(NULL)) == NULL)
	fatal("%s: login_getclass failed", __func__);
	style = login_getcapstr(lc, "localcipher", NULL, NULL);
	if (style == NULL)
	style = xstrdup("blowfish,6");
	login_close(lc);

	if ((rounds_s = strchr(style, ',')) != NULL)
	*rounds_s++ = '\0';
	rounds = strtonum(rounds_s, 1, 1<<31, NULL);

	if (strcmp(style, "md5") == 0) {
	xasprintf(salt, "$1$%s$", makesalt(8, authctxt->user));
	*scheme = xstrdup("md5");
	} else if (strcmp(style, "old") == 0) {
	*salt = xstrdup(makesalt(2, authctxt->user));
	*scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
	} else if (strcmp(style, "newsalt") == 0) {
	rounds = MAX(rounds, 7250);
	rounds = MIN(rounds, (1<<24) - 1);
	xasprintf(salt, "_%c%c%c%c%s",
	pw_encode64(rounds), pw_encode64(rounds >> 6),
	pw_encode64(rounds >> 12), pw_encode64(rounds >> 18),
	makesalt(4, authctxt->user));
	*scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
	} else {
	/* Default to blowfish */
	rounds = MAX(rounds, 3);
	rounds = MIN(rounds, 31);
	xasprintf(salt, "$2a$%02lld$%s", rounds,
	makesalt(22, authctxt->user));
	*scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
	}
	xfree(style);
	debug3("%s: fake %s salt for user %s: %s",
	__func__, scheme, authctxt->user, salt);
	}

	/*
	* Fetch password hashing scheme, password salt and derive shared secret
	* for user. If user does not exist, a fake but stable and user-unique
	* salt will be returned.
	*/
	void
	auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt authctxt, BIGNUM *s,
	char hash_scheme, char salt)
	{
	char *cp;
	u_char *secret;
	u_int secret_len, salt_len;

	#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
	debug3("%s: valid %d pw %.5s...", __func__,
	authctxt->valid, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd);
	#endif

	*salt = NULL;
	*hash_scheme = NULL;
	if (authctxt->valid) {
	if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2$", 3) == 0 &&
	strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 28) {
	/*
	* old-variant bcrypt:
	* "$2$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
	*/
	salt_len = 3 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
	*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
	strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
	*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
	} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2a$", 4) == 0 &&
	strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 29) {
	/*
	* current-variant bcrypt:
	* "$2a$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
	*/
	salt_len = 4 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
	*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
	strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
	*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
	} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$1$", 3) == 0 &&
	strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 5) {
	/*
	* md5crypt:
	* "$1$", salt until "$"
	*/
	cp = strchr(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd + 3, '$');
	if (cp != NULL) {
	salt_len = (cp - authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) + 1;
	*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
	strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
	salt_len);
	*hash_scheme = xstrdup("md5crypt");
	}
	} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "_", 1) == 0 &&
	strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 9) {
	/*
	* BSDI extended crypt:
	* "_", 4 digits count, 4 chars salt
	*/
	salt_len = 1 + 4 + 4 + 1;
	*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
	strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
	*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
	} else if (strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) == 13 &&
	valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[0]) &&
	valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[1])) {
	/*
	* traditional crypt:
	* 2 chars salt
	*/
	salt_len = 2 + 1;
	*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
	strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
	*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
	}
	if (*salt == NULL) {
	debug("%s: unrecognised crypt scheme for user %s",
	__func__, authctxt->pw->pw_name);
	}
	}
	if (*salt == NULL)
	fake_salt_and_scheme(authctxt, salt, hash_scheme);

	if (hash_buffer(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
	strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd), EVP_sha256(),
	&secret, &secret_len) != 0)
	fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
	if ((*s = BN_bin2bn(secret, secret_len, NULL)) == NULL)
	fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn (secret)", __func__);
	#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
	debug3("%s: salt = %s (len %u)", __func__,
	salt, (u_int)strlen(salt));
	debug3("%s: scheme = %s", __func__, *hash_scheme);
	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((*s, "%s: s = ", __func__));
	#endif
	bzero(secret, secret_len);
	xfree(secret);
	}

	/*
	* Begin authentication attempt.
	* Note, sets authctxt->postponed while in subprotocol
	*/
	static int
	auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
	{
	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
	u_char x3_proof, x4_proof;
	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
	char salt, hash_scheme;

	debug("%s: start", __func__);

	PRIVSEP(jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
	&pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
	&pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
	&x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
	&x4_proof, &x4_proof_len));

	PRIVSEP(auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s,
	&hash_scheme, &salt));

	if (!use_privsep)
	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 sending in %s", __func__));

	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1);
	packet_put_cstring(hash_scheme);
	packet_put_cstring(salt);
	packet_put_string(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x3);
	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x4);
	packet_put_string(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
	packet_put_string(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
	packet_send();
	packet_write_wait();

	bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
	xfree(hash_scheme);
	xfree(salt);
	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
	xfree(x3_proof);
	xfree(x4_proof);

	/* Expect step 1 packet from peer */
	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1,
	input_userauth_jpake_client_step1);

	authctxt->postponed = 1;
	return 0;
	}

	/* ARGSUSED */
	static void
	input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
	{
	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
	u_char x1_proof, x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;

	/* Disable this message */
	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);

	/* Fetch step 1 values */
	if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL \|\|
	(pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
	fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
	pctx->client_id = packet_get_string(&pctx->client_id_len);
	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x1);
	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x2);
	x1_proof = packet_get_string(&x1_proof_len);
	x2_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_proof_len);
	packet_check_eom();

	if (!use_privsep)
	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 received in %s", __func__));

	PRIVSEP(jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
	pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
	pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
	pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
	x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
	x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
	&pctx->b,
	&x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len));

	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
	xfree(x1_proof);
	xfree(x2_proof);

	if (!use_privsep)
	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 sending in %s", __func__));

	/* Send values for step 2 */
	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2);
	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->b);
	packet_put_string(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
	packet_send();
	packet_write_wait();

	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
	xfree(x4_s_proof);

	/* Expect step 2 packet from peer */
	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2,
	input_userauth_jpake_client_step2);
	}

	/* ARGSUSED */
	static void
	input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
	{
	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
	u_char *x2_s_proof;
	u_int x2_s_proof_len;

	/* Disable this message */
	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);

	if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
	fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);

	/* Fetch step 2 values */
	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->a);
	x2_s_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_s_proof_len);
	packet_check_eom();

	if (!use_privsep)
	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 received in %s", __func__));

	/* Derive shared key and calculate confirmation hash */
	PRIVSEP(jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
	pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
	pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
	pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
	session_id2, session_id2_len,
	x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
	&pctx->k,
	&pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len));

	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
	xfree(x2_s_proof);

	if (!use_privsep)
	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm sending in %s", __func__));

	/* Send key confirmation proof */
	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM);
	packet_put_string(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
	packet_send();
	packet_write_wait();

	/* Expect confirmation from peer */
	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM,
	input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm);
	}

	/* ARGSUSED */
	static void
	input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
	{
	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
	int authenticated = 0;

	/* Disable this message */
	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);

	pctx->h_k_cid_sessid = packet_get_string(&pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
	packet_check_eom();

	if (!use_privsep)
	JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm received in %s", __func__));

	/* Verify expected confirmation hash */
	if (PRIVSEP(jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
	pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
	session_id2, session_id2_len,
	pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len)) == 1)
	authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
	else
	debug("%s: confirmation mismatch", __func__);

	/* done */
	authctxt->postponed = 0;
	jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
	authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name);
	}

	#endif /* JPAKE */