| /* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.9 2014/07/13 21:21:25 tedu Exp $ */ |
| /* |
| * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst <tedu@openbsd.org> |
| * |
| * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any |
| * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above |
| * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES |
| * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
| * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR |
| * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES |
| * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN |
| * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF |
| * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. |
| */ |
| |
| #include "includes.h" |
| |
| #ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF |
| |
| #include <sys/types.h> |
| #include <sys/param.h> |
| |
| #ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H |
| # include <stdlib.h> |
| #endif |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #ifdef HAVE_BLF_H |
| # include <blf.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "crypto_api.h" |
| #define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES |
| |
| /* |
| * pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash |
| * |
| * The bcrypt hash function is derived from the bcrypt password hashing |
| * function with the following modifications: |
| * 1. The input password and salt are preprocessed with SHA512. |
| * 2. The output length is expanded to 256 bits. |
| * 3. Subsequently the magic string to be encrypted is lengthened and modifed |
| * to "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite" |
| * 4. The hash function is defined to perform 64 rounds of initial state |
| * expansion. (More rounds are performed by iterating the hash.) |
| * |
| * Note that this implementation pulls the SHA512 operations into the caller |
| * as a performance optimization. |
| * |
| * One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material |
| * linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to |
| * generate (e.g.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an |
| * attacker can merely run once through the outer loop, but the user |
| * always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the |
| * entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a |
| * wise caller could do; we just do it for you. |
| */ |
| |
| #define BCRYPT_BLOCKS 8 |
| #define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_BLOCKS * 4) |
| |
| static void |
| bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out) |
| { |
| blf_ctx state; |
| u_int8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] = |
| "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"; |
| uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_BLOCKS]; |
| int i; |
| uint16_t j; |
| size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; |
| |
| /* key expansion */ |
| Blowfish_initstate(&state); |
| Blowfish_expandstate(&state, sha2salt, shalen, sha2pass, shalen); |
| for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { |
| Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2salt, shalen); |
| Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2pass, shalen); |
| } |
| |
| /* encryption */ |
| j = 0; |
| for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_BLOCKS; i++) |
| cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext), |
| &j); |
| for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) |
| blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t)); |
| |
| /* copy out */ |
| for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_BLOCKS; i++) { |
| out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff; |
| out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff; |
| out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff; |
| out[4 * i + 0] = cdata[i] & 0xff; |
| } |
| |
| /* zap */ |
| explicit_bzero(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext)); |
| explicit_bzero(cdata, sizeof(cdata)); |
| explicit_bzero(&state, sizeof(state)); |
| } |
| |
| int |
| bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t saltlen, |
| u_int8_t *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int rounds) |
| { |
| u_int8_t sha2pass[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| u_int8_t sha2salt[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| u_int8_t out[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]; |
| u_int8_t tmpout[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]; |
| u_int8_t *countsalt; |
| size_t i, j, amt, stride; |
| uint32_t count; |
| size_t origkeylen = keylen; |
| |
| /* nothing crazy */ |
| if (rounds < 1) |
| return -1; |
| if (passlen == 0 || saltlen == 0 || keylen == 0 || |
| keylen > sizeof(out) * sizeof(out) || saltlen > 1<<20) |
| return -1; |
| if ((countsalt = calloc(1, saltlen + 4)) == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| stride = (keylen + sizeof(out) - 1) / sizeof(out); |
| amt = (keylen + stride - 1) / stride; |
| |
| memcpy(countsalt, salt, saltlen); |
| |
| /* collapse password */ |
| crypto_hash_sha512(sha2pass, pass, passlen); |
| |
| /* generate key, sizeof(out) at a time */ |
| for (count = 1; keylen > 0; count++) { |
| countsalt[saltlen + 0] = (count >> 24) & 0xff; |
| countsalt[saltlen + 1] = (count >> 16) & 0xff; |
| countsalt[saltlen + 2] = (count >> 8) & 0xff; |
| countsalt[saltlen + 3] = count & 0xff; |
| |
| /* first round, salt is salt */ |
| crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, countsalt, saltlen + 4); |
| |
| bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout); |
| memcpy(out, tmpout, sizeof(out)); |
| |
| for (i = 1; i < rounds; i++) { |
| /* subsequent rounds, salt is previous output */ |
| crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, tmpout, sizeof(tmpout)); |
| bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout); |
| for (j = 0; j < sizeof(out); j++) |
| out[j] ^= tmpout[j]; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * pbkdf2 deviation: ouput the key material non-linearly. |
| */ |
| amt = MIN(amt, keylen); |
| for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) { |
| size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1); |
| if (dest >= origkeylen) |
| break; |
| key[dest] = out[i]; |
| } |
| keylen -= i; |
| } |
| |
| /* zap */ |
| explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out)); |
| free(countsalt); |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif /* HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */ |