| /* |
| * SSLv3/TLSv1 server-side functions |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved |
| * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 |
| * |
| * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may |
| * not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| * You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| * |
| * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| * |
| * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT |
| * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| * limitations under the License. |
| * |
| * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) |
| */ |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) |
| #include "mbedtls/config.h" |
| #else |
| #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C) |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) |
| #include "mbedtls/platform.h" |
| #else |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| #define mbedtls_calloc calloc |
| #define mbedtls_free free |
| #endif |
| |
| #include "mbedtls/debug.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/ssl.h" |
| #include "mbedtls/ssl_internal.h" |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECP_C) |
| #include "mbedtls/ecp.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
| #include "mbedtls/platform_time.h" |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| /* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ |
| static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) { |
| volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) |
| int mbedtls_ssl_set_client_transport_id( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *info, |
| size_t ilen ) |
| { |
| if( ssl->conf->endpoint != MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| mbedtls_free( ssl->cli_id ); |
| |
| if( ( ssl->cli_id = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ilen ) ) == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); |
| |
| memcpy( ssl->cli_id, info, ilen ); |
| ssl->cli_id_len = ilen; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| void mbedtls_ssl_conf_dtls_cookies( mbedtls_ssl_config *conf, |
| mbedtls_ssl_cookie_write_t *f_cookie_write, |
| mbedtls_ssl_cookie_check_t *f_cookie_check, |
| void *p_cookie ) |
| { |
| conf->f_cookie_write = f_cookie_write; |
| conf->f_cookie_check = f_cookie_check; |
| conf->p_cookie = p_cookie; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
| static int ssl_parse_servername_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t servername_list_size, hostname_len; |
| const unsigned char *p; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "parse ServerName extension" ) ); |
| |
| servername_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); |
| if( servername_list_size + 2 != len ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| p = buf + 2; |
| while( servername_list_size > 0 ) |
| { |
| hostname_len = ( ( p[1] << 8 ) | p[2] ); |
| if( hostname_len + 3 > servername_list_size ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME_HOSTNAME ) |
| { |
| ret = ssl->conf->f_sni( ssl->conf->p_sni, |
| ssl, p + 3, hostname_len ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "ssl_sni_wrapper", ret ); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| servername_list_size -= hostname_len + 3; |
| p += hostname_len + 3; |
| } |
| |
| if( servername_list_size != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ |
| |
| static int ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) |
| { |
| /* Check verify-data in constant-time. The length OTOH is no secret */ |
| if( len != 1 + ssl->verify_data_len || |
| buf[0] != ssl->verify_data_len || |
| mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( buf + 1, ssl->peer_verify_data, |
| ssl->verify_data_len ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-matching renegotiation info" ) ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
| { |
| if( len != 1 || buf[0] != 0x0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "non-zero length renegotiation info" ) ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) |
| static int ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len ) |
| { |
| size_t sig_alg_list_size; |
| const unsigned char *p; |
| const unsigned char *end = buf + len; |
| const int *md_cur; |
| |
| |
| sig_alg_list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); |
| if( sig_alg_list_size + 2 != len || |
| sig_alg_list_size % 2 != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * For now, ignore the SignatureAlgorithm part and rely on offered |
| * ciphersuites only for that part. To be fixed later. |
| * |
| * So, just look at the HashAlgorithm part. |
| */ |
| for( md_cur = ssl->conf->sig_hashes; *md_cur != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; md_cur++ ) { |
| for( p = buf + 2; p < end; p += 2 ) { |
| if( *md_cur == (int) mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( p[0] ) ) { |
| ssl->handshake->sig_alg = p[0]; |
| goto have_sig_alg; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Some key echanges do not need signatures at all */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "no signature_algorithm in common" ) ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| have_sig_alg: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, signature_algorithm ext: %d", |
| ssl->handshake->sig_alg ) ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| static int ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len ) |
| { |
| size_t list_size, our_size; |
| const unsigned char *p; |
| const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info *curve_info, **curves; |
| |
| list_size = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | ( buf[1] ) ); |
| if( list_size + 2 != len || |
| list_size % 2 != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Should never happen unless client duplicates the extension */ |
| if( ssl->handshake->curves != NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Don't allow our peer to make us allocate too much memory, |
| * and leave room for a final 0 */ |
| our_size = list_size / 2 + 1; |
| if( our_size > MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX ) |
| our_size = MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_MAX; |
| |
| if( ( curves = mbedtls_calloc( our_size, sizeof( *curves ) ) ) == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_ALLOC_FAILED ); |
| |
| ssl->handshake->curves = curves; |
| |
| p = buf + 2; |
| while( list_size > 0 && our_size > 1 ) |
| { |
| curve_info = mbedtls_ecp_curve_info_from_tls_id( ( p[0] << 8 ) | p[1] ); |
| |
| if( curve_info != NULL ) |
| { |
| *curves++ = curve_info; |
| our_size--; |
| } |
| |
| list_size -= 2; |
| p += 2; |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len ) |
| { |
| size_t list_size; |
| const unsigned char *p; |
| |
| list_size = buf[0]; |
| if( list_size + 1 != len ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| p = buf + 1; |
| while( list_size > 0 ) |
| { |
| if( p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED || |
| p[0] == MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_COMPRESSED ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) |
| ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.point_format = p[0]; |
| #endif |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx.point_format = p[0]; |
| #endif |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 4, ( "point format selected: %d", p[0] ) ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| list_size--; |
| p++; |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| static int ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| if( mbedtls_ecjpake_check( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "skip ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
| buf, len ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_one", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Only mark the extension as OK when we're sure it is */ |
| ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) |
| static int ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len ) |
| { |
| if( len != 1 || buf[0] >= MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_INVALID ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code = buf[0]; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) |
| static int ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len ) |
| { |
| if( len != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| ((void) buf); |
| |
| if( ssl->conf->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED ) |
| ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac = MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_ENABLED; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) |
| static int ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len ) |
| { |
| if( len != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| ((void) buf); |
| |
| if( ssl->conf->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED && |
| ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) |
| { |
| ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac = MBEDTLS_SSL_ETM_ENABLED; |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
| static int ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len ) |
| { |
| if( len != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| ((void) buf); |
| |
| if( ssl->conf->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED && |
| ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) |
| { |
| ssl->handshake->extended_ms = MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_ENABLED; |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| static int ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t len ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| mbedtls_ssl_session session; |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_session_init( &session ); |
| |
| if( ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse == NULL || |
| ssl->conf->f_ticket_write == NULL ) |
| { |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Remember the client asked us to send a new ticket */ |
| ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 1; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket length: %d", len ) ); |
| |
| if( len == 0 ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket rejected: renegotiating" ) ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Failures are ok: just ignore the ticket and proceed. |
| */ |
| if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_parse( ssl->conf->p_ticket, &session, |
| buf, len ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_ssl_session_free( &session ); |
| |
| if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INVALID_MAC ) |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket is not authentic" ) ); |
| else if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_SESSION_TICKET_EXPIRED ) |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ticket is expired" ) ); |
| else |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_parse", ret ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Keep the session ID sent by the client, since we MUST send it back to |
| * inform them we're accepting the ticket (RFC 5077 section 3.4) |
| */ |
| session.id_len = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; |
| memcpy( &session.id, ssl->session_negotiate->id, session.id_len ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_session_free( ssl->session_negotiate ); |
| memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate, &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); |
| |
| /* Zeroize instead of free as we copied the content */ |
| mbedtls_zeroize( &session, sizeof( mbedtls_ssl_session ) ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from ticket" ) ); |
| |
| ssl->handshake->resume = 1; |
| |
| /* Don't send a new ticket after all, this one is OK */ |
| ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) |
| static int ssl_parse_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) |
| { |
| size_t list_len, cur_len, ours_len; |
| const unsigned char *theirs, *start, *end; |
| const char **ours; |
| |
| /* If ALPN not configured, just ignore the extension */ |
| if( ssl->conf->alpn_list == NULL ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| /* |
| * opaque ProtocolName<1..2^8-1>; |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * ProtocolName protocol_name_list<2..2^16-1> |
| * } ProtocolNameList; |
| */ |
| |
| /* Min length is 2 (list_len) + 1 (name_len) + 1 (name) */ |
| if( len < 4 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| |
| list_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; |
| if( list_len != len - 2 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Use our order of preference |
| */ |
| start = buf + 2; |
| end = buf + len; |
| for( ours = ssl->conf->alpn_list; *ours != NULL; ours++ ) |
| { |
| ours_len = strlen( *ours ); |
| for( theirs = start; theirs != end; theirs += cur_len ) |
| { |
| /* If the list is well formed, we should get equality first */ |
| if( theirs > end ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| |
| cur_len = *theirs++; |
| |
| /* Empty strings MUST NOT be included */ |
| if( cur_len == 0 ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| |
| if( cur_len == ours_len && |
| memcmp( theirs, *ours, cur_len ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| ssl->alpn_chosen = *ours; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* If we get there, no match was found */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Auxiliary functions for ServerHello parsing and related actions |
| */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) |
| /* |
| * Return 0 if the given key uses one of the acceptable curves, -1 otherwise |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) |
| static int ssl_check_key_curve( mbedtls_pk_context *pk, |
| const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curves ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **crv = curves; |
| mbedtls_ecp_group_id grp_id = mbedtls_pk_ec( *pk )->grp.id; |
| |
| while( *crv != NULL ) |
| { |
| if( (*crv)->grp_id == grp_id ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| crv++; |
| } |
| |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Try picking a certificate for this ciphersuite, |
| * return 0 on success and -1 on failure. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_pick_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t * ciphersuite_info ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_ssl_key_cert *cur, *list, *fallback = NULL; |
| mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_sig_pk_alg( ciphersuite_info ); |
| uint32_t flags; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
| if( ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert != NULL ) |
| list = ssl->handshake->sni_key_cert; |
| else |
| #endif |
| list = ssl->conf->key_cert; |
| |
| if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite requires certificate" ) ); |
| |
| if( list == NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server has no certificate" ) ); |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| |
| for( cur = list; cur != NULL; cur = cur->next ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "candidate certificate chain, certificate", |
| cur->cert ); |
| |
| if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( cur->key, pk_alg ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: key type" ) ); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This avoids sending the client a cert it'll reject based on |
| * keyUsage or other extensions. |
| * |
| * It also allows the user to provision different certificates for |
| * different uses based on keyUsage, eg if they want to avoid signing |
| * and decrypting with the same RSA key. |
| */ |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_check_cert_usage( cur->cert, ciphersuite_info, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_IS_SERVER, &flags ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: " |
| "(extended) key usage extension" ) ); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) |
| if( pk_alg == MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA && |
| ssl_check_key_curve( cur->key, ssl->handshake->curves ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate mismatch: elliptic curve" ) ); |
| continue; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * Try to select a SHA-1 certificate for pre-1.2 clients, but still |
| * present them a SHA-higher cert rather than failing if it's the only |
| * one we got that satisfies the other conditions. |
| */ |
| if( ssl->minor_ver < MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 && |
| cur->cert->sig_md != MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1 ) |
| { |
| if( fallback == NULL ) |
| fallback = cur; |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "certificate not preferred: " |
| "sha-2 with pre-TLS 1.2 client" ) ); |
| continue; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* If we get there, we got a winner */ |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| if( cur == NULL ) |
| cur = fallback; |
| |
| /* Do not update ssl->handshake->key_cert unless there is a match */ |
| if( cur != NULL ) |
| { |
| ssl->handshake->key_cert = cur; |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_CRT( 3, "selected certificate chain, certificate", |
| ssl->handshake->key_cert->cert ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| return( -1 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if a given ciphersuite is suitable for use with our config/keys/etc |
| * Sets ciphersuite_info only if the suite matches. |
| */ |
| static int ssl_ciphersuite_match( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, int suite_id, |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t **ciphersuite_info ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite_info; |
| |
| suite_info = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( suite_id ); |
| if( suite_info == NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "trying ciphersuite: %s", suite_info->name ) ); |
| |
| if( suite_info->min_minor_ver > ssl->minor_ver || |
| suite_info->max_minor_ver < ssl->minor_ver ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: version" ) ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && |
| ( suite_info->flags & MBEDTLS_CIPHERSUITE_NODTLS ) ) |
| return( 0 ); |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ARC4_C) |
| if( ssl->conf->arc4_disabled == MBEDTLS_SSL_ARC4_DISABLED && |
| suite_info->cipher == MBEDTLS_CIPHER_ARC4_128 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: rc4" ) ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| if( suite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE && |
| ( ssl->handshake->cli_exts & MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP_OK ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: ecjpake " |
| "not configured or ext missing" ) ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_ec( suite_info ) && |
| ( ssl->handshake->curves == NULL || |
| ssl->handshake->curves[0] == NULL ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: " |
| "no common elliptic curve" ) ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) |
| /* If the ciphersuite requires a pre-shared key and we don't |
| * have one, skip it now rather than failing later */ |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_uses_psk( suite_info ) && |
| ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL && |
| ( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL || |
| ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: no pre-shared key" ) ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_X509_CRT_PARSE_C) |
| /* |
| * Final check: if ciphersuite requires us to have a |
| * certificate/key of a particular type: |
| * - select the appropriate certificate if we have one, or |
| * - try the next ciphersuite if we don't |
| * This must be done last since we modify the key_cert list. |
| */ |
| if( ssl_pick_cert( ssl, suite_info ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciphersuite mismatch: " |
| "no suitable certificate" ) ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| *ciphersuite_info = suite_info; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) |
| static int ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret, got_common_suite; |
| unsigned int i, j; |
| size_t n; |
| unsigned int ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len; |
| unsigned char *buf, *p; |
| const int *ciphersuites; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello v2" ) ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client hello v2 illegal for renegotiation" ) ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
| |
| buf = ssl->in_hdr; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, 5 ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, message type: %d", |
| buf[2] ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, message len.: %d", |
| ( ( buf[0] & 0x7F ) << 8 ) | buf[1] ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v2, max. version: [%d:%d]", |
| buf[3], buf[4] ) ); |
| |
| /* |
| * SSLv2 Client Hello |
| * |
| * Record layer: |
| * 0 . 1 message length |
| * |
| * SSL layer: |
| * 2 . 2 message type |
| * 3 . 4 protocol version |
| */ |
| if( buf[2] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO || |
| buf[3] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| n = ( ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1] ) & 0x7FFF; |
| |
| if( n < 17 || n > 512 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->major_ver = MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3; |
| ssl->minor_ver = ( buf[4] <= ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) |
| ? buf[4] : ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; |
| |
| if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" |
| " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", |
| ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, |
| ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = buf[3]; |
| ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = buf[4]; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 2 + n ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf + 2, n ); |
| |
| buf = ssl->in_msg; |
| n = ssl->in_left - 5; |
| |
| /* |
| * 0 . 1 ciphersuitelist length |
| * 2 . 3 session id length |
| * 4 . 5 challenge length |
| * 6 . .. ciphersuitelist |
| * .. . .. session id |
| * .. . .. challenge |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record contents", buf, n ); |
| |
| ciph_len = ( buf[0] << 8 ) | buf[1]; |
| sess_len = ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3]; |
| chal_len = ( buf[4] << 8 ) | buf[5]; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "ciph_len: %d, sess_len: %d, chal_len: %d", |
| ciph_len, sess_len, chal_len ) ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Make sure each parameter length is valid |
| */ |
| if( ciph_len < 3 || ( ciph_len % 3 ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| if( sess_len > 32 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| if( chal_len < 8 || chal_len > 32 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| if( n != 6 + ciph_len + sess_len + chal_len ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", |
| buf + 6, ciph_len ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", |
| buf + 6 + ciph_len, sess_len ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, challenge", |
| buf + 6 + ciph_len + sess_len, chal_len ); |
| |
| p = buf + 6 + ciph_len; |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; |
| memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, |
| sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) ); |
| memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, p, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); |
| |
| p += sess_len; |
| memset( ssl->handshake->randbytes, 0, 64 ); |
| memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32 - chal_len, p, chal_len ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV |
| */ |
| for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 ) |
| { |
| if( p[0] == 0 && p[1] == 0 && p[2] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO " ) ); |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV " |
| "during renegotiation" ) ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
| ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) |
| for( i = 0, p = buf + 6; i < ciph_len; i += 3, p += 3 ) |
| { |
| if( p[0] == 0 && |
| p[1] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ) & 0xff ) && |
| p[2] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) & 0xff ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); |
| |
| if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inapropriate fallback" ) ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK ); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ |
| |
| got_common_suite = 0; |
| ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; |
| ciphersuite_info = NULL; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) |
| for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 ) |
| { |
| for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) |
| #else |
| for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) |
| { |
| for( j = 0, p = buf + 6; j < ciph_len; j += 3, p += 3 ) |
| #endif |
| { |
| if( p[0] != 0 || |
| p[1] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || |
| p[2] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] ) & 0xFF ) ) |
| continue; |
| |
| got_common_suite = 1; |
| |
| if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i], |
| &ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) |
| goto have_ciphersuite_v2; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if( got_common_suite ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, " |
| "but none of them usable" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE ); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); |
| } |
| |
| have_ciphersuite_v2: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) ); |
| |
| ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; |
| ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; |
| mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info ); |
| |
| /* |
| * SSLv2 Client Hello relevant renegotiation security checks |
| */ |
| if( ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && |
| ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->in_left = 0; |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello v2" ) ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO */ |
| |
| static int ssl_parse_client_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret, got_common_suite; |
| size_t i, j; |
| size_t ciph_offset, comp_offset, ext_offset; |
| size_t msg_len, ciph_len, sess_len, comp_len, ext_len; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| size_t cookie_offset, cookie_len; |
| #endif |
| unsigned char *buf, *p, *ext; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| int renegotiation_info_seen = 0; |
| #endif |
| int handshake_failure = 0; |
| const int *ciphersuites; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; |
| int major, minor; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client hello" ) ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) |
| read_record_header: |
| #endif |
| /* |
| * If renegotiating, then the input was read with mbedtls_ssl_read_record(), |
| * otherwise read it ourselves manually in order to support SSLv2 |
| * ClientHello, which doesn't use the same record layer format. |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) |
| #endif |
| { |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, 5 ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| buf = ssl->in_hdr; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_SUPPORT_SSLV2_CLIENT_HELLO) |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_STREAM ) |
| #endif |
| if( ( buf[0] & 0x80 ) != 0 ) |
| return ssl_parse_client_hello_v2( ssl ); |
| #endif |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record header", buf, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) ); |
| |
| /* |
| * SSLv3/TLS Client Hello |
| * |
| * Record layer: |
| * 0 . 0 message type |
| * 1 . 2 protocol version |
| * 3 . 11 DTLS: epoch + record sequence number |
| * 3 . 4 message length |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, message type: %d", |
| buf[0] ) ); |
| |
| if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, message len.: %d", |
| ( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1] ) ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, protocol version: [%d:%d]", |
| buf[1], buf[2] ) ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &major, &minor, ssl->conf->transport, buf + 1 ); |
| |
| /* According to RFC 5246 Appendix E.1, the version here is typically |
| * "{03,00}, the lowest version number supported by the client, [or] the |
| * value of ClientHello.client_version", so the only meaningful check here |
| * is the major version shouldn't be less than 3 */ |
| if( major < MBEDTLS_SSL_MAJOR_VERSION_3 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| /* For DTLS if this is the initial handshake, remember the client sequence |
| * number to use it in our next message (RFC 6347 4.2.1) */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE |
| #endif |
| ) |
| { |
| /* Epoch should be 0 for initial handshakes */ |
| if( ssl->in_ctr[0] != 0 || ssl->in_ctr[1] != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| memcpy( ssl->out_ctr + 2, ssl->in_ctr + 2, 6 ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_ANTI_REPLAY) |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_check( ssl ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "replayed record, discarding" ) ); |
| ssl->next_record_offset = 0; |
| ssl->in_left = 0; |
| goto read_record_header; |
| } |
| |
| /* No MAC to check yet, so we can update right now */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_dtls_replay_update( ssl ); |
| #endif |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
| |
| msg_len = ( ssl->in_len[0] << 8 ) | ssl->in_len[1]; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) |
| { |
| /* Set by mbedtls_ssl_read_record() */ |
| msg_len = ssl->in_hslen; |
| } |
| else |
| #endif |
| { |
| if( msg_len > MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input( ssl, mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ) + msg_len ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_fetch_input", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Done reading this record, get ready for the next one */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) |
| ssl->next_record_offset = msg_len + mbedtls_ssl_hdr_len( ssl ); |
| else |
| #endif |
| ssl->in_left = 0; |
| } |
| |
| buf = ssl->in_msg; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 4, "record contents", buf, msg_len ); |
| |
| ssl->handshake->update_checksum( ssl, buf, msg_len ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Handshake layer: |
| * 0 . 0 handshake type |
| * 1 . 3 handshake length |
| * 4 . 5 DTLS only: message seqence number |
| * 6 . 8 DTLS only: fragment offset |
| * 9 . 11 DTLS only: fragment length |
| */ |
| if( msg_len < mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake type: %d", buf[0] ) ); |
| |
| if( buf[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "client hello v3, handshake len.: %d", |
| ( buf[1] << 16 ) | ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) ); |
| |
| /* We don't support fragmentation of ClientHello (yet?) */ |
| if( buf[1] != 0 || |
| msg_len != mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ) + ( ( buf[2] << 8 ) | buf[3] ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Copy the client's handshake message_seq on initial handshakes, |
| * check sequence number on renego. |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) |
| { |
| /* This couldn't be done in ssl_prepare_handshake_record() */ |
| unsigned int cli_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | |
| ssl->in_msg[5]; |
| |
| if( cli_msg_seq != ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message_seq: " |
| "%d (expected %d)", cli_msg_seq, |
| ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq++; |
| } |
| else |
| #endif |
| { |
| unsigned int cli_msg_seq = ( ssl->in_msg[4] << 8 ) | |
| ssl->in_msg[5]; |
| ssl->handshake->out_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq; |
| ssl->handshake->in_msg_seq = cli_msg_seq + 1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * For now we don't support fragmentation, so make sure |
| * fragment_offset == 0 and fragment_length == length |
| */ |
| if( ssl->in_msg[6] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[7] != 0 || ssl->in_msg[8] != 0 || |
| memcmp( ssl->in_msg + 1, ssl->in_msg + 9, 3 ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "ClientHello fragmentation not supported" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE ); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
| |
| buf += mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); |
| msg_len -= mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); |
| |
| /* |
| * ClientHello layer: |
| * 0 . 1 protocol version |
| * 2 . 33 random bytes (starting with 4 bytes of Unix time) |
| * 34 . 35 session id length (1 byte) |
| * 35 . 34+x session id |
| * 35+x . 35+x DTLS only: cookie length (1 byte) |
| * 36+x . .. DTLS only: cookie |
| * .. . .. ciphersuite list length (2 bytes) |
| * .. . .. ciphersuite list |
| * .. . .. compression alg. list length (1 byte) |
| * .. . .. compression alg. list |
| * .. . .. extensions length (2 bytes, optional) |
| * .. . .. extensions (optional) |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Minimal length (with everything empty and extensions ommitted) is |
| * 2 + 32 + 1 + 2 + 1 = 38 bytes. Check that first, so that we can |
| * read at least up to session id length without worrying. |
| */ |
| if( msg_len < 38 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check and save the protocol version |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, version", buf, 2 ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_read_version( &ssl->major_ver, &ssl->minor_ver, |
| ssl->conf->transport, buf ); |
| |
| ssl->handshake->max_major_ver = ssl->major_ver; |
| ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver = ssl->minor_ver; |
| |
| if( ssl->major_ver < ssl->conf->min_major_ver || |
| ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "client only supports ssl smaller than minimum" |
| " [%d:%d] < [%d:%d]", |
| ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, |
| ssl->conf->min_major_ver, ssl->conf->min_minor_ver ) ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_PROTOCOL_VERSION ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ssl->major_ver > ssl->conf->max_major_ver ) |
| { |
| ssl->major_ver = ssl->conf->max_major_ver; |
| ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; |
| } |
| else if( ssl->minor_ver > ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) |
| ssl->minor_ver = ssl->conf->max_minor_ver; |
| |
| /* |
| * Save client random (inc. Unix time) |
| */ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, random bytes", buf + 2, 32 ); |
| |
| memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes, buf + 2, 32 ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the session ID length and save session ID |
| */ |
| sess_len = buf[34]; |
| |
| if( sess_len > sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) || |
| sess_len + 34 + 2 > msg_len ) /* 2 for cipherlist length field */ |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, session id", buf + 35, sess_len ); |
| |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = sess_len; |
| memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, |
| sizeof( ssl->session_negotiate->id ) ); |
| memcpy( ssl->session_negotiate->id, buf + 35, |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the cookie length and content |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) |
| { |
| cookie_offset = 35 + sess_len; |
| cookie_len = buf[cookie_offset]; |
| |
| if( cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len + 2 > msg_len ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, cookie", |
| buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) |
| if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check != NULL |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| && ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE |
| #endif |
| ) |
| { |
| if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_check( ssl->conf->p_cookie, |
| buf + cookie_offset + 1, cookie_len, |
| ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification failed" ) ); |
| ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 1; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification passed" ) ); |
| ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ |
| { |
| /* We know we didn't send a cookie, so it should be empty */ |
| if( cookie_len != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "cookie verification skipped" ) ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the ciphersuitelist length (will be parsed later) |
| */ |
| ciph_offset = cookie_offset + 1 + cookie_len; |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS */ |
| ciph_offset = 35 + sess_len; |
| |
| ciph_len = ( buf[ciph_offset + 0] << 8 ) |
| | ( buf[ciph_offset + 1] ); |
| |
| if( ciph_len < 2 || |
| ciph_len + 2 + ciph_offset + 1 > msg_len || /* 1 for comp. alg. len */ |
| ( ciph_len % 2 ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, ciphersuitelist", |
| buf + ciph_offset + 2, ciph_len ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the compression algorithms length and pick one |
| */ |
| comp_offset = ciph_offset + 2 + ciph_len; |
| |
| comp_len = buf[comp_offset]; |
| |
| if( comp_len < 1 || |
| comp_len > 16 || |
| comp_len + comp_offset + 1 > msg_len ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello, compression", |
| buf + comp_offset + 1, comp_len ); |
| |
| ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ZLIB_SUPPORT) |
| for( i = 0; i < comp_len; ++i ) |
| { |
| if( buf[comp_offset + 1 + i] == MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE ) |
| { |
| ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_DEFLATE; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* See comments in ssl_write_client_hello() */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) |
| ssl->session_negotiate->compression = MBEDTLS_SSL_COMPRESS_NULL; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Do not parse the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) |
| if( ( ssl->major_ver != 3 ) || ( ssl->minor_ver != 0 ) ) |
| { |
| #endif |
| /* |
| * Check the extension length |
| */ |
| ext_offset = comp_offset + 1 + comp_len; |
| if( msg_len > ext_offset ) |
| { |
| if( msg_len < ext_offset + 2 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| ext_len = ( buf[ext_offset + 0] << 8 ) |
| | ( buf[ext_offset + 1] ); |
| |
| if( ( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) || |
| msg_len != ext_offset + 2 + ext_len ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| ext_len = 0; |
| |
| ext = buf + ext_offset + 2; |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "client hello extensions", ext, ext_len ); |
| |
| while( ext_len != 0 ) |
| { |
| unsigned int ext_id = ( ( ext[0] << 8 ) |
| | ( ext[1] ) ); |
| unsigned int ext_size = ( ( ext[2] << 8 ) |
| | ( ext[3] ) ); |
| |
| if( ext_size + 4 > ext_len ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| switch( ext_id ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SERVERNAME: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ServerName extension" ) ); |
| if( ssl->conf->f_sni == NULL ) |
| break; |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_servername_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION */ |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found renegotiation extension" ) ); |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| renegotiation_info_seen = 1; |
| #endif |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_renegotiation_info( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) && \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SIG_ALG: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found signature_algorithms extension" ) ); |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) |
| break; |
| #endif |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_signature_algorithms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 && |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__WITH_CERT__ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVES: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported elliptic curves extension" ) ); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_supported_elliptic_curves( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found supported point formats extension" ) ); |
| ssl->handshake->cli_exts |= MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT; |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_supported_point_formats( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_ecjpake_kkpp( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found max fragment length extension" ) ); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found truncated hmac extension" ) ); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found encrypt then mac extension" ) ); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found extended master secret extension" ) ); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_extended_ms_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found session ticket extension" ) ); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) |
| case MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "found alpn extension" ) ); |
| |
| ret = ssl_parse_alpn_ext( ssl, ext + 4, ext_size ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| break; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
| |
| default: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "unknown extension found: %d (ignoring)", |
| ext_id ) ); |
| } |
| |
| ext_len -= 4 + ext_size; |
| ext += 4 + ext_size; |
| |
| if( ext_len > 0 && ext_len < 4 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client hello message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| } |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV) |
| for( i = 0, p = buf + 41 + sess_len; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 ) |
| { |
| if( p[0] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE >> 8 ) & 0xff ) && |
| p[1] == (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV_VALUE ) & 0xff ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "received FALLBACK_SCSV" ) ); |
| |
| if( ssl->minor_ver < ssl->conf->max_minor_ver ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inapropriate fallback" ) ); |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_INAPROPRIATE_FALLBACK ); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_FALLBACK_SCSV */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV |
| */ |
| for( i = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; i < ciph_len; i += 2, p += 2 ) |
| { |
| if( p[0] == 0 && p[1] == MBEDTLS_SSL_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "received TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO " ) ); |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "received RENEGOTIATION SCSV during renegotiation" ) ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| ssl->secure_renegotiation = MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Renegotiation security checks |
| */ |
| if( ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && |
| ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_BREAK_HANDSHAKE ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation, breaking off handshake" ) ); |
| handshake_failure = 1; |
| } |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && |
| ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION && |
| renegotiation_info_seen == 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension missing (secure)" ) ); |
| handshake_failure = 1; |
| } |
| else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && |
| ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && |
| ssl->conf->allow_legacy_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_NO_RENEGOTIATION ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "legacy renegotiation not allowed" ) ); |
| handshake_failure = 1; |
| } |
| else if( ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION_IN_PROGRESS && |
| ssl->secure_renegotiation == MBEDTLS_SSL_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION && |
| renegotiation_info_seen == 1 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "renegotiation_info extension present (legacy)" ) ); |
| handshake_failure = 1; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
| |
| if( handshake_failure == 1 ) |
| { |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_HELLO ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Search for a matching ciphersuite |
| * (At the end because we need information from the EC-based extensions |
| * and certificate from the SNI callback triggered by the SNI extension.) |
| */ |
| got_common_suite = 0; |
| ciphersuites = ssl->conf->ciphersuite_list[ssl->minor_ver]; |
| ciphersuite_info = NULL; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_RESPECT_CLIENT_PREFERENCE) |
| for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) |
| { |
| for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) |
| #else |
| for( i = 0; ciphersuites[i] != 0; i++ ) |
| { |
| for( j = 0, p = buf + ciph_offset + 2; j < ciph_len; j += 2, p += 2 ) |
| #endif |
| { |
| if( p[0] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || |
| p[1] != ( ( ciphersuites[i] ) & 0xFF ) ) |
| continue; |
| |
| got_common_suite = 1; |
| |
| if( ( ret = ssl_ciphersuite_match( ssl, ciphersuites[i], |
| &ciphersuite_info ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| if( ciphersuite_info != NULL ) |
| goto have_ciphersuite; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if( got_common_suite ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got ciphersuites in common, " |
| "but none of them usable" ) ); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_USABLE_CIPHERSUITE ); |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no ciphersuites in common" ) ); |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_fatal_handshake_failure( ssl ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); |
| } |
| |
| have_ciphersuite: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "selected ciphersuite: %s", ciphersuite_info->name ) ); |
| |
| ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite = ciphersuites[i]; |
| ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info = ciphersuite_info; |
| mbedtls_ssl_optimize_checksum( ssl, ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info ); |
| |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) |
| mbedtls_ssl_recv_flight_completed( ssl ); |
| #endif |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client hello" ) ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) |
| static void ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen ) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| |
| if( ssl->session_negotiate->trunc_hmac == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNC_HMAC_DISABLED ) |
| { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding truncated hmac extension" ) ); |
| |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_TRUNCATED_HMAC ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| |
| *olen = 4; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) |
| static void ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen ) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *suite = NULL; |
| const mbedtls_cipher_info_t *cipher = NULL; |
| |
| if( ssl->session_negotiate->encrypt_then_mac == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || |
| ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) |
| { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * RFC 7366: "If a server receives an encrypt-then-MAC request extension |
| * from a client and then selects a stream or Authenticated Encryption |
| * with Associated Data (AEAD) ciphersuite, it MUST NOT send an |
| * encrypt-then-MAC response extension back to the client." |
| */ |
| if( ( suite = mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_from_id( |
| ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) == NULL || |
| ( cipher = mbedtls_cipher_info_from_type( suite->cipher ) ) == NULL || |
| cipher->mode != MBEDTLS_MODE_CBC ) |
| { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding encrypt then mac extension" ) ); |
| |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| |
| *olen = 4; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
| static void ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen ) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| |
| if( ssl->handshake->extended_ms == MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MS_DISABLED || |
| ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) |
| { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding extended master secret " |
| "extension" ) ); |
| |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| |
| *olen = 4; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| static void ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen ) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| |
| if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket == 0 ) |
| { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding session ticket extension" ) ); |
| |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SESSION_TICKET ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| |
| *olen = 4; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
| |
| static void ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen ) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| |
| if( ssl->secure_renegotiation != MBEDTLS_SSL_SECURE_RENEGOTIATION ) |
| { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, secure renegotiation extension" ) ); |
| |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_RENEGOTIATION_INFO ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| if( ssl->renego_status != MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE ) |
| { |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = ( ssl->verify_data_len * 2 + 1 ) & 0xFF; |
| *p++ = ssl->verify_data_len * 2 & 0xFF; |
| |
| memcpy( p, ssl->peer_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); |
| p += ssl->verify_data_len; |
| memcpy( p, ssl->own_verify_data, ssl->verify_data_len ); |
| p += ssl->verify_data_len; |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION */ |
| { |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 0x01; |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| } |
| |
| *olen = p - buf; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) |
| static void ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen ) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| |
| if( ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code == MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAG_LEN_NONE ) |
| { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, max_fragment_length extension" ) ); |
| |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 1; |
| |
| *p++ = ssl->session_negotiate->mfl_code; |
| |
| *olen = 5; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| static void ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen ) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| ((void) ssl); |
| |
| if( ( ssl->handshake->cli_exts & |
| MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS_PRESENT ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, supported_point_formats extension" ) ); |
| |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_SUPPORTED_POINT_FORMATS ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| *p++ = 0x00; |
| *p++ = 2; |
| |
| *p++ = 1; |
| *p++ = MBEDTLS_ECP_PF_UNCOMPRESSED; |
| |
| *olen = 6; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C || MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| static void ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, |
| size_t *olen ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| unsigned char *p = buf; |
| const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; |
| size_t kkpp_len; |
| |
| *olen = 0; |
| |
| /* Skip costly computation if not needed */ |
| if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->key_exchange != |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) |
| return; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, ecjpake kkpp extension" ) ); |
| |
| if( end - p < 4 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "buffer too small" ) ); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ECJPAKE_KKPP ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
| p + 2, end - p - 2, &kkpp_len, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1 , "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_one", ret ); |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( kkpp_len ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| *olen = kkpp_len + 4; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN ) |
| static void ssl_write_alpn_ext( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| unsigned char *buf, size_t *olen ) |
| { |
| if( ssl->alpn_chosen == NULL ) |
| { |
| *olen = 0; |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, adding alpn extension" ) ); |
| |
| /* |
| * 0 . 1 ext identifier |
| * 2 . 3 ext length |
| * 4 . 5 protocol list length |
| * 6 . 6 protocol name length |
| * 7 . 7+n protocol name |
| */ |
| buf[0] = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| buf[1] = (unsigned char)( ( MBEDTLS_TLS_EXT_ALPN ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| *olen = 7 + strlen( ssl->alpn_chosen ); |
| |
| buf[2] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| buf[3] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 4 ) ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| buf[4] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| buf[5] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 6 ) ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| buf[6] = (unsigned char)( ( ( *olen - 7 ) ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| memcpy( buf + 7, ssl->alpn_chosen, *olen - 7 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_ECDH_C || MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) |
| static int ssl_write_hello_verify_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4; |
| unsigned char *cookie_len_byte; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write hello verify request" ) ); |
| |
| /* |
| * struct { |
| * ProtocolVersion server_version; |
| * opaque cookie<0..2^8-1>; |
| * } HelloVerifyRequest; |
| */ |
| |
| /* The RFC is not clear on this point, but sending the actual negotiated |
| * version looks like the most interoperable thing to do. */ |
| mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, |
| ssl->conf->transport, p ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server version", p, 2 ); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| /* If we get here, f_cookie_check is not null */ |
| if( ssl->conf->f_cookie_write == NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "inconsistent cookie callbacks" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Skip length byte until we know the length */ |
| cookie_len_byte = p++; |
| |
| if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_cookie_write( ssl->conf->p_cookie, |
| &p, ssl->out_buf + MBEDTLS_SSL_BUFFER_LEN, |
| ssl->cli_id, ssl->cli_id_len ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "f_cookie_write", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| *cookie_len_byte = (unsigned char)( p - ( cookie_len_byte + 1 ) ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "cookie sent", cookie_len_byte + 1, *cookie_len_byte ); |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen = p - ssl->out_msg; |
| ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
| ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; |
| |
| ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write hello verify request" ) ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ |
| |
| static int ssl_write_server_hello( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
| mbedtls_time_t t; |
| #endif |
| int ret; |
| size_t olen, ext_len = 0, n; |
| unsigned char *buf, *p; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello" ) ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY) |
| if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && |
| ssl->handshake->verify_cookie_len != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "client hello was not authenticated" ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) ); |
| |
| return( ssl_write_hello_verify_request( ssl ) ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_DTLS_HELLO_VERIFY */ |
| |
| if( ssl->conf->f_rng == NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no RNG provided") ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_RNG ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * 0 . 0 handshake type |
| * 1 . 3 handshake length |
| * 4 . 5 protocol version |
| * 6 . 9 UNIX time() |
| * 10 . 37 random bytes |
| */ |
| buf = ssl->out_msg; |
| p = buf + 4; |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->major_ver, ssl->minor_ver, |
| ssl->conf->transport, p ); |
| p += 2; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen version: [%d:%d]", |
| buf[4], buf[5] ) ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
| t = mbedtls_time( NULL ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 24 ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 16 ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( t >> 8 ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( t ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, current time: %lu", t ) ); |
| #else |
| if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 4 ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| p += 4; |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME */ |
| |
| if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, p, 28 ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| p += 28; |
| |
| memcpy( ssl->handshake->randbytes + 32, buf + 6, 32 ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, random bytes", buf + 6, 32 ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Resume is 0 by default, see ssl_handshake_init(). |
| * It may be already set to 1 by ssl_parse_session_ticket_ext(). |
| * If not, try looking up session ID in our cache. |
| */ |
| if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 && |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_RENEGOTIATION) |
| ssl->renego_status == MBEDTLS_SSL_INITIAL_HANDSHAKE && |
| #endif |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id_len != 0 && |
| ssl->conf->f_get_cache != NULL && |
| ssl->conf->f_get_cache( ssl->conf->p_cache, ssl->session_negotiate ) == 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "session successfully restored from cache" ) ); |
| ssl->handshake->resume = 1; |
| } |
| |
| if( ssl->handshake->resume == 0 ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * New session, create a new session id, |
| * unless we're about to issue a session ticket |
| */ |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_HAVE_TIME) |
| ssl->session_negotiate->start = mbedtls_time( NULL ); |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 ) |
| { |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 0; |
| memset( ssl->session_negotiate->id, 0, 32 ); |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
| { |
| ssl->session_negotiate->id_len = n = 32; |
| if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, ssl->session_negotiate->id, |
| n ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* |
| * Resuming a session |
| */ |
| n = ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; |
| ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * 38 . 38 session id length |
| * 39 . 38+n session id |
| * 39+n . 40+n chosen ciphersuite |
| * 41+n . 41+n chosen compression alg. |
| * 42+n . 43+n extensions length |
| * 44+n . 43+n+m extensions |
| */ |
| *p++ = (unsigned char) ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; |
| memcpy( p, ssl->session_negotiate->id, ssl->session_negotiate->id_len ); |
| p += ssl->session_negotiate->id_len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, session id len.: %d", n ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "server hello, session id", buf + 39, n ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "%s session has been resumed", |
| ssl->handshake->resume ? "a" : "no" ) ); |
| |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite >> 8 ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ssl->session_negotiate->compression ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, chosen ciphersuite: %s", |
| mbedtls_ssl_get_ciphersuite_name( ssl->session_negotiate->ciphersuite ) ) ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, compress alg.: 0x%02X", |
| ssl->session_negotiate->compression ) ); |
| |
| /* Do not write the extensions if the protocol is SSLv3 */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) |
| if( ( ssl->major_ver != 3 ) || ( ssl->minor_ver != 0 ) ) |
| { |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * First write extensions, then the total length |
| */ |
| ssl_write_renegotiation_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH) |
| ssl_write_max_fragment_length_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_TRUNCATED_HMAC) |
| ssl_write_truncated_hmac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) |
| ssl_write_encrypt_then_mac_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET) |
| ssl_write_extended_ms_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| ssl_write_session_ticket_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDH_C) || defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| ssl_write_supported_point_formats_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| ssl_write_ecjpake_kkpp_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_ALPN) |
| ssl_write_alpn_ext( ssl, p + 2 + ext_len, &olen ); |
| ext_len += olen; |
| #endif |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 3, ( "server hello, total extension length: %d", ext_len ) ); |
| |
| if( ext_len > 0 ) |
| { |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( ( ext_len ) & 0xFF ); |
| p += ext_len; |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; |
| ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
| ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello" ) ); |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
| !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
| !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
| !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) |
| static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) ); |
| |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) ); |
| ssl->state++; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| #else |
| static int ssl_write_certificate_request( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
| size_t dn_size, total_dn_size; /* excluding length bytes */ |
| size_t ct_len, sa_len; /* including length bytes */ |
| unsigned char *buf, *p; |
| const unsigned char * const end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; |
| const mbedtls_x509_crt *crt; |
| int authmode; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write certificate request" ) ); |
| |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
| if( ssl->handshake->sni_authmode != MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_UNSET ) |
| authmode = ssl->handshake->sni_authmode; |
| else |
| #endif |
| authmode = ssl->conf->authmode; |
| |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE || |
| authmode == MBEDTLS_SSL_VERIFY_NONE ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write certificate request" ) ); |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * 0 . 0 handshake type |
| * 1 . 3 handshake length |
| * 4 . 4 cert type count |
| * 5 .. m-1 cert types |
| * m .. m+1 sig alg length (TLS 1.2 only) |
| * m+1 .. n-1 SignatureAndHashAlgorithms (TLS 1.2 only) |
| * n .. n+1 length of all DNs |
| * n+2 .. n+3 length of DN 1 |
| * n+4 .. ... Distinguished Name #1 |
| * ... .. ... length of DN 2, etc. |
| */ |
| buf = ssl->out_msg; |
| p = buf + 4; |
| |
| /* |
| * Supported certificate types |
| * |
| * ClientCertificateType certificate_types<1..2^8-1>; |
| * enum { (255) } ClientCertificateType; |
| */ |
| ct_len = 0; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) |
| p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_RSA_SIGN; |
| #endif |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) |
| p[1 + ct_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_CERT_TYPE_ECDSA_SIGN; |
| #endif |
| |
| p[0] = (unsigned char) ct_len++; |
| p += ct_len; |
| |
| sa_len = 0; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
| /* |
| * Add signature_algorithms for verify (TLS 1.2) |
| * |
| * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm supported_signature_algorithms<2..2^16-2>; |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * HashAlgorithm hash; |
| * SignatureAlgorithm signature; |
| * } SignatureAndHashAlgorithm; |
| * |
| * enum { (255) } HashAlgorithm; |
| * enum { (255) } SignatureAlgorithm; |
| */ |
| if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Only use current running hash algorithm that is already required |
| * for requested ciphersuite. |
| */ |
| ssl->handshake->verify_sig_alg = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA256; |
| |
| if( ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info->mac == |
| MBEDTLS_MD_SHA384 ) |
| { |
| ssl->handshake->verify_sig_alg = MBEDTLS_SSL_HASH_SHA384; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Supported signature algorithms |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) |
| p[2 + sa_len++] = ssl->handshake->verify_sig_alg; |
| p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_RSA; |
| #endif |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) |
| p[2 + sa_len++] = ssl->handshake->verify_sig_alg; |
| p[2 + sa_len++] = MBEDTLS_SSL_SIG_ECDSA; |
| #endif |
| |
| p[0] = (unsigned char)( sa_len >> 8 ); |
| p[1] = (unsigned char)( sa_len ); |
| sa_len += 2; |
| p += sa_len; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |
| |
| /* |
| * DistinguishedName certificate_authorities<0..2^16-1>; |
| * opaque DistinguishedName<1..2^16-1>; |
| */ |
| p += 2; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_NAME_INDICATION) |
| if( ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain != NULL ) |
| crt = ssl->handshake->sni_ca_chain; |
| else |
| #endif |
| crt = ssl->conf->ca_chain; |
| |
| total_dn_size = 0; |
| while( crt != NULL && crt->version != 0 ) |
| { |
| dn_size = crt->subject_raw.len; |
| |
| if( end < p || |
| (size_t)( end - p ) < dn_size || |
| (size_t)( end - p ) < 2 + dn_size ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "skipping CAs: buffer too short" ) ); |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size >> 8 ); |
| *p++ = (unsigned char)( dn_size ); |
| memcpy( p, crt->subject_raw.p, dn_size ); |
| p += dn_size; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "requested DN", p - dn_size, dn_size ); |
| |
| total_dn_size += 2 + dn_size; |
| crt = crt->next; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen = p - buf; |
| ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
| ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; |
| ssl->out_msg[4 + ct_len + sa_len] = (unsigned char)( total_dn_size >> 8 ); |
| ssl->out_msg[5 + ct_len + sa_len] = (unsigned char)( total_dn_size ); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write certificate request" ) ); |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| #endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED && |
| !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED && |
| !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED && |
| !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) |
| static int ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_ECKEY ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "server key not ECDH capable" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PK_TYPE_MISMATCH ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_get_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| mbedtls_pk_ec( *mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) ), |
| MBEDTLS_ECDH_OURS ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "mbedtls_ecdh_get_params" ), ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ |
| |
| static int ssl_write_server_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t n = 0; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = |
| ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| unsigned char *p = ssl->out_msg + 4; |
| unsigned char *dig_signed = p; |
| size_t dig_signed_len = 0, len; |
| ((void) dig_signed); |
| ((void) dig_signed_len); |
| ((void) len); |
| #endif |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server key exchange" ) ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write server key exchange" ) ); |
| ssl->state++; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA ) |
| { |
| ssl_get_ecdh_params_from_cert( ssl ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip write server key exchange" ) ); |
| ssl->state++; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) |
| { |
| size_t jlen; |
| const unsigned char *end = ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN; |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
| p, end - p, &jlen, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_write_round_two", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| p += jlen; |
| n += jlen; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) |
| { |
| /* Note: we don't support identity hints, until someone asks |
| * for them. */ |
| *(p++) = 0x00; |
| *(p++) = 0x00; |
| |
| n += 2; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) |
| { |
| if( ssl->conf->dhm_P.p == NULL || ssl->conf->dhm_G.p == NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no DH parameters set" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Ephemeral DH parameters: |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * opaque dh_p<1..2^16-1>; |
| * opaque dh_g<1..2^16-1>; |
| * opaque dh_Ys<1..2^16-1>; |
| * } ServerDHParams; |
| */ |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P, &ssl->conf->dhm_P ) ) != 0 || |
| ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G, &ssl->conf->dhm_G ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_mpi_copy", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_make_params( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, |
| (int) mbedtls_mpi_size( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ), |
| p, &len, ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_make_params", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| dig_signed = p; |
| dig_signed_len = len; |
| |
| p += len; |
| n += len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: X ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.X ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: P ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.P ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: G ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.G ); |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GX", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GX ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) |
| { |
| /* |
| * Ephemeral ECDH parameters: |
| * |
| * struct { |
| * ECParameters curve_params; |
| * ECPoint public; |
| * } ServerECDHParams; |
| */ |
| const mbedtls_ecp_curve_info **curve = NULL; |
| const mbedtls_ecp_group_id *gid; |
| |
| /* Match our preference list against the offered curves */ |
| for( gid = ssl->conf->curve_list; *gid != MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_NONE; gid++ ) |
| for( curve = ssl->handshake->curves; *curve != NULL; curve++ ) |
| if( (*curve)->grp_id == *gid ) |
| goto curve_matching_done; |
| |
| curve_matching_done: |
| if( curve == NULL || *curve == NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "no matching curve for ECDHE" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_NO_CIPHER_CHOSEN ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "ECDHE curve: %s", (*curve)->name ) ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecp_group_load( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.grp, |
| (*curve)->grp_id ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecp_group_load", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_make_params( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, &len, |
| p, MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN - n, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_make_params", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| dig_signed = p; |
| dig_signed_len = len; |
| |
| p += len; |
| n += len; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Q ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Q ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__ECDHE_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) |
| { |
| size_t signature_len = 0; |
| unsigned int hashlen = 0; |
| unsigned char hash[64]; |
| mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; |
| |
| /* |
| * Choose hash algorithm. NONE means MD5 + SHA1 here. |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
| if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) |
| { |
| md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( ssl->handshake->sig_alg ); |
| |
| if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA ) |
| { |
| md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; |
| } |
| else |
| #endif |
| { |
| md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Compute the hash to be signed |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) |
| if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_md5_context mbedtls_md5; |
| mbedtls_sha1_context mbedtls_sha1; |
| |
| mbedtls_md5_init( &mbedtls_md5 ); |
| mbedtls_sha1_init( &mbedtls_sha1 ); |
| |
| /* |
| * digitally-signed struct { |
| * opaque md5_hash[16]; |
| * opaque sha_hash[20]; |
| * }; |
| * |
| * md5_hash |
| * MD5(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random |
| * + ServerParams); |
| * sha_hash |
| * SHA(ClientHello.random + ServerHello.random |
| * + ServerParams); |
| */ |
| mbedtls_md5_starts( &mbedtls_md5 ); |
| mbedtls_md5_update( &mbedtls_md5, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ); |
| mbedtls_md5_update( &mbedtls_md5, dig_signed, dig_signed_len ); |
| mbedtls_md5_finish( &mbedtls_md5, hash ); |
| |
| mbedtls_sha1_starts( &mbedtls_sha1 ); |
| mbedtls_sha1_update( &mbedtls_sha1, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ); |
| mbedtls_sha1_update( &mbedtls_sha1, dig_signed, dig_signed_len ); |
| mbedtls_sha1_finish( &mbedtls_sha1, hash + 16 ); |
| |
| hashlen = 36; |
| |
| mbedtls_md5_free( &mbedtls_md5 ); |
| mbedtls_sha1_free( &mbedtls_sha1 ); |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || \ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
| if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) |
| { |
| mbedtls_md_context_t ctx; |
| const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); |
| |
| mbedtls_md_init( &ctx ); |
| |
| /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ |
| hashlen = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * digitally-signed struct { |
| * opaque client_random[32]; |
| * opaque server_random[32]; |
| * ServerDHParams params; |
| * }; |
| */ |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_md_setup", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| mbedtls_md_starts( &ctx ); |
| mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, ssl->handshake->randbytes, 64 ); |
| mbedtls_md_update( &ctx, dig_signed, dig_signed_len ); |
| mbedtls_md_finish( &ctx, hash ); |
| mbedtls_md_free( &ctx ); |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 || \ |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "parameters hash", hash, hashlen != 0 ? hashlen : |
| (unsigned int) ( mbedtls_md_get_size( mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ) ) ) ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Make the signature |
| */ |
| if( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) == NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no private key" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
| if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) |
| { |
| *(p++) = ssl->handshake->sig_alg; |
| *(p++) = mbedtls_ssl_sig_from_pk( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) ); |
| |
| n += 2; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_sign( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), md_alg, hash, hashlen, |
| p + 2 , &signature_len, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_sign", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| *(p++) = (unsigned char)( signature_len >> 8 ); |
| *(p++) = (unsigned char)( signature_len ); |
| n += 2; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "my signature", p, signature_len ); |
| |
| n += signature_len; |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED */ |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen = 4 + n; |
| ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
| ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; |
| |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server key exchange" ) ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| static int ssl_write_server_hello_done( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write server hello done" ) ); |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen = 4; |
| ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
| ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_SERVER_HELLO_DONE; |
| |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM ) |
| mbedtls_ssl_send_flight_completed( ssl ); |
| #endif |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write server hello done" ) ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
| static int ssl_parse_client_dh_public( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| size_t n; |
| |
| /* |
| * Receive G^Y mod P, premaster = (G^Y)^X mod P |
| */ |
| if( *p + 2 > end ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
| } |
| |
| n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; |
| *p += 2; |
| |
| if( *p + n > end ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_read_public( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, *p, n ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_read_public", ret ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); |
| } |
| |
| *p += n; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: GY", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.GY ); |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) |
| static int ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, |
| const unsigned char *p, |
| const unsigned char *end, |
| size_t pms_offset ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t len = mbedtls_pk_get_len( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ) ); |
| unsigned char *pms = ssl->handshake->premaster + pms_offset; |
| unsigned char ver[2]; |
| unsigned char fake_pms[48], peer_pms[48]; |
| unsigned char mask; |
| size_t i, peer_pmslen; |
| unsigned int diff; |
| |
| if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), MBEDTLS_PK_RSA ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no RSA private key" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Decrypt the premaster using own private RSA key |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
| if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_0 ) |
| { |
| if( *p++ != ( ( len >> 8 ) & 0xFF ) || |
| *p++ != ( ( len ) & 0xFF ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if( p + len != end ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
| } |
| |
| mbedtls_ssl_write_version( ssl->handshake->max_major_ver, |
| ssl->handshake->max_minor_ver, |
| ssl->conf->transport, ver ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Protection against Bleichenbacher's attack: invalid PKCS#1 v1.5 padding |
| * must not cause the connection to end immediately; instead, send a |
| * bad_record_mac later in the handshake. |
| * Also, avoid data-dependant branches here to protect against |
| * timing-based variants. |
| */ |
| ret = ssl->conf->f_rng( ssl->conf->p_rng, fake_pms, sizeof( fake_pms ) ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_pk_decrypt( mbedtls_ssl_own_key( ssl ), p, len, |
| peer_pms, &peer_pmslen, |
| sizeof( peer_pms ), |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); |
| |
| diff = (unsigned int) ret; |
| diff |= peer_pmslen ^ 48; |
| diff |= peer_pms[0] ^ ver[0]; |
| diff |= peer_pms[1] ^ ver[1]; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ALL) |
| if( diff != 0 ) |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
| #endif |
| |
| if( sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) < pms_offset || |
| sizeof( ssl->handshake->premaster ) - pms_offset < 48 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| ssl->handshake->pmslen = 48; |
| |
| /* mask = diff ? 0xff : 0x00 using bit operations to avoid branches */ |
| /* MSVC has a warning about unary minus on unsigned, but this is |
| * well-defined and precisely what we want to do here */ |
| #if defined(_MSC_VER) |
| #pragma warning( push ) |
| #pragma warning( disable : 4146 ) |
| #endif |
| mask = - ( ( diff | - diff ) >> ( sizeof( unsigned int ) * 8 - 1 ) ); |
| #if defined(_MSC_VER) |
| #pragma warning( pop ) |
| #endif |
| |
| for( i = 0; i < ssl->handshake->pmslen; i++ ) |
| pms[i] = ( mask & fake_pms[i] ) | ( (~mask) & peer_pms[i] ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED) |
| static int ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl, unsigned char **p, |
| const unsigned char *end ) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| size_t n; |
| |
| if( ssl->conf->f_psk == NULL && |
| ( ssl->conf->psk == NULL || ssl->conf->psk_identity == NULL || |
| ssl->conf->psk_identity_len == 0 || ssl->conf->psk_len == 0 ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "got no pre-shared key" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_PRIVATE_KEY_REQUIRED ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Receive client pre-shared key identity name |
| */ |
| if( *p + 2 > end ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
| } |
| |
| n = ( (*p)[0] << 8 ) | (*p)[1]; |
| *p += 2; |
| |
| if( n < 1 || n > 65535 || *p + n > end ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ssl->conf->f_psk != NULL ) |
| { |
| if( ssl->conf->f_psk( ssl->conf->p_psk, ssl, *p, n ) != 0 ) |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; |
| } |
| else |
| { |
| /* Identity is not a big secret since clients send it in the clear, |
| * but treat it carefully anyway, just in case */ |
| if( n != ssl->conf->psk_identity_len || |
| mbedtls_ssl_safer_memcmp( ssl->conf->psk_identity, *p, n ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if( ret == MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_BUF( 3, "Unknown PSK identity", *p, n ); |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_send_alert_message( ssl, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_LEVEL_FATAL, |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_ALERT_MSG_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_UNKNOWN_IDENTITY ); |
| } |
| |
| *p += n; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE__SOME__PSK_ENABLED */ |
| |
| static int ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info; |
| unsigned char *p, *end; |
| |
| ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse client key exchange" ) ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| p = ssl->in_msg + mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); |
| end = ssl->in_msg + ssl->in_hslen; |
| |
| if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA ) |
| { |
| if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( p != end ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx, |
| ssl->handshake->premaster, |
| MBEDTLS_PREMASTER_SIZE, |
| &ssl->handshake->pmslen, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_dhm_calc_secret", ret ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "DHM: K ", &ssl->handshake->dhm_ctx.K ); |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA ) |
| { |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| p, end - p) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Qp ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Qp ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| &ssl->handshake->pmslen, |
| ssl->handshake->premaster, |
| MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_calc_secret", ret ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_CS ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MPI( 3, "ECDH: z ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.z ); |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_RSA_ENABLED || |
| MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDH_ECDSA_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK ) |
| { |
| if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( p != end ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK ) |
| { |
| if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 2 ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_encrypted_pms" ), ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK ) |
| { |
| if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_dh_public( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_dh_public" ), ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( p != end ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad client key exchange" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK ) |
| { |
| if( ( ret = ssl_parse_client_psk_identity( ssl, &p, end ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_client_psk_identity" ), ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ecdh_read_public( &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx, |
| p, end - p ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecdh_read_public", ret ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE_RP ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_ECP( 3, "ECDH: Qp ", &ssl->handshake->ecdh_ctx.Qp ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster( ssl, |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_psk_derive_premaster", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA ) |
| { |
| if( ( ret = ssl_parse_encrypted_pms( ssl, p, end, 0 ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, ( "ssl_parse_parse_encrypted_pms_secret" ), ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED) |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) |
| { |
| ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
| p, end - p ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_read_round_two", ret ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE ); |
| } |
| |
| ret = mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret( &ssl->handshake->ecjpake_ctx, |
| ssl->handshake->premaster, 32, &ssl->handshake->pmslen, |
| ssl->conf->f_rng, ssl->conf->p_rng ); |
| if( ret != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ecjpake_derive_secret", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE_ENABLED */ |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_derive_keys", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse client key exchange" ) ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #if !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
| !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
| !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED) && \ |
| !defined(MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_ECDSA_ENABLED) |
| static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); |
| |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); |
| ssl->state++; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| #else |
| static int ssl_parse_certificate_verify( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_FEATURE_UNAVAILABLE; |
| size_t i, sig_len; |
| unsigned char hash[48]; |
| unsigned char *hash_start = hash; |
| size_t hashlen; |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
| mbedtls_pk_type_t pk_alg; |
| #endif |
| mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg; |
| const mbedtls_ssl_ciphersuite_t *ciphersuite_info = ssl->transform_negotiate->ciphersuite_info; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> parse certificate verify" ) ); |
| |
| if( ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_PSK || |
| ciphersuite_info->key_exchange == MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECJPAKE || |
| ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert == NULL ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= skip parse certificate verify" ) ); |
| ssl->state++; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* Needs to be done before read_record() to exclude current message */ |
| ssl->handshake->calc_verify( ssl, hash ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_read_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_read_record", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| ssl->state++; |
| |
| if( ssl->in_msgtype != MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE || |
| ssl->in_msg[0] != MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
| } |
| |
| i = mbedtls_ssl_hs_hdr_len( ssl ); |
| |
| /* |
| * struct { |
| * SignatureAndHashAlgorithm algorithm; -- TLS 1.2 only |
| * opaque signature<0..2^16-1>; |
| * } DigitallySigned; |
| */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3) || defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1) || \ |
| defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1) |
| if( ssl->minor_ver != MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) |
| { |
| md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_NONE; |
| hashlen = 36; |
| |
| /* For ECDSA, use SHA-1, not MD-5 + SHA-1 */ |
| if( mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, |
| MBEDTLS_PK_ECDSA ) ) |
| { |
| hash_start += 16; |
| hashlen -= 16; |
| md_alg = MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1; |
| } |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_SSL3 || MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1 || |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_1 */ |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2) |
| if( ssl->minor_ver == MBEDTLS_SSL_MINOR_VERSION_3 ) |
| { |
| if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Hash |
| */ |
| if( ssl->in_msg[i] != ssl->handshake->verify_sig_alg ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" |
| " for verify message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
| } |
| |
| md_alg = mbedtls_ssl_md_alg_from_hash( ssl->handshake->verify_sig_alg ); |
| |
| /* Info from md_alg will be used instead */ |
| hashlen = 0; |
| |
| i++; |
| |
| /* |
| * Signature |
| */ |
| if( ( pk_alg = mbedtls_ssl_pk_alg_from_sig( ssl->in_msg[i] ) ) |
| == MBEDTLS_PK_NONE ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "peer not adhering to requested sig_alg" |
| " for verify message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check the certificate's key type matches the signature alg |
| */ |
| if( ! mbedtls_pk_can_do( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, pk_alg ) ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "sig_alg doesn't match cert key" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
| } |
| |
| i++; |
| } |
| else |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_TLS1_2 */ |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "should never happen" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_INTERNAL_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| if( i + 2 > ssl->in_hslen ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
| } |
| |
| sig_len = ( ssl->in_msg[i] << 8 ) | ssl->in_msg[i+1]; |
| i += 2; |
| |
| if( i + sig_len != ssl->in_hslen ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "bad certificate verify message" ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_HS_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY ); |
| } |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_pk_verify( &ssl->session_negotiate->peer_cert->pk, |
| md_alg, hash_start, hashlen, |
| ssl->in_msg + i, sig_len ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_pk_verify", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= parse certificate verify" ) ); |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| #endif /* !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_RSA_ENABLED && |
| !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_DHE_RSA_ENABLED && |
| !MBEDTLS_KEY_EXCHANGE_ECDHE_RSA_ENABLED */ |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| static int ssl_write_new_session_ticket( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t tlen; |
| uint32_t lifetime; |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "=> write new session ticket" ) ); |
| |
| ssl->out_msgtype = MBEDTLS_SSL_MSG_HANDSHAKE; |
| ssl->out_msg[0] = MBEDTLS_SSL_HS_NEW_SESSION_TICKET; |
| |
| /* |
| * struct { |
| * uint32 ticket_lifetime_hint; |
| * opaque ticket<0..2^16-1>; |
| * } NewSessionTicket; |
| * |
| * 4 . 7 ticket_lifetime_hint (0 = unspecified) |
| * 8 . 9 ticket_len (n) |
| * 10 . 9+n ticket content |
| */ |
| |
| if( ( ret = ssl->conf->f_ticket_write( ssl->conf->p_ticket, |
| ssl->session_negotiate, |
| ssl->out_msg + 10, |
| ssl->out_msg + MBEDTLS_SSL_MAX_CONTENT_LEN, |
| &tlen, &lifetime ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_ticket_write", ret ); |
| tlen = 0; |
| } |
| |
| ssl->out_msg[4] = ( lifetime >> 24 ) & 0xFF; |
| ssl->out_msg[5] = ( lifetime >> 16 ) & 0xFF; |
| ssl->out_msg[6] = ( lifetime >> 8 ) & 0xFF; |
| ssl->out_msg[7] = ( lifetime ) & 0xFF; |
| |
| ssl->out_msg[8] = (unsigned char)( ( tlen >> 8 ) & 0xFF ); |
| ssl->out_msg[9] = (unsigned char)( ( tlen ) & 0xFF ); |
| |
| ssl->out_msglen = 10 + tlen; |
| |
| /* |
| * Morally equivalent to updating ssl->state, but NewSessionTicket and |
| * ChangeCipherSpec share the same state. |
| */ |
| ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket = 0; |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_record( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| { |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_RET( 1, "mbedtls_ssl_write_record", ret ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "<= write new session ticket" ) ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS */ |
| |
| /* |
| * SSL handshake -- server side -- single step |
| */ |
| int mbedtls_ssl_handshake_server_step( mbedtls_ssl_context *ssl ) |
| { |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| if( ssl->state == MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_OVER || ssl->handshake == NULL ) |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "server state: %d", ssl->state ) ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_flush_output( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| if( ssl->conf->transport == MBEDTLS_SSL_TRANSPORT_DATAGRAM && |
| ssl->handshake->retransmit_state == MBEDTLS_SSL_RETRANS_SENDING ) |
| { |
| if( ( ret = mbedtls_ssl_resend( ssl ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| switch( ssl->state ) |
| { |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_HELLO_REQUEST: |
| ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO; |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * <== ClientHello |
| */ |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO: |
| ret = ssl_parse_client_hello( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_PROTO_DTLS) |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_SENT: |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUIRED ); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* |
| * ==> ServerHello |
| * Certificate |
| * ( ServerKeyExchange ) |
| * ( CertificateRequest ) |
| * ServerHelloDone |
| */ |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO: |
| ret = ssl_write_server_hello( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CERTIFICATE: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_certificate( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE: |
| ret = ssl_write_server_key_exchange( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST: |
| ret = ssl_write_certificate_request( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_HELLO_DONE: |
| ret = ssl_write_server_hello_done( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * <== ( Certificate/Alert ) |
| * ClientKeyExchange |
| * ( CertificateVerify ) |
| * ChangeCipherSpec |
| * Finished |
| */ |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_certificate( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE: |
| ret = ssl_parse_client_key_exchange( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY: |
| ret = ssl_parse_certificate_verify( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_CLIENT_FINISHED: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_parse_finished( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| /* |
| * ==> ( NewSessionTicket ) |
| * ChangeCipherSpec |
| * Finished |
| */ |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: |
| #if defined(MBEDTLS_SSL_SESSION_TICKETS) |
| if( ssl->handshake->new_session_ticket != 0 ) |
| ret = ssl_write_new_session_ticket( ssl ); |
| else |
| #endif |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_change_cipher_spec( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_SERVER_FINISHED: |
| ret = mbedtls_ssl_write_finished( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_FLUSH_BUFFERS: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 2, ( "handshake: done" ) ); |
| ssl->state = MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP; |
| break; |
| |
| case MBEDTLS_SSL_HANDSHAKE_WRAPUP: |
| mbedtls_ssl_handshake_wrapup( ssl ); |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| MBEDTLS_SSL_DEBUG_MSG( 1, ( "invalid state %d", ssl->state ) ); |
| return( MBEDTLS_ERR_SSL_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); |
| } |
| |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| #endif /* MBEDTLS_SSL_SRV_C */ |