| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG implementation (NIST SP 800-90) |
| * |
| * Copyright (C) 2014, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved |
| * |
| * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) |
| * |
| * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
| * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
| * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or |
| * (at your option) any later version. |
| * |
| * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
| * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
| * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
| * GNU General Public License for more details. |
| * |
| * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License along |
| * with this program; if not, write to the Free Software Foundation, Inc., |
| * 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301 USA. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * The NIST SP 800-90A DRBGs are described in the following publication. |
| * http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-90A/SP800-90A.pdf |
| * References below are based on rev. 1 (January 2012). |
| */ |
| |
| #if !defined(POLARSSL_CONFIG_FILE) |
| #include "polarssl/config.h" |
| #else |
| #include POLARSSL_CONFIG_FILE |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_C) |
| |
| #include "polarssl/hmac_drbg.h" |
| |
| #include <string.h> |
| |
| #if defined(POLARSSL_FS_IO) |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| #if defined(POLARSSL_SELF_TEST) |
| #if defined(POLARSSL_PLATFORM_C) |
| #include "polarssl/platform.h" |
| #else |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #define polarssl_printf printf |
| #endif /* POLARSSL_SELF_TEST */ |
| #endif /* POLARSSL_PLATFORM_C */ |
| |
| /* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ |
| static void polarssl_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) { |
| volatile unsigned char *p = v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG update, using optional additional data (10.1.2.2) |
| */ |
| void hmac_drbg_update( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) |
| { |
| size_t md_len = ctx->md_ctx.md_info->size; |
| unsigned char rounds = ( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) ? 2 : 1; |
| unsigned char sep[1]; |
| unsigned char K[POLARSSL_MD_MAX_SIZE]; |
| |
| for( sep[0] = 0; sep[0] < rounds; sep[0]++ ) |
| { |
| /* Step 1 or 4 */ |
| md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ); |
| md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len ); |
| md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, sep, 1 ); |
| if( rounds == 2 ) |
| md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, additional, add_len ); |
| md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, K ); |
| |
| /* Step 2 or 5 */ |
| md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, K, md_len ); |
| md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len ); |
| md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Simplified HMAC_DRBG initialisation (for use with deterministic ECDSA) |
| */ |
| int hmac_drbg_init_buf( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, |
| const md_info_t * md_info, |
| const unsigned char *data, size_t data_len ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| |
| memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( hmac_drbg_context ) ); |
| |
| md_init( &ctx->md_ctx ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = md_init_ctx( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Set initial working state. |
| * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the |
| * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. |
| */ |
| md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_info->size ); |
| memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_info->size ); |
| |
| hmac_drbg_update( ctx, data, data_len ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG reseeding: 10.1.2.4 (arabic) + 9.2 (Roman) |
| */ |
| int hmac_drbg_reseed( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, |
| const unsigned char *additional, size_t len ) |
| { |
| unsigned char seed[POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT]; |
| size_t seedlen; |
| |
| /* III. Check input length */ |
| if( len > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT || |
| ctx->entropy_len + len > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ) |
| { |
| return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); |
| } |
| |
| memset( seed, 0, POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_SEED_INPUT ); |
| |
| /* IV. Gather entropy_len bytes of entropy for the seed */ |
| if( ctx->f_entropy( ctx->p_entropy, seed, ctx->entropy_len ) != 0 ) |
| return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_ENTROPY_SOURCE_FAILED ); |
| |
| seedlen = ctx->entropy_len; |
| |
| /* 1. Concatenate entropy and additional data if any */ |
| if( additional != NULL && len != 0 ) |
| { |
| memcpy( seed + seedlen, additional, len ); |
| seedlen += len; |
| } |
| |
| /* 2. Update state */ |
| hmac_drbg_update( ctx, seed, seedlen ); |
| |
| /* 3. Reset reseed_counter */ |
| ctx->reseed_counter = 1; |
| |
| /* 4. Done */ |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG initialisation (10.1.2.3 + 9.1) |
| */ |
| int hmac_drbg_init( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, |
| const md_info_t * md_info, |
| int (*f_entropy)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), |
| void *p_entropy, |
| const unsigned char *custom, |
| size_t len ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| size_t entropy_len; |
| |
| memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( hmac_drbg_context ) ); |
| |
| md_init( &ctx->md_ctx ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = md_init_ctx( &ctx->md_ctx, md_info ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| /* |
| * Set initial working state. |
| * Use the V memory location, which is currently all 0, to initialize the |
| * MD context with an all-zero key. Then set V to its initial value. |
| */ |
| md_hmac_starts( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_info->size ); |
| memset( ctx->V, 0x01, md_info->size ); |
| |
| ctx->f_entropy = f_entropy; |
| ctx->p_entropy = p_entropy; |
| |
| ctx->reseed_interval = POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_RESEED_INTERVAL; |
| |
| /* |
| * See SP800-57 5.6.1 (p. 65-66) for the security strength provided by |
| * each hash function, then according to SP800-90A rev1 10.1 table 2, |
| * min_entropy_len (in bits) is security_strength. |
| * |
| * (This also matches the sizes used in the NIST test vectors.) |
| */ |
| entropy_len = md_info->size <= 20 ? 16 : /* 160-bits hash -> 128 bits */ |
| md_info->size <= 28 ? 24 : /* 224-bits hash -> 192 bits */ |
| 32; /* better (256+) -> 256 bits */ |
| |
| /* |
| * For initialisation, use more entropy to emulate a nonce |
| * (Again, matches test vectors.) |
| */ |
| ctx->entropy_len = entropy_len * 3 / 2; |
| |
| if( ( ret = hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, custom, len ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| ctx->entropy_len = entropy_len; |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set prediction resistance |
| */ |
| void hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, |
| int resistance ) |
| { |
| ctx->prediction_resistance = resistance; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set entropy length grabbed for reseeds |
| */ |
| void hmac_drbg_set_entropy_len( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, size_t len ) |
| { |
| ctx->entropy_len = len; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set reseed interval |
| */ |
| void hmac_drbg_set_reseed_interval( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, int interval ) |
| { |
| ctx->reseed_interval = interval; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG random function with optional additional data: |
| * 10.1.2.5 (arabic) + 9.3 (Roman) |
| */ |
| int hmac_drbg_random_with_add( void *p_rng, |
| unsigned char *output, size_t out_len, |
| const unsigned char *additional, size_t add_len ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| hmac_drbg_context *ctx = (hmac_drbg_context *) p_rng; |
| size_t md_len = md_get_size( ctx->md_ctx.md_info ); |
| size_t left = out_len; |
| unsigned char *out = output; |
| |
| /* II. Check request length */ |
| if( out_len > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_REQUEST ) |
| return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_REQUEST_TOO_BIG ); |
| |
| /* III. Check input length */ |
| if( add_len > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) |
| return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); |
| |
| /* 1. (aka VII and IX) Check reseed counter and PR */ |
| if( ctx->f_entropy != NULL && /* For no-reseeding instances */ |
| ( ctx->prediction_resistance == POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON || |
| ctx->reseed_counter > ctx->reseed_interval ) ) |
| { |
| if( ( ret = hmac_drbg_reseed( ctx, additional, add_len ) ) != 0 ) |
| return( ret ); |
| |
| add_len = 0; /* VII.4 */ |
| } |
| |
| /* 2. Use additional data if any */ |
| if( additional != NULL && add_len != 0 ) |
| hmac_drbg_update( ctx, additional, add_len ); |
| |
| /* 3, 4, 5. Generate bytes */ |
| while( left != 0 ) |
| { |
| size_t use_len = left > md_len ? md_len : left; |
| |
| md_hmac_reset( &ctx->md_ctx ); |
| md_hmac_update( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V, md_len ); |
| md_hmac_finish( &ctx->md_ctx, ctx->V ); |
| |
| memcpy( out, ctx->V, use_len ); |
| out += use_len; |
| left -= use_len; |
| } |
| |
| /* 6. Update */ |
| hmac_drbg_update( ctx, additional, add_len ); |
| |
| /* 7. Update reseed counter */ |
| ctx->reseed_counter++; |
| |
| /* 8. Done */ |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * HMAC_DRBG random function |
| */ |
| int hmac_drbg_random( void *p_rng, unsigned char *output, size_t out_len ) |
| { |
| return( hmac_drbg_random_with_add( p_rng, output, out_len, NULL, 0 ) ); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Free an HMAC_DRBG context |
| */ |
| void hmac_drbg_free( hmac_drbg_context *ctx ) |
| { |
| if( ctx == NULL ) |
| return; |
| |
| md_free( &ctx->md_ctx ); |
| |
| polarssl_zeroize( ctx, sizeof( hmac_drbg_context ) ); |
| } |
| |
| #if defined(POLARSSL_FS_IO) |
| int hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| FILE *f; |
| unsigned char buf[ POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; |
| |
| if( ( f = fopen( path, "wb" ) ) == NULL ) |
| return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); |
| |
| if( ( ret = hmac_drbg_random( ctx, buf, sizeof( buf ) ) ) != 0 ) |
| goto exit; |
| |
| if( fwrite( buf, 1, sizeof( buf ), f ) != sizeof( buf ) ) |
| { |
| ret = POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR; |
| goto exit; |
| } |
| |
| ret = 0; |
| |
| exit: |
| fclose( f ); |
| return( ret ); |
| } |
| |
| int hmac_drbg_update_seed_file( hmac_drbg_context *ctx, const char *path ) |
| { |
| FILE *f; |
| size_t n; |
| unsigned char buf[ POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ]; |
| |
| if( ( f = fopen( path, "rb" ) ) == NULL ) |
| return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); |
| |
| fseek( f, 0, SEEK_END ); |
| n = (size_t) ftell( f ); |
| fseek( f, 0, SEEK_SET ); |
| |
| if( n > POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_MAX_INPUT ) |
| { |
| fclose( f ); |
| return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_INPUT_TOO_BIG ); |
| } |
| |
| if( fread( buf, 1, n, f ) != n ) |
| { |
| fclose( f ); |
| return( POLARSSL_ERR_HMAC_DRBG_FILE_IO_ERROR ); |
| } |
| |
| fclose( f ); |
| |
| hmac_drbg_update( ctx, buf, n ); |
| |
| return( hmac_drbg_write_seed_file( ctx, path ) ); |
| } |
| #endif /* POLARSSL_FS_IO */ |
| |
| |
| #if defined(POLARSSL_SELF_TEST) |
| |
| #if !defined(POLARSSL_SHA1_C) |
| /* Dummy checkup routine */ |
| int hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) |
| { |
| |
| if( verbose != 0 ) |
| polarssl_printf( "\n" ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #else |
| |
| #define OUTPUT_LEN 80 |
| |
| /* From a NIST PR=true test vector */ |
| static const unsigned char entropy_pr[] = { |
| 0xa0, 0xc9, 0xab, 0x58, 0xf1, 0xe2, 0xe5, 0xa4, 0xde, 0x3e, 0xbd, 0x4f, |
| 0xf7, 0x3e, 0x9c, 0x5b, 0x64, 0xef, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x02, 0x8c, 0xf8, 0x11, |
| 0x48, 0xa5, 0x84, 0xfe, 0x69, 0xab, 0x5a, 0xee, 0x42, 0xaa, 0x4d, 0x42, |
| 0x17, 0x60, 0x99, 0xd4, 0x5e, 0x13, 0x97, 0xdc, 0x40, 0x4d, 0x86, 0xa3, |
| 0x7b, 0xf5, 0x59, 0x54, 0x75, 0x69, 0x51, 0xe4 }; |
| static const unsigned char result_pr[OUTPUT_LEN] = { |
| 0x9a, 0x00, 0xa2, 0xd0, 0x0e, 0xd5, 0x9b, 0xfe, 0x31, 0xec, 0xb1, 0x39, |
| 0x9b, 0x60, 0x81, 0x48, 0xd1, 0x96, 0x9d, 0x25, 0x0d, 0x3c, 0x1e, 0x94, |
| 0x10, 0x10, 0x98, 0x12, 0x93, 0x25, 0xca, 0xb8, 0xfc, 0xcc, 0x2d, 0x54, |
| 0x73, 0x19, 0x70, 0xc0, 0x10, 0x7a, 0xa4, 0x89, 0x25, 0x19, 0x95, 0x5e, |
| 0x4b, 0xc6, 0x00, 0x1d, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x6a, 0x2b, 0xf8, 0xa3, 0x01, 0xab, |
| 0x46, 0x05, 0x5c, 0x09, 0xa6, 0x71, 0x88, 0xf1, 0xa7, 0x40, 0xee, 0xf3, |
| 0xe1, 0x5c, 0x02, 0x9b, 0x44, 0xaf, 0x03, 0x44 }; |
| |
| /* From a NIST PR=false test vector */ |
| static const unsigned char entropy_nopr[] = { |
| 0x79, 0x34, 0x9b, 0xbf, 0x7c, 0xdd, 0xa5, 0x79, 0x95, 0x57, 0x86, 0x66, |
| 0x21, 0xc9, 0x13, 0x83, 0x11, 0x46, 0x73, 0x3a, 0xbf, 0x8c, 0x35, 0xc8, |
| 0xc7, 0x21, 0x5b, 0x5b, 0x96, 0xc4, 0x8e, 0x9b, 0x33, 0x8c, 0x74, 0xe3, |
| 0xe9, 0x9d, 0xfe, 0xdf }; |
| static const unsigned char result_nopr[OUTPUT_LEN] = { |
| 0xc6, 0xa1, 0x6a, 0xb8, 0xd4, 0x20, 0x70, 0x6f, 0x0f, 0x34, 0xab, 0x7f, |
| 0xec, 0x5a, 0xdc, 0xa9, 0xd8, 0xca, 0x3a, 0x13, 0x3e, 0x15, 0x9c, 0xa6, |
| 0xac, 0x43, 0xc6, 0xf8, 0xa2, 0xbe, 0x22, 0x83, 0x4a, 0x4c, 0x0a, 0x0a, |
| 0xff, 0xb1, 0x0d, 0x71, 0x94, 0xf1, 0xc1, 0xa5, 0xcf, 0x73, 0x22, 0xec, |
| 0x1a, 0xe0, 0x96, 0x4e, 0xd4, 0xbf, 0x12, 0x27, 0x46, 0xe0, 0x87, 0xfd, |
| 0xb5, 0xb3, 0xe9, 0x1b, 0x34, 0x93, 0xd5, 0xbb, 0x98, 0xfa, 0xed, 0x49, |
| 0xe8, 0x5f, 0x13, 0x0f, 0xc8, 0xa4, 0x59, 0xb7 }; |
| |
| /* "Entropy" from buffer */ |
| static size_t test_offset; |
| static int hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy( void *data, |
| unsigned char *buf, size_t len ) |
| { |
| const unsigned char *p = data; |
| memcpy( buf, p + test_offset, len ); |
| test_offset += len; |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| |
| #define CHK( c ) if( (c) != 0 ) \ |
| { \ |
| if( verbose != 0 ) \ |
| polarssl_printf( "failed\n" ); \ |
| return( 1 ); \ |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Checkup routine for HMAC_DRBG with SHA-1 |
| */ |
| int hmac_drbg_self_test( int verbose ) |
| { |
| hmac_drbg_context ctx; |
| unsigned char buf[OUTPUT_LEN]; |
| const md_info_t *md_info = md_info_from_type( POLARSSL_MD_SHA1 ); |
| |
| /* |
| * PR = True |
| */ |
| if( verbose != 0 ) |
| polarssl_printf( " HMAC_DRBG (PR = True) : " ); |
| |
| test_offset = 0; |
| CHK( hmac_drbg_init( &ctx, md_info, |
| hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_pr, |
| NULL, 0 ) ); |
| hmac_drbg_set_prediction_resistance( &ctx, POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_PR_ON ); |
| CHK( hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); |
| CHK( hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); |
| CHK( memcmp( buf, result_pr, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); |
| hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); |
| |
| if( verbose != 0 ) |
| polarssl_printf( "passed\n" ); |
| |
| /* |
| * PR = False |
| */ |
| if( verbose != 0 ) |
| polarssl_printf( " HMAC_DRBG (PR = False) : " ); |
| |
| test_offset = 0; |
| CHK( hmac_drbg_init( &ctx, md_info, |
| hmac_drbg_self_test_entropy, (void *) entropy_nopr, |
| NULL, 0 ) ); |
| CHK( hmac_drbg_reseed( &ctx, NULL, 0 ) ); |
| CHK( hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); |
| CHK( hmac_drbg_random( &ctx, buf, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); |
| CHK( memcmp( buf, result_nopr, OUTPUT_LEN ) ); |
| hmac_drbg_free( &ctx ); |
| |
| if( verbose != 0 ) |
| polarssl_printf( "passed\n" ); |
| |
| if( verbose != 0 ) |
| polarssl_printf( "\n" ); |
| |
| return( 0 ); |
| } |
| #endif /* POLARSSL_SHA1_C */ |
| #endif /* POLARSSL_SELF_TEST */ |
| |
| #endif /* POLARSSL_HMAC_DRBG_C */ |