SSH(1) | General Commands Manual | SSH(1) |
ssh
—
ssh |
[-l login_name]
[hostname | user@hostname]
[command] |
ssh |
[-afgknqtvxCPX ] [-c
blowfish | 3des]
[-e escape_char]
[-i identity_file]
[-l login_name]
[-o option]
[-p port]
[-L
host:port:hostport]
[-R
host:port:hostport]
[hostname | user@hostname]
[command] |
ssh
(Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a
remote machine and for executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended
to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary
TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
ssh
connects and logs into the specified
hostname. The user must prove his/her identity to the
remote machine using one of several methods.
First, if the machine the user logs in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, the user is immediately permitted to log in. Second, if .rhosts or .shosts exists in the user's home directory on the remote machine and contains a line containing the name of the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is permitted to log in. This form of authentication alone is normally not allowed by the server because it is not secure.
The second (and primary) authentication method is the rhosts or hosts.equiv method combined with RSA-based host authentication. It means that if the login would be permitted by .rhosts, .shosts, /etc/hosts.equiv, or /etc/shosts.equiv, and if additionally the server can verify the client's host key (see /etc/ssh_known_hosts in the FILES section), only then login is permitted. This authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, .rhosts, and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.]
As a third authentication method, ssh
supports RSA based authentication. The scheme is based on public-key
cryptography: there are cryptosystems where encryption and decryption are
done using separate keys, and it is not possible to derive the decryption
key from the encryption key. RSA is one such system. The idea is that each
user creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The
server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. The
file $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public
keys that are permitted for logging in. When the user logs in, the
ssh
program tells the server which key pair it would
like to use for authentication. The server checks if this key is permitted,
and if so, sends the user (actually the ssh
program
running on behalf of the user) a challenge, a random number, encrypted by
the user's public key. The challenge can only be decrypted using the proper
private key. The user's client then decrypts the challenge using the private
key, proving that he/she knows the private key but without disclosing it to
the server.
ssh
implements the RSA authentication
protocol automatically. The user creates his/her RSA key pair by running
ssh-keygen(1). This stores the private key in
.ssh/identity and the public key in
.ssh/identity.pub in the user's home directory. The
user should then copy the identity.pub to
.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on
the remote machine (the authorized_keys file
corresponds to the conventional .rhosts file, and
has one key per line, though the lines can be very long). After this, the
user can log in without giving the password. RSA authentication is much more
secure than rhosts authentication.
The most convenient way to use RSA authentication may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) for more information.
If other authentication methods fail, ssh
prompts the user for a password. The password is sent to the remote host for
checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, the password
cannot be seen by someone listening on the network.
When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives the user a normal shell on the remote machine. All communication with the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session),
the user can disconnect with ~.
, and suspend
ssh
with ~^Z
. All forwarded
connections can be listed with ~#
and if the session
blocks waiting for forwarded X11 or TCP/IP connections to terminate, it can
be backgrounded with ~&
(this should not be used
while the user shell is active, as it can cause the shell to hang). All
available escapes can be listed with ~?
.
A single tilde character can be sent as ~~
(or by following the tilde by a character other than those described above).
The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as
special. The escape character can be changed in configuration files or on
the command line.
If no pseudo tty has been allocated, the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the escape character to “none” will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used.
The session terminates when the command or shell in on the remote
machine exists and all X11 and TCP/IP connections have been closed. The exit
status of the remote program is returned as the exit status of
ssh
.
If the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY
environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypted
channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the local
machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY
.
Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in
configuration files.
The DISPLAY
value set by
ssh
will point to the server machine, but with a
display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because
ssh
creates a “proxy” X server on the
server machine for forwarding the connections over the encrypted
channel.
ssh
will also automatically set up
Xauthority data on the server machine. For this purpose, it will generate a
random authorization cookie, store it in Xauthority on the server, and
verify that any forwarded connections carry this cookie and replace it by
the real cookie when the connection is opened. The real authentication
cookie is never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the
plain).
If the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the remote side unless disabled on command line or in a configuration file.
Forwarding of arbitrary TCP/IP connections over the secure channel can be specified either on command line or in a configuration file. One possible application of TCP/IP forwarding is a secure connection to an electronic purse; another is going trough firewalls.
ssh
automatically maintains and checks a
database containing RSA-based identifications for all hosts it has ever been
used with. The database is stored in
.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory.
Additionally, the file /etc/ssh_known_hosts is
automatically checked for known hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added
to the user's file. If a host's identification ever changes,
ssh
warns about this and disables password
authentication to prevent a trojan horse from getting the user's password.
Another purpose of this mechanism is to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The
StrictHostKeyChecking
option (see below) can be used
to prevent logins to machines whose host key is not known or has
changed.
-a
-c
blowfish|3des-e
ch|^ch|none~
’). The escape character is only
recognized at the beginning of a line. The escape character followed by a
dot (‘.
’) closes the connection,
followed by control-Z suspends the connection, and followed by itself
sends the escape character once. Setting the character to
“none” disables any escapes and makes the session fully
transparent.-f
ssh
to go to background after
authentication. This is useful if ssh
is going to
ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the background.
This implies -n
. The recommended way to start X11
programs at a remote site is with something like ssh -f
host xterm
.-i
identity_file-i
options (and multiple identities specified in
configuration files).-g
-k
-l
login_name-n
ssh
is
run in the background. A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs
in a remote machine. For example, ssh -n
shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs &
will start an emacs on
shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be automatically forwarded
over an encrypted channel. The ssh
program will be
put in the background. (This does not work if ssh
needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the
-f
option.)-o
option-p
port-P
RhostsAuthentication
and
RhostsRSAAuthentication
.-q
-t
-v
ssh
to print debugging
messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging connection,
authentication, and configuration problems. The verbose mode is also used
to display skey(1) challenges, if the user entered
"s/key" as password.-x
-X
-C
CompressionLevel
option (see below).
Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but
will only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be set
on a host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the
Compress
option below.-L
port:host:hostport-R
port:host:hostportssh
obtains configuration data from the following
sources (in this order): command line options, user's configuration file
($HOME/.ssh/config), and system-wide configuration
file (/etc/ssh_config). For each parameter, the first
obtained value will be used. The configuration files contain sections
bracketed by "Host" specifications, and that section is only applied
for hosts that match one of the patterns given in the specification. The
matched host name is the one given on the command line.
Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and general defaults at the end.
The configuration file has the following format:
Empty lines and lines starting with
‘#
’ are comments.
Otherwise a line is of the format “keyword arguments”. The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that the configuration files are case-sensitive):
Host
Host
keyword) to be only for those hosts that
match one of the patterns given after the keyword.
‘*
’ and
‘
’? can be used as wildcards in the
patterns. A single ‘*
’ as a pattern
can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts. The host is the
hostname argument given on the command line (i.e.,
the name is not converted to a canonicalized host name before
matching).AFSTokenPassing
BatchMode
Cipher
Compression
CompressionLevel
ConnectionAttempts
EscapeChar
~
’). The escape character can also
be set on the command line. The argument should be a single character,
‘^
’ followed by a letter, or
“none” to disable the escape character entirely (making the
connection transparent for binary data).FallBackToRsh
ssh
fails due to
a connection refused error (there is no sshd(8)
listening on the remote host), rsh(1) should
automatically be used instead (after a suitable warning about the session
being unencrypted). The argument must be “yes” or
“no”.ForwardAgent
ForwardX11
DISPLAY
set. The argument
must be “yes” or “no”.GatewayPorts
GlobalKnownHostsFile
HostName
HostName
specifications).IdentityFile
KeepAlive
The default is “yes” (to send keepalives), and the client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
To disable keepalives, the value should be set to “no” in both the server and the client configuration files.
KerberosAuthentication
KerberosTgtPassing
LocalForward
PasswordAuthentication
NumberOfPasswordPrompts
Port
ProxyCommand
sshd -i
somewhere. Host key management will be
done using the HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the
name typed by the user).RemoteForward
RhostsAuthentication
RhostsRSAAuthentication
RSAAuthentication
CheckHostIP
StrictHostKeyChecking
ssh
ssh will never automatically add host keys to the
$HOME/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to
connect hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum protection
against trojan horse attacks. However, it can be somewhat annoying if you
don't have good /etc/ssh_known_hosts files
installed and frequently connect new hosts. Basically this option forces
the user to manually add any new hosts. Normally this option is disabled,
and new hosts will automatically be added to the known host files. The
host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in either case.
The argument must be “yes” or “no”.User
UserKnownHostsFile
UsePrivilegedPort
RhostsAuthentication
and
RhostsRSAAuthentication
.UseRsh
ssh
protocol. This causes ssh
to immediately exec
rsh(1). All other options (except
HostName
) are ignored if this has been specified.
The argument must be “yes” or “no”.ssh
will normally set the following environment
variables:
DISPLAY
DISPLAY
variable indicates the location of the
X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh
to
point to a value of the form “hostname:n” where hostname
indicates the host where the shell runs, and n is an integer >= 1. Ssh
uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure
channel. The user should normally not set DISPLAY explicitly, as that will
render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to manually
copy any required authorization cookies).HOME
LOGNAME
USER
; set for compatibility with
systems that use this variable.MAIL
PATH
PATH
, as specified when
compiling ssh
.SSH_AUTH_SOCK
SSH_CLIENT
SSH_TTY
TZ
USER
Additionally, ssh
reads
$HOME/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format
“VARNAME=value” to the environment.
ssh
ignores
this file if it is accessible by others. It is possible to specify a
passphrase when generating the key; the passphrase will be used to encrypt
the sensitive part of this file using 3DES.ssh
client. This file does not usually contain any sensitive information, but
the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not
accessible by others.The canonical system name (as returned by name servers) is
used by sshd(8) to verify the client host when logging
in; other names are needed because ssh
does not
convert the user-supplied name to a canonical name before checking the
key, because someone with access to the name servers would then be able
to fool host authentication.
Note that by default sshd(8) will be installed so that it requires successful RSA host authentication before permitting .rhosts authentication. If your server machine does not have the client's host key in /etc/ssh_known_hosts, you can store it in $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts. The easiest way to do this is to connect back to the client from the server machine using ssh; this will automatically add the host key inxi $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts.
ssh
without permitting login
with rlogin(1) or rsh(1).ssh
but not using
rsh/rlogin.ssh
when the
user logs in just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
sshd(8) manual page for more information.ssh
when the
user logs in just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
sshd(8) manual page for more information.Issues can be found from the SSH WWW home page:
http://www.cs.hut.fi/ssh
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original (free) ssh 1.2.12 release, but with bugs removed and newer features re-added. Rapidly after the 1.2.12 release, newer versions bore successively more restrictive licenses. This version of OpenSSH
The libraries described in ssl(8) are required for proper operation.
September 25, 1999 | BSD |