| SSH(1) | General Commands Manual | SSH(1) |
ssh —
ssh |
[-l login_name]
[hostname | user@hostname]
[command] |
ssh |
[-afgknqstvxACNPTX1246]
[-c cipher_spec]
[-e escape_char]
[-i identity_file]
[-l login_name]
[-m mac_spec]
[-o option]
[-p port]
[-L
port:host:hostport]
[-R
port:host:hostport]
[hostname | user@hostname]
[command] |
ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a
remote machine and for executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended
to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary
TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
ssh connects and logs into the specified
hostname. The user must prove his/her identity to the
remote machine using one of several methods depending on the protocol
version used:
The second (and primary) authentication method is the rhosts or hosts.equiv method combined with RSA-based host authentication. It means that if the login would be permitted by $HOME/.rhosts, $HOME/.shosts, /etc/hosts.equiv, or /etc/shosts.equiv, and if additionally the server can verify the client's host key (see /etc/ssh_known_hosts and $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts in the FILES section), only then login is permitted. This authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, $HOME/.rhosts, and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.]
As a third authentication method, ssh
supports RSA based authentication. The scheme is based on public-key
cryptography: there are cryptosystems where encryption and decryption are
done using separate keys, and it is not possible to derive the decryption
key from the encryption key. RSA is one such system. The idea is that each
user creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The
server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. The
file $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public
keys that are permitted for logging in. When the user logs in, the
ssh program tells the server which key pair it would
like to use for authentication. The server checks if this key is permitted,
and if so, sends the user (actually the ssh program
running on behalf of the user) a challenge, a random number, encrypted by
the user's public key. The challenge can only be decrypted using the proper
private key. The user's client then decrypts the challenge using the private
key, proving that he/she knows the private key but without disclosing it to
the server.
ssh implements the RSA authentication
protocol automatically. The user creates his/her RSA key pair by running
ssh-keygen(1). This stores the private key in
$HOME/.ssh/identity and the public key in
$HOME/.ssh/identity.pub in the user's home
directory. The user should then copy the
identity.pub to
$HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory
on the remote machine (the authorized_keys file
corresponds to the conventional $HOME/.rhosts file,
and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long). After this,
the user can log in without giving the password. RSA authentication is much
more secure than rhosts authentication.
The most convenient way to use RSA authentication may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) for more information.
If other authentication methods fail, ssh
prompts the user for a password. The password is sent to the remote host for
checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, the password
cannot be seen by someone listening on the network.
The public key method is similar to RSA authentication described in the previous section except that the DSA or RSA algorithm is used instead. The client uses his private key $HOME/.ssh/id_dsa to sign the session identifier and sends the result to the server. The server checks whether the matching public key is listed in $HOME/.ssh/authorized_keys2 and grants access if both the key is found and the signature is correct. The session identifier is derived from a shared Diffie-Hellman value and is only known to the client and the server.
If public key authentication fails or is not available a password can be sent encrypted to the remote host for proving the user's identity. This protocol 2 implementation does not yet support Kerberos or S/Key authentication.
Protocol 2 provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the traffic is encrypted using 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128 or Arcfour) and integrity (hmac-sha1, hmac-md5). Note that protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the connection.
If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session),
the user can disconnect with ~., and suspend
ssh with ~^Z. All forwarded
connections can be listed with ~# and if the session
blocks waiting for forwarded X11 or TCP/IP connections to terminate, it can
be backgrounded with ~& (this should not be used
while the user shell is active, as it can cause the shell to hang). All
available escapes can be listed with ~?.
A single tilde character can be sent as ~~
(or by following the tilde by a character other than those described above).
The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as
special. The escape character can be changed in configuration files or on
the command line.
If no pseudo tty has been allocated, the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the escape character to “none” will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used.
The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote
machine exits and all X11 and TCP/IP connections have been closed. The exit
status of the remote program is returned as the exit status of
ssh.
DISPLAY environment
variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is automatically forwarded
to the remote side in such a way that any X11 programs started from the shell
(or command) will go through the encrypted channel, and the connection to the
real X server will be made from the local machine. The user should not
manually set DISPLAY. Forwarding of X11 connections
can be configured on the command line or in configuration files.
The DISPLAY value set by
ssh will point to the server machine, but with a
display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because
ssh creates a “proxy” X server on the
server machine for forwarding the connections over the encrypted
channel.
ssh will also automatically set up
Xauthority data on the server machine. For this purpose, it will generate a
random authorization cookie, store it in Xauthority on the server, and
verify that any forwarded connections carry this cookie and replace it by
the real cookie when the connection is opened. The real authentication
cookie is never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the
plain).
If the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the remote side unless disabled on command line or in a configuration file.
Forwarding of arbitrary TCP/IP connections over the secure channel can be specified either on command line or in a configuration file. One possible application of TCP/IP forwarding is a secure connection to an electronic purse; another is going through firewalls.
ssh automatically maintains and checks a database
containing identifications for all hosts it has ever been used with. RSA host
keys are stored in $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts and host
keys used in the protocol version 2 are stored in
$HOME/.ssh/known_hosts2 in the user's home directory.
Additionally, the files /etc/ssh_known_hosts and
/etc/ssh_known_hosts2 are automatically checked for
known hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a
host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about
this and disables password authentication to prevent a trojan horse from
getting the user's password. Another purpose of this mechanism is to prevent
man-in-the-middle attacks which could otherwise be used to circumvent the
encryption. The StrictHostKeyChecking option (see
below) can be used to prevent logins to machines whose host key is not known
or has changed.
The options are as follows:
-a-A-c
blowfish|3desssh.
blowfish is a fast block cipher, it appears very
secure and is much faster than 3des.-c
cipher_specCiphers
for more information.-e
ch|^ch|none~’). The escape character is only
recognized at the beginning of a line. The escape character followed by a
dot (‘.’) closes the connection,
followed by control-Z suspends the connection, and followed by itself
sends the escape character once. Setting the character to
“none” disables any escapes and makes the session fully
transparent.-fssh to go to background just before
command execution. This is useful if ssh is going
to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the
background. This implies -n. The recommended way
to start X11 programs at a remote site is with something like
ssh -f host xterm.-g-i
identity_file-i options (and multiple identities specified in
configuration files).-k-l
login_name-m
mac_specMACs keyword for more
information.-nssh is
run in the background. A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs
on a remote machine. For example, ssh -n
shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start an emacs on
shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be automatically forwarded
over an encrypted channel. The ssh program will be
put in the background. (This does not work if ssh
needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the
-f option.)-N-o
option-p
port-PRhostsAuthentication and
RhostsRSAAuthentication for older servers.-q-s-t-t
options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no
local tty.-T-vssh to print debugging
messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging connection,
authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple
-v options increases the verbosity. Maximum is
3.-x-X-CCompressionLevel option (see below). Compression
is desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will only slow
down things on fast networks. The default value can be set on a
host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the
Compress option below.-L
port:host:hostport-R
port:host:hostport-1ssh to try protocol version 1 only.-2ssh to try protocol version 2 only.-4ssh to use IPv4 addresses only.-6ssh to use IPv6 addresses only.ssh obtains configuration data from the following
sources (in this order): command line options, user's configuration file
($HOME/.ssh/config), and system-wide configuration
file (/etc/ssh_config). For each parameter, the first
obtained value will be used. The configuration files contain sections
bracketed by “Host” specifications, and that section is only
applied for hosts that match one of the patterns given in the specification.
The matched host name is the one given on the command line.
Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and general defaults at the end.
The configuration file has the following format:
Empty lines and lines starting with
‘#’ are comments.
Otherwise a line is of the format “keyword arguments”. The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that the configuration files are case-sensitive):
HostHost keyword) to be only for those hosts that
match one of the patterns given after the keyword.
‘*’ and
‘*’ as a pattern
can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts. The host is the
hostname argument given on the command line (i.e.,
the name is not converted to a canonicalized host name before
matching).AFSTokenPassingBatchModeCheckHostIPCipherCiphers
``3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,arcfour,aes128-cbc,
aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael128-cbc,rijndael192-cbc,
rijndael256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se''
CompressionCompressionLevelConnectionAttemptsPubkeyAuthenticationEscapeChar~’). The escape character can also
be set on the command line. The argument should be a single character,
‘^’ followed by a letter, or
“none” to disable the escape character entirely (making the
connection transparent for binary data).FallBackToRshssh fails due to
a connection refused error (there is no sshd(8)
listening on the remote host), rsh(1) should
automatically be used instead (after a suitable warning about the session
being unencrypted). The argument must be “yes” or
“no”.ForwardAgentForwardX11DISPLAY set. The argument
must be “yes” or “no”. The default is
“no”.GatewayPortsGlobalKnownHostsFileHostKeyAliasHostNameHostName specifications).IdentityFileKeepAliveThe default is “yes” (to send keepalives), and the client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
To disable keepalives, the value should be set to “no” in both the server and the client configuration files.
KerberosAuthenticationKerberosTgtPassingLocalForwardLogLevelssh. The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR,
INFO, VERBOSE and DEBUG. The default is INFO.MACs
``hmac-sha1,hmac-md5,hmac-ripemd160,hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com,
hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96''
NumberOfPasswordPromptsPasswordAuthenticationPortProtocolssh should support
in order of preference. The possible values are “1” and
“2”. Multiple versions must be comma-separated. The default
is “1,2”. This means that ssh tries
version 1 and falls back to version 2 if version 1 is not available.ProxyCommand%h’ will be substituted by the host
name to connect and ‘%p’ by the
port. The command can be basically anything, and should read from its
standard input and write to its standard output. It should eventually
connect an sshd(8) server running on some machine, or
execute sshd -i somewhere. Host key management
will be done using the HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to
the name typed by the user). Note that CheckHostIP
is not available for connects with a proxy command.RemoteForwardRhostsAuthenticationRhostsRSAAuthenticationRSAAuthenticationChallengeResponseAuthenticationStrictHostKeyCheckingssh
will never automatically add host keys to the
$HOME/.ssh/known_hosts and
$HOME/.ssh/known_hosts2 files, and refuses to
connect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum
protection against trojan horse attacks. However, it can be somewhat
annoying if you don't have good
/etc/ssh_known_hosts and
/etc/ssh_known_hosts2 files installed and
frequently connect to new hosts. This option forces the user to manually
add all new hosts. If this flag is set to “no”,
ssh will automatically add new host keys to the
user known hosts files. If this flag is set to “ask”, new
host keys will be added to the user known host files only after the user
has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and
ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key
has changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically
in all cases. The argument must be “yes”, “no”
or “ask”. The default is “ask”.UsePrivilegedPortRhostsAuthentication and
RhostsRSAAuthentication for older servers.UserUserKnownHostsFileUseRshssh
protocol. This causes ssh to immediately execute
rsh(1). All other options (except
HostName) are ignored if this has been specified.
The argument must be “yes” or “no”.XAuthLocationssh will normally set the following environment
variables:
DISPLAYDISPLAY variable indicates the location of the
X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh to
point to a value of the form “hostname:n” where hostname
indicates the host where the shell runs, and n is an integer >= 1.
ssh uses this special value to forward X11
connections over the secure channel. The user should normally not set
DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection insecure (and
will require the user to manually copy any required authorization
cookies).HOMELOGNAMEUSER; set for compatibility with
systems that use this variable.MAILPATHPATH, as specified when
compiling ssh.SSH_AUTH_SOCKSSH_CLIENTSSH_ORIGINAL_COMMANDSSH_TTYTZUSERAdditionally, ssh reads
$HOME/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format
“VARNAME=value” to the environment.
ssh ignores a private key file if it is accessible
by others. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key;
the passphrase will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file
using 3DES.ssh
client. This file does not usually contain any sensitive information, but
the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not
accessible by others.The canonical system name (as returned by name servers) is
used by sshd(8) to verify the client host when logging
in; other names are needed because ssh does not
convert the user-supplied name to a canonical name before checking the
key, because someone with access to the name servers would then be able
to fool host authentication.
Note that by default sshd(8) will be installed so that it requires successful RSA host authentication before permitting .rhosts authentication. If your server machine does not have the client's host key in /etc/ssh_known_hosts, you can store it in $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts. The easiest way to do this is to connect back to the client from the server machine using ssh; this will automatically add the host key to $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts.
ssh without permitting login
with rlogin(1) or rsh(1).ssh but not using
rsh/rlogin.ssh when the
user logs in just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
sshd(8) manual page for more information.ssh when the
user logs in just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
sshd(8) manual page for more information.| September 25, 1999 | BSD |